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Abstract 
Is diversity in European Union (EU) competition law possible from a constitutional point of 
view? This question has become even more contentious after the Treaty of Lisbon. Under 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, establishing the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market is within the exclusive competence of the Union. Under Article 2(1) TFEU, 
when the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the 
Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so 
themselves only if so empowered by the Union or when implementing Union acts. The 
exclusive nature of the Union’s competence in the area of competition is controversial. The 
majority of the authors criticise the policy choice of EU exclusive competence, but seem to 
accept that diversity in EU competition law is excluded under the Treaties. This thesis, 
however, challenges that conclusion.  
First it is submitted that EU system of competences as introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon the 
competence to legislate on substantive principles of EU competition law remained shared. It 
will be seen that under this system, Article 3(1)(b) TFEU excludes much more than it includes.  
Secondly, it is showed that the principles of direct effect,, primacy of EU law and the 
fundamental principle of ne bis in id allow for diversity in EU competition law. These 
principles certainly have the potential to affect Member States’ sphere of competence. 
However, it will be seen that they do not exclude Member States’ competence in the area of 
competition. On the contrary, diversity in European Union competition law is allowed. There 
are nonetheless several bottlenecks to the recognition of this diversity that should be 
removed, and some other potential obstacles that should be avoided.  This thesis does not 
ask the question of whether diversity in EU competition law is desirable, and it also does not 
discuss the limits to the application of divergent national competition laws stemming from 
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the internal market freedoms. These questions complete the picture of the scope for 
diversity in EU competition law and are identified as avenues for future research work.  
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The research question: Is diversity in EU competition law 
possible from a constitutional point of view? 
There is an overwhelming support for uniformity in EU competition law.1 Uniformity in EU 
competition law is not however straight forward from a policy point of view. As expressed 
by Monti, “[t]he body of rules we call ‘competition law’, and each decision reached, reflects 
a particular vision of what competition law is designed to do, or a compromise, which reflects 
the tensions among law makers as to the purposes of a particular rule.”2 Moreover, 
“[e]nforcers have diverging policy preferences, and different economic theories can be used 
to justify diametrically opposed conclusions as to the legality of a given practice.”3 Townley, 
also, points out that “competition assessments are riddled with value judgements (about 
goals, methods, procedures and institutional structures). Different Member States and (and 
their citizens) have different opinions on the appropriate balance between competing 
values.”4 If these views are correct, the existence of divergence in EU competition law and 
policy is unavoidable and mirrors the conflictual dynamics of EU law.  
Supporters of uniformity in EU competition law argue in favour of a harmonised solution for 
divergent views i.e. the harmonised enforcement of EU competition law and uniform 
national competition laws. They generally present the following major arguments in favour 
of uniformity: it reduces business costs, enhances legal certainty and fosters integration of 
the internal market and, in any case, the competence in the area of competition is exclusive 
                                                             
1 See Christopher Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition 
Law (and for EU Law too)' in Piet Eeckhout and Takis Tridimas (eds), Yearbook of European Law, vol 
33 (Oxford Universtiy Press 2014). 
2 Giorgio Monti, EU Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 2009), 3. 
3 Ibid, ix.  
4 Christopher Townley, 'The EU Constitutional Order and Competition Law', Draft manuscript with the 
autho (2018), 1. 
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to the Union under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU.5 Supporters of diversity, on the other hand argue 
that diversity is both inevitable and desirable: for example, allowing different views to prevail 
in EU competition law enhances the legitimacy of decisions and increases the chances for 
better regulation through experimentation and innovation, which will in due course improve 
the quality of decisions.6 
This thesis asks a more fundamental question: whether diversity in EU competition law is 
possible from a constitutional point of view? This thesis does not ask whether diversity in EU 
competition law is desirable, and it also does not discuss who far the application of divergent  
national competition laws goes against internal market freedoms. The constitutional 
analysis, however is the foundation upon which all other policy arguments must rest. The 
research question breaks down further into three sub-questions: (i) is the application of 
national competition law possible?; (ii) are Member States able to give their own 
interpretation of EU competition law even if it risks diverging from the approach favoured 
by the Commission?; (iii) how do the general principles of EU law limit diversity in EU 
competition law? 
A constitutional approach to diversity in EU competition law requires an analysis of 
competence allocation in the EU. Multijurisdictional competence allocation sets the 
jurisdictional boundaries of the Union and of the Member States. The Treaty of Lisbon 
subdivided the Union’s competences into exclusive and non-exclusive competences. Where 
the EU has exclusive competence, Member States may act only if empowered by the Union 
or when implementing an act of the Union. However,  if a competence is non-exclusive, the 
competence of the Member States is not supressed in those areas.  
                                                             
5 Larry E.   Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, 'An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Law' (1996) 25 
The Journal of Legal Studies 131. 
6 Steven G. Calabresi, 'A government of limited and enumerated powers": in defense of United States 
v. Lopez (Reflections on United States v. Lopez)' (1995) 94 Michigan Law Review ; Charles Tiebout, 'A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures' (1956) 64 The Journal of Political Economy . 
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Academic literature seems to acquiesce in the proposition that the Treaty of Lisbon has 
consecrated an exclusive competence of the EU in the field of competition, as per Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU, even though this article is considered controversial by the majority of the 
commentators.  7 If correct, that would be a crucial limitation on the Member States’ capacity 
to legislate on competition matters and to enforce EU competition law, since under Article 
2(1) TFEU, in areas of exclusive competence of the Union, Member States are not free to act. 
Yet, empirical observation reveals a different reality. The daily life of a national competition 
authority does not reflect exclusiveness of EU competence in the field of competition. 
National competition authorities still enforce both EU and national competition laws, Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition law laid down 
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Regulation 1/2003)8 has not been abolished, and national 
competition laws keep evolving and reforming, notably under the auspices of the European 
Commission.9  Moreover, when enforcing EU competition laws, Member States continue to 
give their own interpretation of EU competition law, with not much interference from the 
EU, as showed by the Booking.com cases discussed below. That has an impact on the 
uniformity of the enforcement of EU competition law. There is, in effect, a mismatch 
between the reality and what would be expected if the EU had exclusive competence in the 
                                                             
7 See Alan Dashwood, 'The relationship between Member States and the European Union/European 
Community' (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review ; Giorgio Monti, 'Legislative and Executive 
Competence in Competition Law' in Loïc Azoulai (ed), The question of competence in the European 
Union (Oxford University Press 2014); Lucia Serena Rossi, 'Does the Lisbon Treaty Provide a Clearer 
Separation of Competences between EU and Member States?' in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and 
Stefanie Ripley (eds), EU Law After Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012); Robert Schütze, 'From Rome 
to Lisbon: Executive federalism in the (new) European Union' (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 
; Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU Law 
too)'. 
8 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Regulation 1/2003) [2003] OJ L 1/1.  
9 The Economic Adjustment Programmes for Greece, Ireland (2010) and for Portugal (2012) signed 
between these Member States and the European Commission, International Monetary Fund and 
European Central Bank contained commitments to introduce changes on the national competition 




field of competition. This itself poses a challenge to the received wisdom that the field of 
competition has become the exclusive competence to the EU under the Treaty of Lisbon. 
To address the research question, it is necessary to consider EU primary and secondary law, 
national constitutional law and national competition laws, case law of the CJEU as well as 
national courts. Also, preparatory documents of EU primary and secondary law and 
communications of the Commission on its interpretation of EU competition law as well as 
documents of the European Competition Network are useful sources. Finally, specialised 
academic literature on EU primary and secondary law, particularly regarding the system of 
EU competences introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and the enforcement of EU competition 
law is of great interest to understand the context and the state of the debate on the matter.  
The debate on diversity in EU competition law is not only of a pure academic interest. A 
uniform enforcement of EU competition law may not produce the desired results at Member 
States’ level and a diversify approach may be justified. Two cases illustrate this well. First the 
uniform approach to multilateral interchange fees following MasterCard10 and Visa11 cases, 
that is deemed to have solidified the market shares of Visa and Mastercard in some national 
markets not allowing for new entrants in the market. Second the diverse approach to Online 
Travel Agents parity clauses in what are known as the “Booking”cases, that was considered 
necessary to protect competition in some national markets.   
The uniform approach to multilateral interchange fees (MIF) 
In 2007, the Commission issued a decision against MasterCard MIFs applicable to cross-
border payment card transactions with MasterCard and Maestro consumer debit and credit 
cards in the European Economic Area (EEA). The Commission found that MasterCard’s MIFs 
restricted competition between acquiring banks leading to higher costs of card acceptance 
                                                             
10 MasterCard Case (Case COMP/34.579), Commission Decision C(2007) 6474, OJ C 264/8.   
11Visa MIF (Case AT.39398), Commission Decision C(2014) 1199 final, OJ C147/6. 
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by retailers, in violation of Article 101 TFEU. The decision that MIFs were incompatible with 
Article 101 TFEU and thus should be removed, was received with high criticisms both by the 
industry12 and academics13 that argued inter alia, that considering MIFs as restrictive 
agreements prohibited under Article 101 TFEU risked the operability and sustainability of 
payment cards schemes.14 Economic theory on two-sided markets supported the existence 
of an interchange fee as necessary to the functioning of four party payment scheme such as 
MasterCard and Visa.15  
In 2009 amid strong controversy on the implementation of a 0% MIF following the 
MasterCard decision, the Commissioner for Competition, Neelie Kroes, reached a provisional 
agreement with MasterCard to reduce to 0.30% the maximum weighted average  cross 
border MIF per transaction for consumer credit cards and to 0.20% for consumer debit cards. 
16 The same level of MIFs was accepted by the Commission in a parallel case against  VISA, 
where the Commission adopted a commitment decision.17  
                                                             
12 European Payments Council, 'Cross-border Interchange Fees: Why the General Court Got it Wrong 
in the MasterCard v. Commission Case' accessed 10 March 2018, available at:  
 https://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/news-insights/insight/cross-border-interchange-fees-
why-general-court-got-it-wrong-mastercard-v 
13  E.g.: David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Paying with Plastic:  the Digital Revolution in Buying 
and Borrowing (MIT Press 2005); Stuart E. Weiner and Julian Wright, 'Interchange Fees in Various 
Countries: Developments and Determinants' (Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit Card Industries: 
What Role for Public Authorities?); David S. Evans, 'The Economic and Regulation of What Merchants 
Pay for Carts ' (2011) Competition Policy International .  
14 “Through the fallback MIF, MasterCard balances the interests of both cardholders and merchants 
so that each party pays its fair share of the costs for the benefits it receives. The fallback MIF provides 
compensation to issuers for the benefits they provide to merchants, such as guaranteed payment (i.e. 
guarantee against fraud and against cardholder default). Without the fallback MIF, the balance of 
interests between merchants and cardholders would be upset and tipped against cardholders who 
would have to pay the costs of services provided to merchants.” See European Payments Council 
https://www.europeanpaymentscouncil.eu/news-insights/insight/cross-border-interchange-fees-
why-general-court-got-it-wrong-mastercard-v. 
15 For a general discussion see OECD - Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition 
Committee Policy Round Table on Two sided-markets, 2009, DAF/COMP(2009)20, available at:  
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf  
16 IP/09/515, 1 April 2009.  
17 Commission decision of 26 February 2015, Case AT.39398 Visa MIF.  
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The investigations of the Commission in both MasterCard and Visa cases left space for the 
enforcement of EU competition law by the Member States regarding domestic MIFs. Some 
competition authorities, in particular the Portuguese competition authority, feared that the 
level of fees considered appropriate by the Commission under Article 101 TFEU were not 
adequate in the national context. Empirical evidence supported by statistical data from the 
Central Bank of Portugal was against a 0% MIF as in the original 2007 MasterCard decision. 
Even a 0,2% MIF for debit cards and 0,3% MIF for debit cards under the commitments 
decisions were not sufficient for the banks in Portugal to cover the costs of operating card 
payments schemes.18 Economic evidence revealed that a minimum 0,9% average MIF was 
necessary for the business model to continue.19 The level of MIFs allowed under the 
Commission’s commitment decision were not high enough to create an incentive for new 
entrants in some national markets.  
The possibility however, for the recognition of national specificities in the enforcement of 
EU competition law at national level, was very limited as there was strong pressure from the 
Commission, including the creation of the ECN “Banking and payments subgroup of the 
European Competition Network,” to secure a uniform enforcement of Article 101 TFEU 
regarding domestic interchange fees by the national competition authorities.20  Yet, uniform 
MIFs across the EU were not in accordance with the different realities of national markets 
and was too restrictive to allow new entrants in the market. In Portugal a project for a 
domestic payment cards scheme was known to have been abandoned because the allowed 
MIFs levels were too low. This contributed to the solidification of MasterCard and Visa 
                                                             
18 See the report form the Portuguese Central Bank, Retail Payment Instruments in Portugal: Costs 
and Benefits, July 2007.  
19 Ibid,  Table II.17, p. 69. 
20 The ECN Subgroup Banking and Payments published an Information Paper on Competition 
Enforcement in the Payment Sector , March 2012, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/information_paper_payments_en.pdf 
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market shares, and was exactly contrary to the objective of encouraging more competition 
in the market.  
The diversified approach to Online Travel Agents (OTA) parity clauses  
Online hotel bookings have been formally investigated by several national competition 
authorities in simultaneous.21 A key issue of the investigation is whether obligations on 
hotels to make their best prices available (“MFNs”) to Online Travel agent (“OTA”) platforms 
are anti-competitive.  
There are typically two kinds of parity clauses, ‘wide’ and ‘narrow’. The “‘wide’ parity clauses 
oblige hotels to give the OTA the lowest room prices and best room availability relative to all 
other sales channels, whereas ‘narrow’ parity clauses allow the hotel to offer lower room 
prices and better room availability on other OTAs and on offline sales channels, but still 
allows the OTA to stop the hotel from publishing lower room prices on the hotel’s own 
website.”22  
The French, Italian and Swedish NCAs were appointed by the European Competition Network 
to take the joint lead with the understanding that other NCAs would not duplicate their 
activities, but would be informed and have an opportunity to contribute to the process. A 
working group was established open to all interested NCAs whose activities were 
coordinated by the European Commission through the ECN. In 2015 the French, Italian and 
Swedish NCAs accepted identical commitments from Booking.com to settle their 
investigations. These commitments “[…]eliminate wide price parity clauses across all 
European markets (including the UK), but […] allow them to retain narrow clauses.”23  
                                                             
21 Belgian, Czech, French, German, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Dutch, Swedish and UK National 
Competition Authorities. 
22 CMA, Online travel agents: monitoring of pricing practices results (2017). 
23 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Online Platforms and the Digital Single 
Market, Chapter 5: Competition and online platforms (2016), paragraph 111. 
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The German NCA, the Bundeskartellamt, was also investigating the same type of clauses used 
by Booking.com. However, it did not follow the other three NCAs approach. The 
Bundeskartellamt  rejected exactly the same commitments accepted by the three NCAs,24  
and prohibited Booking (Booking.com Deutschland GmbH, Berlin, and Booking.com B.V., 
Amsterdam) from continuing to apply its 'best price' clauses and ordered the hotel booking 
portal to completely delete the clauses from its contracts and general terms and conditions 
by 31 January 2016 as far as they affect hotels in Germany.25 As explained by Andreas Mundt, 
President of the Bundeskartellamt:  
"These so-called narrow best price clauses also restrict both competition between 
the existing portals and competition between the hotels themselves. Firstly they 
infringe the hotels' freedom to set prices on their own online sales channels. There 
is little incentive for a hotel to reduce its prices on a hotel booking portal if at the 
same time it has to display higher prices for its own online sales. Secondly, it still 
makes the market entry of new platform providers considerably difficult. The 'best 
price' clauses barely provide an incentive for the hotels to offer their rooms on a 
new portal cheaper if they cannot implement these price reductions on their own 
websites as well. There is no apparent benefit for the consumer."26 
The Bundskartellamt defended its position by arguing that a uniform enforcement would not 
take into account the different context of the German market that makes it necessary to 
prohibit the narrow parity clause in Germany: 
“While we are of course working with our European neighbours to ensure 
uniformity, here we are talking about different national markets with different 
market conditions. In addition, different tools were used by the authorities. There 
is no inconsistency.”27  
                                                             
24 See Bundeskartellamt press release from 2 April 2015: “The Bundeskartellamt‘s statement of 
objections gives Booking.com the opportunity to review its position on the issue. In line with the 
Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court’s decision in the parallel proceedings against HRS the 
Bundeskartellamt regards Booking’s proposals for a compromise as insufficient.” 
25 See Bundeskartellamt press release from 23 December 2015: “Narrow 'best price' clauses of 
Booking also anticompetitive.” 
26 Idem. 
27 Spokesperson for the Bundeskartellamt, as quoted in the Global Competition Review, Tuesday 21 
April 2015.  
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Meanwhile, and contrary to the commitments accepted by the French competition authority 
under EU competition law, the French Parliament has since gone further and banned narrow 
parity clauses too, in order to protect Small and Medium Enterprises.28  
The divergences on the approach in the Booking.com cases is well illustrated in the “Report 
on the monitoring exercise carried out in the online hotel booking sector by EU Competition 
Authorities In 2016”29:  
[…] it should be recalled that since 2010 several national competition authorities 
('NCAs') have investigated OTA parity clauses,30 and that these NCAs have adopted 
differing approaches. Germany's Bundeskartellamt has pursued a prohibition 
approach, whereas the French, Italian and Swedish NCAs pursued a commitments 
approach.31,32 The Bundeskartellamt prohibited the parity clause used by HRS (a 
major German OTA) in December 2013. In April 2015, Booking.com committed to 
the French, Italian and Swedish competition authorities to change its 'wide' parity 
clause to a 'narrow' parity clause.33 Booking decided to apply this change EU-wide 
from July 2015, and Expedia also decided to apply a narrow parity clause EU-wide, 
from August 2015. In December 2015, the Bundeskartellamt prohibited 
Booking.com's narrow parity clause in Germany.34,35 In addition to these antitrust 
measures, in France, in August 2015, the so- called Loi Macron36 rendered null and 
void all OTA price parity clauses and, in Austria, in November 2016, all OTA parity 
                                                             




/MACRON_LAW_FRANCE> accessed 31 May 2018 
29 The Participating Authorities are the Belgian, Czech, French, German, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, 
Dutch, Swedish and UK National Competition Authorities and DG Comp, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/hotel_monitoring_report_en.pdf 
30 Also known as 'Most Favoured Nation' or 'MFN' clauses. 
31 The OFT (now CMA) also investigated the online hotel booking sector between 2010 and 2014, 
though its case focussed not on OTA parity clauses but on restrictions on the ability of OTAs to offer 
discounted room prices.  
32 The Irish NCA also subsequently accepted commitments from Booking.com modelled on those 
agreed by the French, Italian and Swedish NCAs. 
33 In brief, 'wide' parity clauses oblige the hotel to give the OTA the lowest room prices and best room 
availability relative to all other sales channels, whereas 'narrow' parity clauses allow the hotel to offer 
lower room prices and better room availability on other OTAs and on offline sales channels, but allow 
the OTA to stop the hotel from publishing lower room prices on the hotel's own website.  
34 Booking.com's appeal against the prohibition decision is pending before the German courts.  
35 Expedia continues to apply its narrow parity clause in Germany. The Bundeskartellamt's 
investigation of Expedia's clause continues. 
36 Article 133 of the Loi no 2015-990 du 6 août 2015 pour la croissance, l'activité et l'égalité des chances 
économiques. 
 17 
clauses were rendered null and void by an amendment to the law on unfair 
competition.37,38  
Although commentators claimed that the diverse approaches created uncertainty for 
business and consumers,39 the Commission did not intervene to avoid what some authors 
classified as a “real risk of an inconsistent application of European law.”40 The 
Bundeskartellamt claim that a diverse approach to OTA was needed to take into 
consideration the diversity of different national markets realities, such as the German 
market, as well as the French Parliament’s wider public policy concerns , regarding the 
impact on small hotel businesses were respected.  
Overview of the thesis 
This thesis examines and explains both the existence, and the limits, to diversity in EU 
competition law from a constitutional point of view.  
Chapter 1 establishes the need to discuss diversity in EU competition law, despite the 
overwhelming support for uniformity. It elaborates on the conflictual dynamic of EU law in 
general and EU competition law in particular. This chapter distinguishes within the literature 
the different types of conflicts in EU competition law that can occur and asks whether 
conflicts in EU competition law are inevitable. The chapter takes the view that, indeed, 
conflicts are inherent in the application of EU competition law, because of the very diversity 
that exists within the EU, not only as regards differences in economic structures and legal 
                                                             
37 Bundesgesetz: Änderung des Bundesgesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb 1984 – UWG und 
des Preisauszeichnungsgesetzes. 
38 Similar legislation is being debated in the Italian parliament. 
39 Written evidence from Skyscanner Limited (OPL0006). From “Onlilne Platforms and the Digital 
Single Market, Chapter 5: Competition and Online Platforms” paragraph 114. Matthew Newman, 
'Booking.com, Expedia and Others Escape Formal Probe in Poland' MLex (3 November 2015). See also, 
Philippe Chappatte and Helen Townley, Online Hotel Bookings - A Joint European Approach or a Most 
Favoured Nation? (Briefing May 2015, 2015), 3. 
40 Chappatte and Townley, Online Hotel Bookings - A Joint European Approach or a Most Favoured 
Nation?, 1.   
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systems but also as a result of a range of views of the proper function of competition law, 
which may vary between Member States and economic sectors. In other words, 
heterogeneity in the EU makes conflicts unavoidable. However, if diversity gives raise to 
conflicts, diversity is itself a potential solution, if the applicable constitutional arrangements 
allow for more than one decision maker, and leave open the possibility of more than one 
outcome, for example through differentiating national laws , and differences in the 
application and interpretation of national and EU competition law. This is why it is essential 
to analyse the fundamental constitutional issue of how far such diversity is in fact possible 
under the allocation of competences in EU law. This issue is explored in the following 
chapters.  
Chapter 2  reviews the academic literature on competence allocation in the field of EU 
competition law. It offers a framework of analysis of the system of competences introduced 
by the Treaty of Lisbon. This chapter serves to show that the existing literature does not 
provide a conclusive answer on the nature of the competence of the EU in the field of 
competition. It is not enough to accept that competence in this field is exclusive under Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU. A further analysis of the scope of the exclusive competence of the EU  under 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is needed. Only then do we know the extent to which  the competence 
of the Member States in that area has been excluded.   
 The question of the extent of the exclusive competence of the EU in the field of competition 
is examined in chapters 3 and 4, which should be read together. Both chapters explore the 
boundaries of the exclusive competence of the EU in the field of competition under Article 
3(1)(b)TFEU. These chapters explain why Article 3(1)(b) TFEU excludes more from the scope 
of EU exclusive competence in the field of competition than it includes, and why the 
executive competence to enforce EU competition law and the legislative competence to 
establish substantive principles of competition law has remained shared with the Member 
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States under the Treaty of Lisbon. These chapters constitute the heart of the contribution 
this thesis makes to the debate on the nature of EU competence in the field of competition 
and thus to the debate of diversity in EU competition law.  
This debate would not be complete though, without a discussion of the limits which general 
principles of EU law impose on diversity in EU competition law. This issue is dealt with in 
Chapter 5, which discusses the limits to diversity in EU competition law resulting from the 
general principles of direct effect and the primacy of EU law, and from the principle of ne bis 
in idem, enshrined at the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In particular, Chapter 5 explores 
the degree of discretion allowed by the principle of direct effect as regards the enforcement 
of EU competition law, and the theories of pre-emption that govern how conflicts between 
national and EU competition laws are adjudicated by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). It explains why diversity in EU competition law in not anathema either to the 
principle of direct effect or to the primacy of EU law. This chapter also undertakes an analysis 
of ne bis in indem in the context of competence allocation under the Treaty of Lisbon, and 
argues that this principle does not preclude the parallel enforcement of national and EU 
competition laws and thus does not excludes diversity in EU competition law.  
Chapter 6 then concludes, that there is a strong case for diversity in EU competition law from 
a constitutional point of view. The chapter identifies unlawful bottlenecks to diversity that 
ought to be abolished or avoided, and proposes measures to achieve more diversity in EU 
competition law within the constitutional limits that have been set.  
Whether diversity in EU competition law is desirable or not is a policy choice that can be 
discussed within the constitutional limits identified in this thesis. This policy consideration is 
not the object of this thesis and remain an area for future research endeavours.  
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Chapter 1 - The conflictual dynamics of EU 
competition law 
In 1970, Pierre Pescatore declared the law of the EU as “the law of solidarity and integration.” 
He argued that it was distinct from international law, as the latter is characterized by an 
“absence of solidarity” that makes international law fundamentally a law of conflicts, 
equilibrium and co-ordination.”  In comparison if “[c]o-ordination […] is based on the hidden 
premise that national interest prevails at every stage and, especially in the last resort, over 
all other considerations, [integration] presupposes the establishment of a common interest 
between two or more States in an essential area, such as security or economic affairs, and it 
is brought into being by the organisation of inter-State relation on the basis of an attitude of 
solidarity in such a way that the safeguarding of the over-all interest prevails over motives 
drown from the defence of nation al interest.” Though integration through law has been the 
“operational code” of Europe,41 as “the only tool and the only weapon of the Union is the 
law it establishes,”42 the view of EU law as “the law of solidarity and integration”43 seems to 
underestimate the impact of the increase heterogeneity in the EU membership, as well as 
the role of the competing interests which shape legal integration.44 As argued by Chalmers 
                                                             
41 Giandomenico Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power: The EU at Fifty (Cambridge University 
Press 2010) 1. 
42 Walter Hallstein introduced the concept of Rechtsgemeinschaft that was later enshrined by the 
Court in the Judgement of 23 April 1986, Les Verts v Parliament, Case 294/83, EU:C:1986:166, at 1339. 
See Walter  Hallstein, 'Europäische Redes' in T.  Oppermann (ed), European Speeches of Walter 
Hallstein (Deutsche Verl.-Anst 1979) . 
43 Pierre Pescatore, 'International Law and Community Law - A Comparative Analysis ' (1970) 7 
Common Market Law Review . 
44  Recent sovereign debt crises combined with the refugee crisis  have been testing the limits of 
solidarity between Member States and EU integration. Weiler speaks about “some of the uglier 
manifestations of European ‘solidarity’” as regards the sovereign debt crises or “the near 
abandonment of Italy to deal with the influx of migrants from North Africa as if this was an Italian 
problem and not a problem for Europe as a whole.” Chalmers argues that the EU and intense conflict 
have become conjoined. J.H.H. Weiler, '60 Years since the First European Community—Reflections on 
Political Messianism' (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law ; Damian Chalmers, 
'Introduction: The Conflicts of EU Law and the Conflicts in EU Law' (2012) 18 European Law Journal .  
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the EU and intense conflict have become conjoined.45 Where conflictual views exist there 
may be space for diversity through the differentiating national laws or different 
interpretation of the EU law.   
This chapter discusses the conflictual dynamics of EU law in general (Section 1) and of EU 
competition law in particular (Section 2). It explores the relevance of conflicts for the debate 
on diversity in EU competition law (section 3) and makes a short reflection on the value of 
diversity in EU law (section 4).  
1. The conflictual dynamics of the EU law  
 
Throughout EU history, law and integration have been interconnected in what Shaw calls the 
“common sense view about Europe and its law.”46 Dagtoglou claims that EU law is important 
as a unifying factor, especially because not only the Member States, but also individuals, 
have been recognised as directly subject to that law.47  
Against this view, Shaw argues that the focus of the EU on integration creates division.48 If, 
on the one hand, integration brings parties closer together, on the other hand it excludes all 
the other parties that are not part of this process, creating an exclusionary counter-dynamic. 
De Búrca and Scott pointed out that increased heterogeneity, political, economic and 
cultural inevitably brings an increase in the heterogeneity within the functioning of the EU’s 
institutions and policies.49  This increases  the counter-dynamic effect of  integration in the 
EU legal order. Governments need to respond to their citizens’ necessities and preferences. 
                                                             
45  Chalmers, 'Introduction: The Conflicts of EU Law and the Conflicts in EU Law'. 
46 Jo Shaw, 'European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic' (1996) 16 Oxford journal 
of legal studies , 232. 
47 P. D.  Dagtoglou, 'The Legal Nature of the European Community' in Commission of European 
Communities (ed), Thirty Years of Community Law (1981), 40. 
48 Shaw, 'European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic'. 
49 Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott, 'Introduction ' in Gráinne de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), 
Constitutional Change in the EU from Uniformity to Flexibility? (Hart 2000), 2. 
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They vary in space - different Member States may have different priorities and concerns, and 
in time - the pro-tempore character of democracy is translated into political cycles that 
emerge from periodical elections.50 Depending on the political, social, economic and even 
international cycle, what is a concern of a state at a certain time may not be a concern at a 
different time. In the EU context different political cycles coexist.51 Furthermore, as observed 
by Wils, integration is only partial as it is only one of the specific concerns of the Treaty, and 
only one amongst society’s many objectives with which it needs to be reconciled.52 Given 
competence allocation between the EU and the Member States, the responses to 
functionally interdependent problems often require a coordination of different, semi-
autonomous levels of governance.53 This increases the possibility of conflict between 
different policies enacted at different jurisdictional levels, as competence to regulate 
different aspects of a problem may be located at different governmental levels.  
Adding to this, we have been assisting in the EU to what European scholars call the 
“rematerialisation” of the law, i.e. a trend to use the law as an instrument of purposive, goal 
oriented interventions. They associate this to the rise of the welfare state.54 Such a shift 
represents what Teubner calls a “change in norm rationality” triggered by a “change in the 
functions that the law fulfils:” 
“A formal rational system creates and applies a body of universal rules, and formal 
law relies on a body of legal professionals who employ peculiarly legal reasoning to 
solve specific conflicts. With the coming of the welfare and regulatory state, greater 
stress has been placed on substantive rational law, i.e., on law used as an 
instrument for purposive, goal-oriented interventions. Since substantively rational 
law is designed to achieve specific goals in concrete situations, it tends to be more 
                                                             
50 Juan J. Linz, 'Democracy’s Time Constraints' (1998) 19 International Political Science Review . 
51 For example, governments lead by anti-austerity parties such as the Greek Syriza and the 
Portuguese Socialist party co-exist with pro-austerity Governments such as the German government 
lead by CDU-CSU and FDP coalition and the Finnish Government lead by the Centre, Finns and National 
Coalition parties. 
52 Wouter P. J. Wils, 'The search for the rule in Article 30 EEC: much ado about nothing?' (1993) 18 
European Law Review . 
53 Ibid. 
54 For a general discussion see Gunther Teubner, 'Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law' 
(1983) 17 Modern Law, Law Society Review , 239. 
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general and open-ended, yet at the same time more particularistic, than classical 
formal law.” 55 (References omitted) 
EU law has also been subject to this phenomenon of rematerialisation. If, in 1957, the Treaty 
of Rome was predominately “market oriented”56 and structured so as to lay down core 
concepts such as free movement, and undistorted competition,57 in 2007, the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), signed at Lisbon focused on non-economic goals to a greater extent 
than the previous Treaties,58 The original mainly non-economic objectives of the EU59 were 
amended to include objectives such as “economic and social cohesion”, “environmental 
protection”, “non-inflationary growth” and a high level of employment and social 
protection.” The Treaty of Amsterdam60 included further objectives such as “promoting 
quality between men and women”, and “a high degree of competitiveness and convergence 
of economic performance” and also enlarged the existent objectives of sustainable growth 
and protection of environment.  
The Treaty of Lisbon went further. The introductory title of the TEU – Title I “Common 
Provisions” contemplates a set of values of the EU pursuant to Article 2 of the TEU: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member 
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. 
                                                             
55 Ibid 
56 Manfred E. Streit and Werner  Mussler, 'European economic and social constitutionalism after the 
Treaty of Lisbon' in Francis Snyder (ed), Constitutional Dimensions of European Economic Integration 
(Kluwer Law International 1996). 
57 See in this sense Paul Craig, 'Competence and Member State Autonomy: Casuality, Consequence 
and Legitimacy' (2009) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 57/2009  
58 Koen Lenaerts and others, European Union Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011), 107. 
59 Under Article 2 EC Treaty the Community’s objectives were “to promote through the Community a 
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase 
in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the states 
belonging to it.” 
60 Article 2 Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty).  
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It also introduced an extended list of objectives set in Article 3 TEU.61  The objectives as set 
out in Article 3 TEU have to be complemented by horizontal objectives laid down in 
“provisions of general application” of Title II of the TFEU, which the EU must take into 
account in the implementation of its policies. 62 
In the implementation of EU values and objectives, different policies may pursue different 
objectives  that can be in conflict among them. The European Treaties do not necessarily 
provide an answer to these conflicts as they are, what the constitutional scholars call 
“incomplete contracts.”  
The potential for legal conflict in such context is high. The literature classifies legal conflicts 
that may occur in a multilevel context as vertical, horizontal or diagonal conflicts.  
Vertical conflicts are conflicts between legal regimes at different territorial levels; 
they occur both between national law and EU legislation […]. In horizontal conflicts, 
the injunctions of different national laws to a given case diverge. Horizontal legal 
conflicts occur typically in the context of transactions involving the movement of 
persons, goods, or finances across national borders. Diagonal legal conflicts finally 
                                                             
61 First the “Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.” (Article 3(1) 
TEU ) Secondly, it mentions that the EU is an “area of freedom, security and justice without internal 
frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures 
with respect to external borders control, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of 
crime.”(Article 3(2) TEU) Thirdly, the establishment of an internal market is described as “the 
sustainable development of Europe based on  balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly 
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level 
of protection and improvement of the environment.” (Article 3(2) TEU)  Article 3 TEU also makes 
reference to promotion of scientific and technological advance, to combating social exclusion and 
discrimination, to promotion of social justice and protecting equality between women and men, 
solidarity between generations and protection of the rights to the child, to promotion of economic, 
social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States, to respect for the EU’s rich 
cultural and linguistic diversity and to the safeguarding and enhancement of Europe’s cultural 
heritage. (Article 3(3) TEU) Lastly, Article 3(4) TEU refers to the establishment of an economic and 
monetary union, the currency of which is the Euro. 
62 These horizontal objectives comprise, inter alia, “to eliminate inequalities and to promote equality 
between men and women;” (Article 8 TFEU) “to promote a high level of employment”, “adequate 
social protection”, “the fight against social exclusion and a high level of education”, “training and 
protection of human heath,” (Article 9 TFEU ) “environmental protection,” “sustainable development” 
(Art. 11 TFEU)  and “consumer protection,” (Art. 12 TFEU) “ensuring the provision and good 
functioning of services of general economic interest,” (Art. 14 TFEU ) the “promotion of good 
governance” and “ensuring the participation of civil society.” (Art. 15 TFEU). 
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occur if regimes at two different levels that apply to different aspects of a given 
case make contradictory demands.63 
2. The conflictual dynamics of EU competition law 
EU competition law mirrors the conflictual dynamics of EU law. Townley identified five 
regulatory challenges that potentiate conflicts in EU competition law: “competition v. co-
ordination” (Issue 1); “public policy importance” (Issue 2); “appropriate mechanisms” (Issue 
3), “multi-level distribution” (Issue 4), and “uncertainty” (Issue 5). These regulatory 
challenges may be at the origin of legal (vertical, horizontal and diagonal) conflicts.   
Issue 1 is connected with what Thatcher refers to as the different “varieties of capitalism.” 
Thatcher pointed out that the way states perceive market power varies.  For example, while 
the “UK has a liberal economy; Germany encourages a more inter-firm cooperation; France 
lies somewhere in between.”64  The Portuguese Constitution, for example, expressly grants 
protection to cooperative forms of ownership in parallel with private ownership of the 
means of production. Though there are factors that create pressures for institutional reforms 
and convergence, divergent views remain across the nations regarding, for example, the role 
of the State, and the power of firms and organized labour.65 Different types of capitalism 
have an impact on how States perceive market power, regulation in general and organising 
principles such as competition law, in particular.66 Different approaches to market power 
                                                             
63 Renate Mayntz, 'The architecture of Multi-level Governance of Economic Sectors ' (2007) Discussion 
Paper 07-13 Cologne: Max Planck-Institute für Gesellschaftsforschung , 23-4. See also Christian 
Joerges, 'The idea of a Three-dimensional Conflicts law as constitutional form' RECON Online Working 
Paper 2010/05 ; Giorgio Monti, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy' (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 
; Christoph U. Schmid, 'Diagonal Competence Conflicts between European Competition Law and 
National Regulation – A Conflict of Laws Reconstruction of the Dispute on Book Price Fixing' (2000) 1 
European Review of Private Law ; Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU 
Competition Law (and for EU Law too)'. 
64 Mark Thatcher, 'Varieties of Capitalism in an Internationalized World' (2004) 37 Comparative 
Political Studies 753.   
65 Ibid. 
66 Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU 
Law too)'. 
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potentiate e.g. horizontal and vertical conflicts. The Member States and the EU may wish to 
have different standards under competition laws to address these issues, for example 
consumer welfare or the protection of the competitive process (vertical conflicts). Even 
within the consumer welfare standard there may be disagreements on whether to focus on 
long term, or short term gains.67 Depending on the standard used the findings of an 
infringement to EU competition law may differ. For example, in a case of predatory prices, if 
the emphasis is placed on consumer welfare, such as in the EU cases and in the UK, proof of 
the possibility of recouping of losses is necessary. If there is no possibility of recoupment, 
“consumers and their interests should in principle not be harmed.”68 However, if the focus 
is placed on the harm of the competitive process, such as in Germany,69 the possibility of 
recouping losses need not be demonstrated in order for an infringement to be found.70  A 
further example of vertical and horizontal conflicts is the different standards in case of 
“economic dependence” while in EU law and, for example in the UK, only article 102 TFEU 
would be applicable, in some Member States, e.g. France, Germany and Portugal, there are 
particular provisions that protect enterprises that are economic dependent (e.g. distributors) 
on another undertaking even though the latter undertaking may not be dominant under 
article 102 TFUE.  
Issue 2 relates to the importance of public policy. The plurality of the Treaty’s objectives 
identified previously,71 also has an impact on the probability of conflicts occurring in EU 
competition law.  Conflicts occur where conflicting goals of the Treaty collide among 
                                                             
67 Christopher Townley, 'Inter-Generational Impacts in Competition Analysis: remembering those not 
yet born' (2011) 32 European Competition Law Review . 
68 See Opinion of Advocate General Mazák of 25 September 2008, France Télécom v Commission, C-
202/07 P, EU:C:2008:520, paragraph 74. 
69 See Written Statement of the German Bundeskartellamt and the German Ministry of Economics 
and Technology on the DG Competition Discussion paper on the Application of Articles 82 of the Treaty 
to exclusionary abuses, Bonn 2006, p. 2. 
70 Judgment of 2 April 2009, France Télécom v Commission, C-202/07 P, EU:C:2009:214, paragraph 
105. 
71 See Section 2 above.   
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themselves or where they collide with those of the Member States. Defenders of the market 
orientation followed by the Treaty of Rome identified the tension between the non-market 
elements and the market elements of the Treaty and the possibility of conflict. 72 This 
potentiates conflicts between policies pursuing non-economic goals with policies securing 
an undistorted competition in the internal market. Steit and Mussler argued that the 
inclusion of non-market elements such as “economic and social cohesion” in the Treaties 
offers a “considerable number of opportunities for the EU authorities to apply discretionary 
policies incompatible with the principle of undistorted competition.”73 The Treaty of Lisbon 
has exacerbated the possibility of conflict between goals with the establishment of a set of 
enlarged principles and values of the EU, without providing a hierarchy among them and 
requiring the EU to “tak[e] all of its objectives into account”74 in its policies and activities. 
This is of particular relevance in the context of competition law as, since its inception in the 
Treaty of Rome, it has been associated with the construction of the internal market.75 As 
argued by Townley, the potential conflicts between the Treaty´s aims and values or between 
the Treaty’s aims and values and those of the Member States affect the implementing 
provisions such as Article 101 TFEU.76 Different Member States and the Commission may 
value public policy differently. They may also value goals differently and as competition rules 
“have large footprints, they may affect many Member States’ public policy goals.”77 Ezrachi 
speaks about the “porous and absorbent characteristics”78 of EU competition law which 
make it permeable to the core values and priorities of the jurisdiction where it is being 
                                                             
72 Streit and Mussler, 'European economic and social constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon'. 
73 Ibid. 
74  Art. 7 TFEU. 
75 David J. Gerber, 'The Transformation of European Community Competition Law?' (1994) 35 Harvard 
International Law Journal ; Pierre Pescatore, 'Public and Private aspects of European Community 
Competition Law' (1987) 10 Fordham International Law Journal . 
76 Christopher Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Bloomsbury Publishing 2009), 50.  
77 Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU 
Law too)'. 
78 Ariel Ezrachi, 'Sponge' (2016) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement , 3.  
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implemented. For very different legitimate reasons connected to their national context, 
Member States may value policy goals differently. The factual background of Wouters case 
shows how different Member States might value public policy issues and its impact in terms 
of enforcement of Article 101 TFEU. Netherlands Bar Association had adopted a regulation 
prohibiting lawyers practicing in the Netherlands from entering into multi-disciplinary 
partnerships with accountants. There is a public interest with the Netherlands Bar 
Association thought to protect: the respect for the professional rules of the bar and that 
lawyers remain independent and respect legal secrecy.79 According to the Netherlands Bar 
Association, given the system of regulation in the Netherlands, the multidisciplinary practices 
of lawyers and accountants would hamper the proper practice of legal profession.80 This rule 
is restrictive of competition as it prevents the creation of a business which would be in favour 
of many consumers.81 On the contrary, in the UK such type of multidisciplinary practices are 
accepted. This is an example of a horizontal conflict between Member States balancing 
competition law against other public interest, such as the public value of the integrity of the 
justice system, leading to different answers. 
Issue 3 relates to the mechanisms to pursue policy goals. Even where Member States achieve 
an agreement as to the value of public policy Issue 2, the way Member States wish to address 
the issue may differ. Some might wish to leave it to the market to deal with, favouring self-
regulation, in which case competition law would be relevant. Others may prefer to regulate 
by statute, taking the issue outside competition law. The classical example was the issue of 
resale price maintenance (RPM) of printed books. In the UK that was self-regulated by an 
agreement between the members of PA (Publishers Associations) 82 that was approved by 
                                                             
79 Monti, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy'.  
80 Judgment of 19 February 2002, Wouters e o., C-309/99, EU:C:2002:98, paragraphs 98 to 108.  
81 Judgment of 19 February 2002, Wouters e o., C-309/99, EU:C:2002:98, paragraphs 87 to 90 and 
Monti, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy', 1086.  
82 R.J.L. Kingsford, The Publishers Association 1896-1946 (Cambridge University Press 1970).  
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the Restrictive Practices Court.83 This agreement lasted from the 1950’s to the 1990’s. Since 
then, there has been no price regulation in the sale of books. In France, by contrast, under 
the Loi Lang the fixing of French language printed book prices became obligatory by statute, 
which had the effect of disapplying competition law to this area.84  
Issue 4 concerns multi-level power distribution. As previously seen, due to partial 
integration, the responses to functionally interdependent problem constellations may 
require a plurality of legal sources located at different levels, which potentiates conflicts. For 
example, Monti explores the “problem with culture” and EU competition law.85 Building on 
Schmid’s work on diagonal conflicts,86  Monti submits that, due to a lack of competence of 
the EU in cultural matters, it may be difficult to take cultural aspects into consideration when 
enforcing Article 101 TFEU, and that cultural aspects should be left for national competition 
laws to deal with.87 As also argued by Schmid,88  the EU lacks true legislative competence in 
the field of culture. This is because the Treaty’s provision on national culture, Article 167 
TFEU,89 gives very limited competence to the EU in the field of culture, and under Article 167 
(5) TFEU, any harmonization is definitely excluded. This “competence clause” under Article 
167 TFEU has been called by de Witte a “negative competence clause,”90 the purpose of 
which is to pre-empt any further expansion of the EU’s involvement in the field of culture.91 
Therefore, the conflict between national laws on culture and EU competition law becomes a 
diagonal conflict instead of a hierarchical one, as both legal orders have competence to 
                                                             
83 Barry J. Rodger and Angus MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK (Canvendish 
Publishing 2001), 158-59. 
84 Loi n° 81-766 du 10 août 1981 relative au prix du livre, Journal officiel de la République française, 
11 août 1981 p. 2198. 
85 Monti, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy', 1083.  
86 Schmid, 'Diagonal Competence Conflicts between European Competition Law and National 
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87 Monti, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy' 
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89 Former Article 151 EC Treaty. 
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regulate different policy considerations. Therefore, according to Monti, to take cultural 
considerations into account under Article 101 TFEU might lack a “sound legal basis.”92 
Finally, Issue 5 addresses the problem of “uncertainty” which arises from opening up markets 
for globalisation. Townley argues that it brings fundamental transformations in models of 
business organisation. This may demand more complex analysis in terms of, for example, 
competition law assessment of the arrangements’ positive dynamic effects, e.g. joint-
ventures, digital economy and disruptive innovation. For example, a joint-venture restricting 
competition in the EU may be justified on the basis of the need to compete at a global levels. 
Or to give another example, the promotion of FinTech, may undermine traditional banking 
models in a fundamental way. These transformational developments give raise to the 
possibility of conflicting solutions in the enforcement of competition law. . This may mean 
conflicting decisions.93 
Some believe however, that the opportunities for conflicts in EU competition law would be 
residual.94 This is because competition law is founded on economic choices, not political 
choices. I do not agree and, as I show next, EU competition law mirrors the conflictual 
dynamics of EU law. I do not agree since most economic choices also involve political value 
judgements.  
 
It  has been claimed however that the founders of the Treaty of Rome, inspired by ordo-
liberal theories, believed that it was “possible to reduce to a minimum the economic 
implications of the coexistence of sovereign states with their legal orders and systems of 
                                                             
92 Monti, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy', 1084.  
93 Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU 
Law too)' 
94 E.g. Mario Motta, Competition policy : Theory and practice (Cambridge University Press 2004). 
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administration, their frontiers, and separate citizenship.”95 The ordo-liberal European polity 
was described by Joerges and Redol as consisting of a “two-fold structure: at supranational 
level, it is committed to economic rationality and a system of undistorted competition, while, 
at the national level, re-distibutive (social) policies may be pursued and developed further […] 
social policy at European level could at best be said to have been handled through 
intergovernmental bargaining process.”96 According to Gerber the ordo-liberal model was 
given concrete expression in the Treaty of Rome’s norms on competition and freedom of 
movement.97  The ordo-liberal conception of Ordnungspolitik, required that individual 
governmental decisions should flow from the principles embodied in the economic 
constitution and be constrained by those same principles. Where the economic constitution 
calls for a transaction economy, the Ordnungspolitik requires that conditions of complete 
competition be promoted by the legal system. This would allow the economic system to 
function effectively, independently of political choices.98 In such a context, where economics 
is decoupled from politics, conflicts would be residual if not inexistent. However, this 
assumption that economics can be decoupled from politics is difficult to sustain, and this is 
particularly true in a multilevel context, such as the EU.  
Economics and politics cannot be decoupled   
Economic and politics cannot be decoupled. First, we learn from political and economic 
sociology that market institutions are imbedded on their own political, social and ideological 
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contexts. Second, we learn from economics that economic decisions are rarely 
distributionally neutral. These aspects make it difficult for decisions on markets to be 
politically, socially or even ideologically neutral, as now seen. 
The social embeddedness of market institutions  
Laws are not neutral, “they are imbedded in the values and interests of a society and serve 
the interests of some at the expenses of others.” 99 Competition law is not immune to these 
dynamics.100 On the contrary, it has a direct impact on the regulatory activity of States, 
potentiating conflicts. Different levels of economic development, government and 
enforcement structure, and market realities can all have an impact on competition rules and 
policy.101 In his work The Great Transformation: The political and Economics of Our Time, 
Mark Polanyi, observed that the market relies on three operational institutions: property, 
labour and money.102 These institutions are treated as commodities by the market. However, 
they have their own independent, political, idealistic and social qualities, independent from 
market processes. Against the idea of the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith, Polanyi argued 
that the XIX century market economy did not come into being on its own account. It was a 
product of planned realisation of the functional institutions upon which it relied in order to 
operate.103 Accordingly, it cannot be assumed that it is possible to create EU internal market 
with its freedoms and competition policy by decoupling the market’s institutions from their 
social, political and ideological dimensions.104 For example, the enforcement of the freedom 
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to provide services may not be only about abolishing barriers to trade, but abolishing barriers 
to the provision of services. Take the example of the medical termination of pregnancy 
services. The decision on the compatibility of a prohibition of the distribution of information 
on how to lawfully use these services in another Member State, though it concerns the 
freedom to provide services,105 is not without social and ideological consequences. 
Moreover, the decision on the compatibility with the EU competition law of a merger that 
can lead to the closure of a production’s unit that employs great part of the workforce of the 
local community is not a decision without social and political consequences.   
Economic decisions rarely are distributional neutral  
Only where wealth effects can be ignored is it possible to separate economics from 
politics.106 Economics shows that choices concerning markets are rarely distributional 
neutral. As argued by Majone, “economics tells us that economic decisions are much simpler 
when efficiency considerations – the size of the pie – can be separated from distributive 
considerations – how the pie gets divided; in other words, when the issue of how value is 
created is separable from that of the distribution of value.”107   
Coase argues that only in the “world of zero transaction costs (…) the allocation of resources 
would be independent of the legal position.”108 For that to happen three conditions must be 
met. First, given any two alternative decisions there is a definite amount of resources to 
compensate the decision maker to switch from one alternative to another. Second, the 
amount needed to compensate the switch would not be affected if the decision maker were 
first given an additional amount of wealth. Third, the decision maker should have the 
capacity to compensate any wealth reduction necessary to pay for the switch from the less 
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to the more preferred option.109 It is hard to find situations where at least one of these 
conditions would be met. Resources are not unlimited and some countries have more 
resources than others. Therefore, for example if Member State A could have enough 
resources to compensate the loss of jobs from a merger that led to the closure of the 
production unit that employed a great part of the work force of a community, another 
Member State probably could not. Moreover, even if resources were unlimited, there may 
be situations where no amount is enough to compensate for the loss of life, health, heavy 
reduction of environmental conditions, etc. 
Concerning competition law specifically, some academics, such as Motta, argue that if the 
total surplus is adopted as a competition law goal, then it is possible to have competition law 
decisions where no welfare considerations are necessary.110 Three welfare standards can be 
identified: consumer surplus, producer surplus and total surplus.111 Consumer surplus is the 
aggregate measure of the surplus of all relevant consumers. The surplus of a specific 
consumer is given by the difference between the consumer’s valuation for the good 
considered and the price that the consumer effectively paid for it. Producer surplus is the 
aggregate measure of the surplus made by all relevant producers. The individual producer 
surplus is the surplus that is made from selling the relevant goods. The total surplus is the 
sum of the consumer and the producer surplus.112 Under the total surplus standard the 
society as a whole will be better off. If the society does not like how the surplus is distributed 
it will always be possible to redistribute it later by other means.  
This reasoning however is not flawless. As to the first premise – ‘the society as a whole will 
be better off’ – competition has many direct and indirect benefits and can affect other policy 
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goals positively and negatively.113 This is relevant because it shows that “the claim that 
society as a whole it is better off is itself value-laden.”114 When measuring the ‘better-off’ 
one can focus on the increase of the surplus, or include some measurement of the 
environmental and cultural impact of the measure. Townley provides the following example 
to illustrate the “value-laden” bias of the “better-off” claim. “[W]ould one encourage an 
agreement between manufacturers that would increase the total surplus by € I million if this 
were to immediately lead to the irreparable poisoning of all drinking water?”115 He concludes 
by arguing that “if the total welfare standard does not make all society better off, then this 
would significantly weaken the claim that competition law should pursue a unitary welfare 
goal.”116 
As to the second premise – “redistribution is possible by other means” – this may not be 
necessarily true. For example, neo-classical economists assume that even if the distribution 
created by the total surplus is considered unfair, a redistribution of the surplus can be done 
later by other means. However, they also consider that due to the dynamic nature of 
business practice the later distribution is risky and therefore they consider that it should be 
limited to a minimum.117 This undermines the reliance on the argument of possible 
redistribution by other means as a justification in the first place. 
Furthermore, redistribution may not be possible or is not always convenient as it does not 
provide the best solution at that time. For example, a delay on redistributing the surplus may 
make distribution more expensive, or even impossible to remedy the inequality later in a 
way that makes everyone better off.118 This means that also when it comes to competition 
law and policy, it is not possible to separate economics from politics and conflicts on the 
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redistributional aspects of the decisions will be possible. In such a context, conflicts between 
different levels of government in EU competition law are inevitable and will be perceived in 
the several regulatory challenges which impact decision makers in EU competition law. 
3. The relevance of conflicts: the EU Treaties are incomplete 
contracts  
Given the eventuality of conflicts the constitutional issue is whether each conflict must be 
solved with a uniform solution across the EU or whether different solutions may be possible 
at national level or, at certain extant, via EU law e.g. different interpretation of EU law being 
possible. However, in the EU context, the answers to conflicts are incomplete as the Treaties 
do not law down definite rules, and depending on the provisions in question competences 
are allocated differently in the EU and the Member States.  
Constitutional bargain theory argues that parties contract with each other to achieve a joint 
purpose.119 However, even if united under a broad common goal, such as, for example, the 
reaffirmation of democratic values, peace maintenance, and economic growth, each party 
or group of parties that participate in the process bring to the bargaining table their own 
constitutional preferences, and their own ideas on how the polity is to be constructed. Each 
party or group of parties will fight to enshrine their ideas into constitutional provisions.120 
Due to the difficulties associated with negotiating rules for all possible contingencies, and 
the need to secure the adaptability of the contract to the change of conditions and evolution 
of parties’ interests as time passes,121 constitutional agreements are achieved by what 
organisational economists call ‘relational contracting’.122 The parties to an agreement seek 
to ‘frame’ broadly their relationship, by agreeing on a set of basic ‘goals and objectives’, 
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fixing outer limits on acceptable behaviour, and establishing procedures for completing the 
contract over time.123 “Generalities and vagueness facilitate agreements at the ex ante 
constitutional moment.”124 The Treaty of Lisbon has the characteristics of an incomplete 
contract. As previously mentioned, it establishes a set of values and objectives EU policies 
must pursue, but it does not specify precisely what is to be done in every possible 
circumstance. As pointed out by Majone, as an incomplete contract, the Treaty recognises 
that it may not have provided the EU with all the necessary competences to pursue these 
goals. In order to remedy this, the Treaty grants a complementary competence to the EU, 
under Article 352 TFEU if an action is proved to be necessary to attain one of the 
objectives.125  
Furthermore, the Treaty establishes a rule on how it expects these objectives to be 
implemented. It specifies that these objectives are to be treated on an equal footing with 
the objectives set for the EU in other specific provisions of the Treaties, and the EU has to 
ensure consistency between its different policies and activities “taking all of its objectives 
into account.”126 As the Treaty does not establish a hierarchy of goals, this causes conflict in 
that different Member States may value the objectives differently and may have different 
ways to pursue them .127 
The key issues in the competition law sphere is whether the competence is in fact exclusive 
to the EU, which the key to answer the central research question of this thesis: is diversity 
possible in EU competition law? 
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4. The value of diversity  
This thesis is not concerned in reaching any conclusion or even discussion in detail the value 
of diversity on EU competition law, i.e. diversity as a policy choice. However, as background 
the following short reflection on this issue might help to clarify the background to the 
debate.   
There is an overwhelming majority position for a uniform application of EU competition law. 
Defenders of uniformity generally present the following three main arguments in favour of 
harmonization. First, some claim that uniform law reduces business costs. Kozuca argued 
that international trade is affected by the prospect of divergent decisions. These can happen 
in the case of non-uniform competition law. Where certain conduct is legal in one territory 
but prohibited in another, even if trade between those territories is possible, it becomes 
more expensive. Firms need to understand, for example, where the law stands. Uniformity 
reduces these costs as it allows for the development of a detailed body of case law, reducing 
uncertainty as to what the laws are, and of trying to adjust business models to different types 
of laws. It also eliminates litigation costs related to forum shopping.128   
Secondly, Visser argues that uniformity is part of the right to equality, i.e. to have the same 
situation receiving the same treatment throughout the EU.129 Advocate General Kokott 
argues that uniformity in EU competition law ensures “[n]ot only the fundamental objectives 
of equal conditions of competition for undertakings on the single market but also the 
concern for uniform protection of consumer interest in the entire Community.”130 Finally, 
there is also the classic argument that harmonization fosters integration. As argued by 
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Dagtoglou, EU law “is important as a unifying factor.”131 Conversely, diversity could lead to 
disintegration. 
However, it is difficult to argue that any of these reasons in favour of uniformity are 
irrefutable. As to the transaction costs, a uniform competition law does not necessarily avoid 
much by way of transaction costs, as different laws in other fields remain. We have seen that 
integration is partial. Not so rarely, more than one set of laws will be applicable to the same 
facts, originating at both Member State and EU level. Also, Treaties exclude the 
harmonization of certain areas.132 Even if competition law is fully harmonized, laws on 
culture, environment, social protection, healthcare, and the administration of justice at 
Member State level may differ. Transaction costs remain. Therefore, even in the presence of 
the same competition law, businesses face different laws in other fields. Furthermore, 
“increased transaction costs may be tolerated if the benefits derived from diversity are 
sufficiently important, or at least if the cost of uniformity is more than the benefits of 
preventing diversity.”133 We have seen that Member States may value public policy 
differently. This may have an impact in the application of competition law. If however, 
uniformity of enforcement of EU competition law is imposed upon Member States, this may 
give them an incentive to cheat, for example, by narrowing the definition of appreciable 
effect on trade between Member States. As pointed out by Walker, this contributes to legal 
uncertainty.134 Legal uncertainty also increases transaction costs as it makes it more difficult 
for business to anticipate where the law stands.  
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Regarding Visser’s and AG Kokkot’s claims, the principle of equality cannot go as far as to 
encompass the right to have a uniform law which covers the whole of the EU. Treaties allow 
Member States to create different conditions of competition at home,135 and in respect of 
consumer protection the harmonisation at EU level is only minimal, not precluding 
divergence in national legislation.136 
Finally, regarding the argument that, unlike uniformity, diversity leads to disintegration, this 
is a chimera.  Ignoring regulatory preferences of the Member States, by imposing a uniform 
solution of EU law, particularly in areas under their competence, creates a democratic 
deficit.137 This can lead to disillusion with the EU project and disintegration, as the people of 
Europe do not feel represented in EU regulatory choices.138 Recent sovereign debt crises 
showed that is difficult to avoid questions on  democratic legitimacy of the decisions. The 
degree of social mobilisation against the mechanisms agreed by the Member States and the 
relevant institutions of the EU to face the sovereign debt crises was notorious. This is well 
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illustrated by the Pringle139 and Gauweiler140 cases, against the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), 141  and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)142 respectively.143 This 
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debate on diversity in EU law has never been as important as now, the aftermath of the 
Brexit vote. As Grimm put it, the peoples of Europe know that “whereas Grexit would be a 
judgment on Greece, Brexit was a judgment on the EU.”144 Many European voices have since 
then raised to call for more respect to national or regional differences and underline the risk 
of EU leaders taking steps towards further centralisation and, as expressed by Helmut Kohl, 
“mistaking a unified Europe with a standardised Europe.”145 
EU competition law cuts across many policy domains,146 some of which may still be under 
the responsibility of the Member States (e.g. culture v. competition). Imposing a uniform 
solution of EU competition law, lacks democratic legitimacy. This is not the best way to 
protect integration.  
Diversity - Regulatory competition  
A major advantage of diversity is that, it not only increases the legitimacy of the decisions; it 
increases the chances of better regulation, experimentalism and innovation, which 
eventually will improve the quality of decisions. These are the assumptions put forward by 
the literature on regulatory competition as the outcomes of diversity. The concept of 
regulatory competition originates in the work of Tiebout147 regarding regulatory competition 
of fiscal federalism. It claims that if left to compete, governments will adopt regulations that 
efficiently match the needs of their people. According to the Tiebout model, “if social tastes 
and preferences differ and if States are allowed to exist and take those differences into 
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account in passing laws, then the States will compete with one another to satisfy their 
citizens’ preferences for public goods.”148 Governments supply legal products and 
institutions, and as suppliers of any other goods should be subject to market conditions. 
Competition pressure from other governments – regulatory competition – will force 
governments to produce regulations efficiently if they do not want to risk of losing their 
clients, i.e. citizens and or business.149 Supporters of regulatory competition argue that this 
competition leads to match the demand for public services with the corresponding 
willingness of citizens to pay the taxes required to provide them. Also, Calabresi argues that 
decentralised governments make better decision than centralised ones as “decentralisation 
ensures that those responsible for choosing a given social policy are made aware of the costs 
of that policy.”150 Regulatory competition however, can lead to a race to the bottom, where 
jurisdictions lower standards. In such situations there may be a claim for a centralised 
intervention in order to avoid undesirable outcomes. This theory is based on three necessary 
premises. First, that governments are free to decide on their policies. Secondly, that 
individuals and businesses are free to move between jurisdictions up to a certain extent. 
Finally, that the market is sufficiently transparent to allow them to make informed choices.151  
Competition policy and Regulatory competition  
The possibility of regulatory competition in the field of competition law is contested by 
Fox.152 She claims that either regulatory competition does not work in competition or, if it 
works, it only creates a race to the bottom, which supports a centralised solution. This is 
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contested by others, such as Easterbrook, who argues that regulatory competition is possible 
and that States must not have restraints as regards their economic regulatory activity. 
Finally, there are also those who argue for a milder form of regulatory competition.153 
Eleanor Fox argues that regulatory competition does not necessarily work as regards 
competition policy.154 She makes this claim in the context of a study about the globalisation 
of competition laws, but it is just as valid in the EU regional context; this is only a question of 
scale. Fox argues that “the concept [of regulatory competition] assumes that nations are 
competing against one another in the formulation or application of their laws to be more 
attractive to business than the neighbour’s laws.”155 According to Fox, competition law does 
not work like this. That is because, generally, companies are subject to competition laws of 
the jurisdictions where their anticompetitive behaviours are felt, irrespective of where they 
are located. In this sense, competition law is different from, for example, corporation law, as 
only one law grants firms corporate character. Therefore, competition law is not a 
determinant element for a company to “exit” a jurisdiction to another one, as it will not allow 
it to avoid enforcement of the competition law of a different jurisdiction. In any case, Fox 
claims that there may nevertheless be some “margin for a race among nations” when it 
comes to competition rules. However, that race would lead to a race to the bottom, which 
is an argument in favour of the need for a centralised solution. She argues that a competition 
law based on economic efficiency only (i.e. it only prescribes conduct or transactions that 
lessen both rivalry and efficiency) is less costly to business than a competition law which 
takes public policy into consideration. When in confrontation, the former competition law 
would be considered the bottom and the latter would be considered the top. Given the 
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globalisation of markets, jurisdictions with the costlier competition law would have an 
incentive to change its criteria to economic efficiency only.156 This means a race to the 
bottom; this pleads in favour of a centralised uniform solution in order to avoid such a result.  
Fox’s arguments against the possibility of regulatory competition in the field of competition 
can however be contradicted, for two major reasons. Firstly, Fox’s argument that 
competition law does not determine the “exit” of companies from one jurisdiction to 
another can be proved wrong.  Fox’s starting point is that the motive for a company to exit 
a certain jurisdiction would be to escape the application of competition law. However, this 
assumption may be wrong.  A company may not wish to escape competition law as it did not 
breach it but may want it to be enforced against its competitors in order to maintain a level 
playing field. A company may prefer to be in a jurisdiction whose competition law offers 
merger control and prohibits abuse of dominance and not only cartels. Furthermore, is not 
absolutely accurate to say that competition law would not determine exit. Cross-border 
enforcement of competition law is more complex than national enforcement. Political 
foundations and enforcement structures have an impact on the implementation of 
competition laws.157 Therefore, a company may prefer to be located within jurisdictions that 
have a strong record of national and cross-border competition law enforcement.  
Secondly, “exit” is only one of the criteria for regulatory competition to be possible. Others 
are a “plurality of jurisdictions, with freedom to select any law they desired and if all 
consequences of one jurisdiction’s regulation are felt within that jurisdiction.”158 The closer 
one comes to fulfilling all these conditions, the more likely effective competition between 
jurisdictions becomes. This is particularly relevant if we take into consideration the wider 
context of economic regulation. Competition law exists in parallel with legislation which 
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pursues different objectives. Integration in the EU is partial, so different levels of government 
may be competent to regulate different aspects of the same problem. The more jurisdictions 
there are, the easier it is for a person to find one where the law suits her needs the best. A 
uniform solution for EU competition law may undermine this. It should be possible to 
allocate competence at different jurisdictional levels as this would increase the number of 
jurisdictions, and therefore increase the pressure on governments to provide the set of laws 
people with a credible exit capability value the most. Additionally, regarding the extent to 
which governments can tailor their laws, the more options they have the more they can try 
to attract people with their laws. Therefore, the more the laws can correspond to the needs 
of the population, i.e. the more chances there are for a good law.  
Taking this into consideration, Easterbrook argues that States should not be limited in their 
legislative choices. Regulatory competition should be absolute even if that means an “inverse 
supremacy” rule, i.e. a principle under which state and local rules prevail over the EU’s law.159 
Otherwise, the chances for the states to get the law that best suits their populations may be 
undermined. He considers that this is not a desirable result as there are reasons to believe 
that whenever politically powerful groups (including companies) are denied their preferred 
methods of regulation, the result will be worse for all groups. This is because firms that have 
political power will maximise the redistribution of income in their favour by holding as low 
as they can the allocative loss of their chosen methods.  He believes that there is “at least a 
weak presumption that politically powerful groups will initially choose methods of 
redistribution that have relatively low deadweight losses. If these preferred methods are 
foreclosed, perhaps by federal antitrust doctrine, politically powerful groups will shift to 
other methods of redistribution that benefit them less but, perhaps, also leave less for the 
rest of us.” 160   The only limitation to state regulatory freedom which Easterbrook accepts is 




the prohibition of monopoly overcharge. If the externalities of the legislation are not felt 
within the jurisdiction of the state, there is no incentive for exit, which reduces the chances 
of regulatory competition. In his words: “[U]nder such an approach States could have any 
rules they want, so long as he who calls the tune also pays the piper.”161 This extreme 
approach to regulatory competition seems however not to be adequate and there have been 
calls for a moderate version of regulatory competition, such as the possibility for “regulatory-
co-operation”162 or for “coordinate diversity.”163 
 Esty and Geradin present a critique to the debate on the merits of “regulatory competition” 
versus “harmonization.”164 They argue that both race towards the bottom and regulatory 
competition theories, and the resulting centralisation and decentralisation strategies that 
they trigger, “are overstated.”165 They present an alternative approach that they call 
“regulatory-co-operation.” Among the points they raise is the fact they believe that 
competition between regulators may produce inefficient outcomes and therefore, some sort 
of cooperation between and among jurisdictions may be required.  This is because of the 
following four major reasons: market failure, externalities, imperfect information and lack of 
mobility. The benefits of regulatory competition depend on the forces generated by a 
functioning and competitive market for legal products. There are however reasons to believe 
that there are market failures, notably for lack of adequate information, that do not allow 
markets to operate in an efficient manner. This makes the market for legal products 
relatively imperfect, and therefore, competition cannot be counted on to deliver an optimal 
outcome. Furthermore, externalities cannot be ignored by the regulator. If regulators 
systematically ignore the impact their regulations have beyond their own borders, then the 
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standards that they set will be systematically suboptimal. We have seen however that the 
benefits of regulatory competition are stronger if the costs associated with the regulatory 
policy are confined to the borders of the regulatory jurisdiction. Externalities can be of very 
different nature. For example, they can be physical, such as pollution spillover, as air or water 
pollution. They can also be economic, weak enforcement of competition rules in one nation 
may have a negative impact on the profits of a foreign-based producers whose products are 
thereby squeezed out of the market. Esty and Geradin argue that “to the extent that these 
spillover effects are not based on market-clearing effects but rather driven by strategic 
behaviour, suboptimal results must be anticipated.”166 Another reason for a failure of 
regulatory competition is imperfect information. To understand whether the government is 
delivering an appropriate level of regulation and doing so in a cost-effective manner may not 
be possible or be too difficult to assess, particularly when the scope of the inquiry covers a 
large number of regulatory variables, e.g. environment, health, competition, tax burden, etc. 
Finally, there may also be an issue of lack of mobility. Regulatory competition requires that 
natural and legal people are free to exit a jurisdiction to another they believe to have 
regulation that correspond more to their needs. However, Esty and Geradin show that 
perfect mobility may also not reflect the reality, as, for example, in case of business “market 
requirements and regulatory barriers dramatically constrain mobility.”167 
They offer “Regulatory co-operation” as an alternative model. They argue that “the 
regulatory process will almost always benefit from a degree of cooperation among 
governmental actors and between governmental officials and non-governmental actors.”168 
This cooperation may occur in shared mechanisms for issue-spotting, joint information 
gathering or data exchange, divided or collaborative research and analytic work technology 





or policy transfers and a division of labour in policy implementation and evaluation.169 It may 
also occur between different levels of government and between non-political actors.  
In the specific field of competition, Townley argues for “coordinated diversity,” which implies 
coordinated regulatory competition. Townley claims that there is space for diversity in EU 
competition law. Diversity allows to solve complex jurisdictional problems, democratic 
legitimacy and diverse national views on public policy. Members of the European 
Competition Network become public laboratories. They share outcomes, generating a reach 
pool of learning experiences and comparing results against the best performances. This 
should aid in rapidly leading to the best practice and harmonisation or at least informed 
divergence. Townley however points out that diversity can lead to increased costs of 
international trade, raise the spectrum of externalities and races to the bottom and as such 
it can undermine the internal market.170 Therefore, he concludes, both uniformity and 
diversity are valuable. The answer he proposes is coordinated diversity in the field of 
competition. It is something between diversity and uniformity. The idea goes as follows; the 
EU Court lays down the law. However, the Commission and the national competition 
authorities can experiment in the gaps. “The aim is to encourage sufficiently commonality 
and expertise while simultaneously encouraging experimentation and accepting diversity in 
EU competition law and other areas too.”171   
Conclusion 
The considerations set out above in this chapter show that conflicts are inherent in the EU 
law in general, and in EU competition law in particular, for many different aspects and at 
many different levels. EU Treaties are incomplete contracts, determining a set of values and 
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objectives of the EU policies without always specifying precisely what to do in case of 
conflicts between the EU and the Member States or between different Member States due 
to different preferences and redistributional consequences of decisions the taken. The 
question of where competence lies to resolve these conflicts in competition law, in particular 
whether it is exclusive competence of the Union or a shared competence between the Union 
and the Member States is therefore of paramount importance. This is the central question 




Chapter 2 - The EU constitutional response 
to the allocation of multijurisdictional 
competence 
Chapter 1 has discussed the existence of conflicts as an inherent feature of EU (competition) 
law, Chapter 2 highlights the importance of how competences are allocated between the 
Union and the Member States. Competence allocation within the EU has an impact on how 
conflicts are solved and thus on the degree of diversity allowed. Whether Member States 
can legislate and whether they can enforce EU competition law will depend on the way 
competence in the field of competition is allocated in the EU. Multijurisdictional competence 
allocation sets the jurisdictional boundaries of the Union and of the Member States. If only 
the Union has competence, then the door to diversity may be closed. If both the Union and 
Member States can act, the door to diversity is left open.  
Competence allocation within the EU is constitutionally protected. Depending on the 
relationship with the competences of the Member States,172 the Treaty of Lisbon subdivided 
the Union’s competences into exclusive and non-exclusive competences. Where the EU has 
exclusive competences Member States may act only if empowered by the Union or to 
implement a Union act. If a competence is non-exclusive, the competence of the Member 
States is not supressed in those areas.  
It has been claimed that “there are only two realistic options in the field of competition law: 
competence is exclusively conferred to the EU, so that a single set of rules is applicable across 
the EU and Member States surrender what legislative competence they have; or competence 
is shared, that is to say the EU legislator leaves space for national competition legislation 
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provided that the latter does not conflict with the former.”173 Since the Treaty of Lisbon, 
under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, the EU has exclusive competence in the area of “the establishing 
of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.” This provision 
is considered controversial by the majority of commentators. 174 Nevertheless, all seem to 
acquiesce to the fact that the Treaty of Lisbon has consecrated an exclusive competence of 
the EU in the area. This would be a crucial limitation of the Member States’ capacity to 
legislate on competition matters and to enforce EU competition law. Therefore, a careful 
analysis of the EU competence in the field of competition is of paramount importance.  
This chapter reviews the academic literature on competence allocation in the field of EU 
competition law  (Section 1) and sets the framework of analysis of the system of 
competences introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (Section 2). This chapter also identifies what 
Dashwood calls “conservative elements”175 that allow Member States to preserve their 
positions by influencing the EU legislative and executive decision making processes: the 
voting at the Council and the subsidiarity principle (Section 3). It finally explores the 
applicability of the principle of subsidiarity to the exercise of EU executive competence 
(Section 4).  
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1. Article 3(1)(b) TFEU -  EU exclusive competence in the 
area of “the establishing of the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market”  
The competence of the EU as regards competition maters is set out in Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, 
i.e. within the list of competences under the exclusive competence of the EU. Under this 
provision: 
“The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: 
(b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning 
of the internal market;” 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU has provoked some controversy in the doctrine for various and, often, 
opposite reasons. There are authors, such as Monti, Rossi, Schütze and Townley, who 
question the reference to competition under Article 3 TFEU, i.e. in the list of the exclusive 
competence of the EU. They see no coherence in classifying as exclusive the EU’s 
competence to establish competition rules necessary for the functioning of internal market. 
However, they all consider that the EU legislative competence in EU competition law has 
become exclusive under the Treaty of Lisbon. Other authors consider that Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU did not change the status quo. Dashwood considers that Article 3(1)(b) TFEU states the 
obvious and that “the reference to competition policy [under Article 3(1)(b)TFEU] is 
technically inept.”176 Finally, Liannos seems to see no problem with this provision. He states 
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that Article 3(1)(b) TFEU confirms that “competition law is as before, one of the EU exclusive 
competences.”177  
I argue that the arguments put forward by the above-mentioned authors concerning the 
exclusive nature of the EU legislative competence in EU competition law are not fully 
convincing.   
Starting with the arguments of those authors who question the classification of EU 
competence in competition matters as exclusive to the EU under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, Monti 
struggles with this classification. He argues that, as confirmed by the CJEU in AKZO, the EU 
holds exclusive competences “insofar as the procedural rules to empower the Commission 
to apply the Treaty provision on competition are concerned.”178 This is necessary to 
safeguard the uniform and effective application of the EU competition law by the 
Commission.179  However, Monti finds no logic in classifying as exclusive the EU competence 
to enact substantive competition rules. He argues that such competence is shared “at least 
from an economic point of view.” 180 The application of national competition laws has a 
positive effect on the market as a whole and therefore contributes to the EU goals in respect 
of the functioning of the internal market. I agree with Monti on this point. The enforcement 
of national competition laws has an impact on the overall level of competition in Member 
States which will have an impact on the overall level of competition in the internal market. 
Monti then tries to analyse this situation from a legal point of view and asks whether the 
EU’s competence in the field of competition could, though exclusive, be granted back by the 
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EU to the Member States, under Article 2(2) TFEU. In such cases, Member States would 
exercise their competence “to the extent that the Union has ceased exercising its 
competence.” According to Monti, Article 3 Regulation 1/2003 would be a particular 
illustration of this situation in the competition field. Article 3(1) of that Regulation establishes 
that when Member States apply national competition law to situations which fall under 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU they must apply EU law as well. The first paragraph of Article 3(2) 
replicates what the Court held in Walt Wilhelm,181 that when applying national law Member 
States must not reach a result contrary to EU law. Nevertheless, Article 3(2) allows Member 
States to apply stricter unilateral conduct laws, granting competence back to the Member 
States. Article 3(3) would also grant competence back to the Member States in respect to 
merger control as it states that national merger control rules are not affected by Regulation 
1/2003. Monti concludes however that this interpretation of Article 3 Regulation 1/2003 
would go against the aim of the Treaties to clarify the EU competences.182 Support for the 
possibility of the EU granting exclusive competence back to the Member States is not 
unanimous in the literature. Some authors, such as Lenaerts and Van Nuffel, consider that 
the EU cannot grant exclusive competence back the Member States.183 I agree with this 
position, as to allow the EU to grant exclusive powers back to the Member States would be 
to allow a secondary legislative act to change the structures of the competences as provided 
for in the Treaties. This runs against the principle of conferral. In any situation, it seems to 
me even less probable for it to be possible under Article 2(2) TFEU, as this provision concerns 
areas of shared competence only. EU competence in competition matters though is 
mentioned under Article 3, i.e. within the list of exclusive competence of the EU. Moreover, 
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to try to understand the nature of the EU’s competence in competition on the basis of 
Regulation 1/2003 can be a misleading exercise. Regulation 1/2003 is secondary legislation. 
As such it cannot change the nature of EU competence under primary law.  
Turning now to Rossi’s arguments, she questions the choice of the EU constituent legislator 
to classify the competence of the EU to legislate on competition law as exclusive to the EU. 
Rossi claims that that there is no rationale for an exclusive competence of the EU regarding 
competition except for State Aid rules only.184 However, the same could not be said of 
disciplining cartels and abuse of dominance. Furthermore, she points out that the Protocol 
(No 27) on the Internal Market and Competition is contradictory with an exclusive 
competence in this area. The Protocol states that: 
“Considering that the internal market set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European 
Union includes a system of ensuring that competence is not distorted (….) To this 
end the Union shall if necessary take action under the provisions of the Treaties, 
including Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union.”  
 
Article 352 TFEU grants to the EU residual competence within the framework of the policies 
defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, where the 
Treaties have not provided the EU with the necessary powers to act. Rossi concludes, though 
very briefly, that the classification as an exclusive competence has however become clear 
after the Treaty of Lisbon. She adds that though previous jurisprudence of the Court seems 
to contradict the existence of an exclusive competence, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) itself seems to have changed its approach in Akzo, recognizing that the 
Regulation 1/2003 and the principles it establishes form part of the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of internal market under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU.185 
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I agree with Rossi that there is no real rationale for an exclusive competence of the EU for 
matters other than State Aid. This has been shown by Townley who made an exhaustive 
inquest on the reasons that can justify a competence being exclusive to the EU. This will be 
discussed below. I also agree with Rossi that Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and 
competition,186 and previous jurisprudence of the CJEU, points to the existence of a shared 
competence to adopt substantive competition rules.187 However, I disagree with Rossi’s 
conclusion that it is clear that the competence in competition matters has become exclusive 
under the Treaties and that the CJEU has also changed its approach to the competence of 
the EU in conformity. I argue that AKZO is limited in scope and that Rossi’s interpretation of 
this case is too broad.  First, AKZO concerns EU competence to adopt procedural rules 
applicable to the Commission’s proceedings under Article 101 and 102 TFEU only. No 
conclusions on the competence of the EU to adopt substantive competition rules or to 
enforce EU competition law can be drawn from AKZO. Secondly, the CJEU approach to EU 
competences under AKZO is fully coherent with previous jurisprudence on this matter. The 
CJEU has always rejected the possibility of legal privilege in the context of Commission 
procedures to be regulated by national procedural law, it was rather for the EU alone to 
regulate it.  
The background of the AKZO case is a dispute that occurred in a search conducted by the 
European Commission, in February 2003, at the business premises of Akzo Nobel Chemicals 
Ltd and of its subsidiarity Akcros Chemicals Ltd, in the United Kingdom. In the course of that 
search, officials from the Commission took photocopies of two e-mails exchanged between 
the managing director and Akzo Nobel’s coordinator for competition law. This coordinator 
was an Advocaat of the Netherlands Bar and a member of Akzo Nobels’ legal department 
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employed by the company. The representatives of Akzo and Akcros regarded these 
documents as being exempted from seizure. In their view, they were covered by legal 
professional privilege. The Commission rejected that claim and considered that the 
documents were not covered by legal professional privilege. Akzo brought an action against 
this decision before the General Court, which dismissed the action.188 Akzo appealed against 
the judgment to the CJEU. One of the grounds of appeal presented was that the findings of 
the General Court violated the principle of national procedural autonomy and the principle 
of conferred powers. The CJEU rejected these claims. It recalled that:  
“in accordance with the principle of national procedural autonomy, in the absence 
of European Union rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of 
each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to 
lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights 
which individuals derive from European Union law.”189  
The Court considered this ground as unfounded as: 
“in the present case, the Court is called on to decide on the legality of a decision 
taken by an institution of the European Union on the basis of a regulation adopted 
at European Union level, which, moreover, does not refer back to national law.”190  
In this regard, the Court confirmed: 
“that the rules of procedure with respect to competition law, as set out in Article 14 
of Regulation No 17 and Article 20 of Regulation No 1/2003, are part of the 
provisions necessary for the functioning of the internal market whose adoption is 
part of the exclusive competence conferred on the Union by virtue of Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU.”191  
This is so because: 
“in accordance with the provisions of Article 103 TFEU, is for the European Union 
to lay down the regulations and directives to give effect to the principles in Article 
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101 TFEU and 102 TFEU concerning the competition rules applicable to 
undertakings. That power aims in particular to ensure observance of the 
prohibitions referred to in those Articles by the imposition of fines and periodic 
penalties payments and to define the Commission’s role in the application of those 
provisions.”192  
The scope of Akzo is thus limited to the adoption of procedural rules under Article 103(2)(a) 
and (d) TFEU, to be applicable by the Commission on its proceedings to enforce Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. The Court confirms that such competence is exclusive of the EU under Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU. As pointed out by Monti, this finding could be only logical, as to allow Member 
States to legislate in this matter would render the uniform and effective application of the 
EU competition law by the Commission impossible.193  
Moreover, contrary to Rossi’s conclusions, AKZO cannot be seen as a change of the Court’s 
approach to the EU’s competence on procedural matters. It is well established case law that 
the Commission enforces EU competition law according to the procedural provisions enacted 
under Article 103 TFEU, subject to the general principles of EU law and respect for Human 
Rights. If those provisions had not been enacted, the Commission would enforce EU 
competition law according to the rules established directly in the Treaty under Article 105 
TFEU.194 Furthermore, a similar issue to the one in Akzo was brought before the Court for the 
first time in AM & S v Commission195, and the Court considered that Member States had no 
competence to regulate the matter. In AM&S v Commission, the Commission had requested 
the applicant to produce documents in the course of its investigation to enforce EU 
competition law. The company raised objections to the request of the Commission as it 
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considered that the documents were protected by legal professional privilege. Neither 
Regulation 17/62, which provided for the powers of the Commission to order inspections 
and carry out investigations, nor any other EU law protected the confidentiality of 
communications between lawyer and client. The Court considered that in all Member States, 
written communication between lawyer and client are protected by virtue of a principle 
common to all those States, even if the scope and means of that protection can vary from 
one country to another. The Court specifically stated that: 
“Community law, which derives from not only the economic but also the legal 
interpenetration of the Member States, must take into account the principles and 
concepts common to all the laws of those states concerning the observance of 
confidentiality, in particular, as regards certain communications between lawyers 
and clients. That confidentiality serves the requirements, the importance of which 
is recognized in all of the Member States, that any person must be able without 
constraint to consult a lawyer whose profession entails the giving of independent 
legal advice to all those in need of it.”196   
Despite differences of the meaning and scope of protection of legal privilege in the Member 
States, the CJEU recognised a common criterion among Member States. They all protect, in 
similar circumstances, the confidentiality of written communications between lawyer and 
client provided that (i) such communications are made for the purpose and in the interest of 
the client’s right of defence and (ii) they emanate from independent lawyers, that is to say, 
lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment.197 The Court 
concluded then that  Regulation 17/62 should be interpreted as respecting confidentiality of 
communications between lawyer and client subject to those two conditions.198 The Court did 
not recognize any legislative power to the Member States on procedural matters to be 
applicable to the Commission’s proceedings. The reference made to the national laws was in 
order to identify a general principle common to the laws of the Member States, inferring the 
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existence of a general principle of the EU legal order to be respected by EU institutions.199 
Therefore, when it comes to the competence to establish procedural rules applicable to the 
Commission in its proceedings to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, particularly regarding 
legal professional privilege, the CJEU has always considered it as an exclusive competence of 
the EU. AKZO does not therefore, represent a change to the CJEU approach to EU 
competences after the Treaty of Lisbon.   
Townley is also surprised by the classification of EU competence in competition as exclusive 
and goes as far as to wonder whether competition became an exclusive competence under 
the Treaties as the result of an error.200 Perhaps, he asks, “the [Treaty’s] drafters were 
focusing on State Aids rather than Articles 101 and 102?”201 Townley conducts an inquest on 
the foundations of EU competences. Building on the work of Schütze, he analyses two 
reasons that had been used to justify a competence emerging as exclusive in the EU legal 
order. There is an ontological rationale, under which competence ought to be exclusive 
where legal action at the state level would be conceptually impossible. There is also a 
functional rationale, that requires a competence to be exclusive where necessary for the 
defence of the common interest of the EU.202 Townley asks whether either one of those 
rationales could justify the EU competence in competition to be exclusive.203 He concludes 
they could not.  
A critique of the ontological rationale is that it can lead to the following fallacy:  Member 
States cannot harmonise each other’s laws, only EU action can. Therefore, EU action in fields 
that fall within the Treaty must be under the exclusive competence of the EU. Schütze argues 
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that the CJEU “has not succumbed to the ontological fallacy,” as it treats the EU’s 
competence in the internal market as shared.204 Townley claims that the ontological 
rationale seems to have been rejected by the Treaty of Lisbon, as under Article 4(2)(a) TFEU 
competence in the internal market is again shared,205 even if conflicts are possible. For 
example, conflicts between free movement rules and culture or other areas of Member 
States’ competence. This was not however sufficient for the constituent power to exclude 
an autonomous action by the Member State regarding the internal market.206 Townley 
argues that the same is true in relation to the competition field. In this area, it is not 
necessary to exclude all national action. On the contrary, he argues that “[e]nforcing national 
competition law (e.g. deterring cartels within a Member State) can even contribute to the 
EU’s economic interests (deter EU cartels and encourage intra-EU Trade).207 The ontological 
rationale thus does not require the competence of the EU in competition to be exclusive.   
As to the functional rationale, it was for example, the rationale behind the CJEU classification 
of the EU competence regarding common commercial policy. The CJEU considered that: 
“Such a policy is conceived in that Article [113 EC Treaty] in the context of the 
operation of the common market, for the defence of the common interest of the 
Community, within which the particular interests of the Member States must 
endeavour to adapt to each other. Quite clearly, however, this conception is 
incompatible with the freedom to which the Member States could lay claim by 
invoking a concurrent power, so as to ensure that their own interests were 
separately satisfied in external relations, at the risk of compromising the effective 
defence of the common interests of the Community. In fact, any unilateral action 
on the part of the Member States would lead to disparities in the conditions for the 
grant of export credits, calculated to distort competition between undertakings of 
the various Member States in external markets. Such distortion can be eliminated 
only by means of a strict uniformity of credit conditions granted to undertakings in 
the Community, whatever their nationality. (…) To accept that the contrary were 
true would amount to recognizing that, in relations with third countries, Member 
States may adopt positions which differ from those which the Community intends 
to adopt, and would thereby distort the institutional framework, call into question 
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the mutual trust within the Community and prevent the latter from fulfilling its 
tasks in the defence of the common interest.”208  
According to Townley, it would not be reasonable to apply this criterion to the classification 
of the competence in competition matters as exclusive, on the grounds that wherever the 
Member States act they create a potential for conflict and therefore, for distortion of 
competition.209 On this basis, the exclusion of Member States’ competence would then 
always be justified. Schütze considers that the “constitutional drafters seem to have fallen 
victim to a logical fallacy,” and asks “what distinguishes competition rule from the 
establishment of all other rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market?”210 
Townley considers that it would be highly problematic if legislative competence is held to be 
an exclusive competence of the EU. This is because Member States would not be able to 
maintain national competition law in force. Moreover, national competition authorities 
would only be able to enforce EU competition law if this was mandated by the EU. While this 
would create a kind of uniformity which would increase the scope of EU law, and possibly 
the deterrence of anti-competitive behaviour by undertakings, it would be done at the cost 
of diversity. The possibility of the Member States balancing public goals in the enforcement 
of competition provisions would be lost.211 Therefore, Townley concludes that competition 
should not be an exclusive competence of the EU. Finally, he asks whether competition could 
be a shared competence in the EU legal order. He concludes it could. This is because, first,  
the EU tends towards a model of co-operative federalism, i.e. a model where areas of 
competences cannot be isolated and which forces joint-decision making, rather than a model 
of dual-federalism, where areas of jurisdictions are “constitutional guaranteed 
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monopolies.”212 Secondly, before the Treaty of Lisbon, competition seemed to be an area of 
shared competence and it would be against the goal of that Treaty to limit  EU powers, if a 
shared competence had become an exclusive one.213 I agree with Townley’s analysis that 
there is no valid ontological or functional rationale that could support the exclusive nature 
of the EU competence in competition. I also add another argument in support of his claims.  
Membership of the European Union requires Member States to have national competition 
laws. The role of national competition laws in the adhesion process is well illustrated by the 
2004 and 2007 enlargement process, as showed by Cseres.214 She argues that this 
enlargement process has been “bigger, more intrusive and transformative than earlier 
enlargements in the 1990s”215 and that the influence on domestic legal systems was “more 
comprehensive”, as it interacted with “market, constitutional and institutional reforms.”216 
Cseres claims that the area of competition is perhaps the “strongest illustration of this 
process.”217 The legal, economic and political conditions for adhesion firstly laid down in the 
so-called Copenhagen criteria by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council included “a 
functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the EU.”218  Competition law and policy have become instrumental for 
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accession.219 This required a considerable effort of adaptation and adjustment to the EU legal 
order by the administratively planed economies of Central and Eastern Europe.220 In this 
process “the implementation of competition law and policy were of great importance in 
creating a market economy and showing the commitment of these countries to market 
economy, competition advocacy and fair market practices.”221 Once the adhesion process is 
concluded, Member States remain competent to apply their national competition laws.222  
Despite concluding that neither the ontological or the functional rational could justify the 
classification of the EU’s competence to establish the competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market as exclusive, Townley however concludes that the 
legislative competence of the EU has become exclusive under the Treaty of Lisbon.  
I turn now to the analysis of the arguments put forward the authors that are on the other 
side of the argument and consider the competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU less 
contentious.  Dashwood argues that the way the Treaty phrases the competence of the EU 
under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is “technically inept”223 and that it limits to state the obvious. That 
is because of two main reasons. According to Dashwood, there is no need to be told that the 
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EU alone is competent to establish the competition rules applicable through the internal 
market. Member States do not have such power. Second, under Walt Wilhelm224 the national 
rules on competition must be applied in a way which does not interfere with the uniform 
application of the EU rules, not so much because competition is an area of a priori exclusive 
competence, but because of the application of the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 
4(3) TEU.225 I do not agree with Dashwood, as it does not seem to follow conclusively from 
his arguments that the EU competence on competition is exclusive. As to the argument that 
there is no need to say that only the EU has competence to enact competition rules with 
effect across the entire internal market, there is no such need indeed. Member State 
jurisdiction is limited to the respective territory. However, the limited jurisdictional scope of 
Member State action has no impact on the nature of their competence. Member States do 
not have the power to establish rules applicable across the internal market, even in matters 
that have remained under their exclusive competence. Furthermore, as previously 
submitted, the existence of an exclusive competence cannot be established by reference to 
the functioning of the internal market.226 If the fact that only the EU has competence to 
adopt rules applicable across the entire internal market was a relevant criteria to establish 
an exclusive competence, then the competence regarding the internal market itself would 
need to be under the exclusive competence of the EU. The Treaty did not follow this road, 
as competence in the internal market is shared under Article 4(2)(a) TFEU.227  
Against Dashwood’s view I would argue however that the reference to EU competence under 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is not “technically inept.” His argument seems to ignore the conferral 
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function of Article 3 TFEU. Article 3 TFEU, as well as Articles 4, 5 and 6 TFEU, have a general 
constitutional conferral role. Under the principle of conferral, the EU only has the 
competences that have been conferred to it by the Member States and must exercise them 
according to the objectives establishes in the Treaties.228 Given the constitutional role of 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU the expression “necessary for the functioning of the internal market” is 
a constitutive element of the powers conferred to the EU, limiting their scope. Had the Treaty 
not introduced this limitation under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, it could be argued that Member 
States had conferred unlimited competence to the EU to legislate on competition law. They 
did not. They limited the powers conferred on the EU under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU to those 
“necessary for the functioning of the internal market.”  
Dashwood’s second argument grounded on the principle of sincere cooperation also does 
not stand. The fact that under this principle, national rules on competition must be applied 
in a way that does not interfere with the uniform application of the EU law says nothing on 
the nature of the EU competence in this area.  
Article 4(3) TEU requires Member States to:  
“[t]ake any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions 
of the Union;”  
and to: 
“[f]acilitate the achievement of the Union’s task and refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objective.”  
The principle of sincere cooperation frames the whole relation between Member States and 
the EU, independently of the nature of their competences. It binds all the authorities of the 
Member States, even in matters within their jurisdiction,229 including courts and 
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decentralized authorities and it is not dependent on the exclusive nature of the EU 
competence. Also, the EU’s institutions are subject to the principle of sincere cooperation in 
the relation with the Member States and with each other.230  
Therefore, Dashwood’s arguments on the competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU 
are not conclusive. 
Turning now to Liannos, he considers that Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is less contentious. He states 
that “[A]rticle 3(c) TFEU indicates that competition law is, as before, one of the EU’s exclusive 
competences confined to the establishment of competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market.”231 However, he provides no reasoning on why he 
considers that EU competence on competition was already exclusive under the Treaty of 
Rome. The opinion of a majority of authors is that such competence was shared.232 I agree 
with the view that the competence of the EU in competition matters was shared. I argue that 
this is confirmed by the CJEU’s approach to the competence of the EU in competition matters 
before the Treaty of Lisbon in competition matters. Although the list of the EU’s exclusive 
competences was enacted under the Treaties only with the Treaty of Lisbon, the CJEU had 
already recognised some areas as under its exclusive competence, such as the common 
commercial policy and the conservation of the biological resources of the sea. In these areas 
the CJEU ruled out any action on the part of the Member States unless authorised by the EU. 
As regards common commercial policy, the Court was called to rule upon the compatibility 
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with the Treaty of a draft Understandings on a Local Cost Standard drawn up under the 
auspices of the OECD (the Understanding). More specifically the question was whether the 
EU had the power to conclude the said Understanding and, if so, whether that power was 
exclusive to the EU. In its Opinion 1/75233, the Court considered that the subject matter of 
the standard, and therefore of the Understanding, “is one of the measures belonging to the 
common commercial policy prescribed by [then] Article 113 of the Treaty.”234 It then 
excluded the possibility of the exercise of concurrent powers by the EU and the Member 
States, concluding that:  
“It cannot be accepted that, in a field such as the one governed by the 
Understanding in question, which is covered by export policy and more generally by 
the common commercial policy, the Member States should exercise a power 
concurrent to that of the Community, in the Community sphere and in the 
international sphere. The provision of [then] Articles 113 and 114 concerning the 
conditions under which, according to the Treaty, agreements on commercial policy 
must be concluded show clearly that the exercise of concurrent powers by the 
Member States and the Community in this matter is impossible.235” 
Later, in Donckerwolke the Court hold that  
“as full responsibility in the matter of commercial policy was transferred to the 
Community, by means of [then] Article 113(1) measures of commercial policy of a 
national character are only permissible (…) by virtue of a specific authorisation by 
the Community.”236  
In the field of conservation of the biological resources of the sea, in Cornelis Kramer and 
Others the Court was called to access the authority of the Member States to assume and 
enforce international commitments within the framework of the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries Convention in respect of the conservation of the biological resources of the sea 
during the transitional period established by Article 102 of the Accession act.  The CJEU ruled 
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out the possibility of any Member State action after the elapsing of the transitional period 
established by Article 102 of the Accession act, i.e. 1 January 1979.237  The Court emphasized 
that, while at the time of the matters Member States had the power to assume such 
commitments and therefore to enforce them, that competence was of transitional nature.238   
The Court confirmed its approach to Member States’ powers in the field of conservation of 
the biological resources of the sea in Commission v. United Kingdom.239  This case concerned 
an action brought by the Commission against the United Kingdom for failure to fulfil its 
obligations under the Treaty. The UK took unilateral measures regarding sea fisheries after 
the expiration of the Transitional period as the Council had failed to do so under Article 102 
of the UK’s Act of Accession. The United Kingdom claimed that as long as the Council had not 
exercised the powers conferred upon it by Article 102 of the Act of Accession, even after the 
expiration of the period laid down in that Article, the Member States retained residual 
powers and duties until the Community has fully exercised its powers.240  
The Court, however considered that:  
“Since the expiration on 1 January 1979 of the transitional period lay down by 
Article 102 of the Act of Accession, power to adopt, as part of the common fisheries 
policy, measures related to the conservation of the resources of the sea has 
belonged fully and definitively to the Community.241”  
As a consequence,  
“Member States are therefore no longer entitled to exercise any power of their own 
in the matter of conservation measure in the waters under their jurisdiction. The 
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adoption of such measures, with the restrictions which they imply as regards fishing 
activities, is a matter, as from that date, of community law.242”  
The fact that the Council had not adopted the conservation measures referred to by Article 
102 of the Act of Accession, within the required period, could not in any case restore to the 
Member States the power and freedom to act unilaterally in this field.243  The Court then 
considered that nevertheless it could not be entirely impossible for the Member States to 
amend the existing conservation measures due to the development of the relevant biological 
and technological facts in this sphere.244 Such amendment though could not amount to a 
new conservation policy on the part of a Member State, as the power regarding such policy 
belongs now to the Community institutions.245 Moreover, the CJEU stated that the measures 
could only be adopted by means of all the available elements of law and by having regard to 
the structural principles on which the Community is founded. These principles require the 
Community to retain in all circumstances the capacity to comply with its responsibilities 
subject to the observance of the essential balance intended by the Treaty.246 The Court then 
concluded that in a situation characterized by the inaction of the Council and by the 
maintenance of the conservation measures in force at the expiration of the transitional 
period, a Member State has the obligation to undertake consultations with the Commission 
and to seek its approval in good faith. These consultations must be undertaken in a way 
which allows the Commission to exercise properly its duty of supervision in pursuance of 
then Article 155 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty). 
The Member States also had a duty not to lay down conservative measures in case of 
objection reservations or conditions which might be formulated by the Commission.247  
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From the above-mentioned case, it is clear that in the areas which the CJEU considered were 
under the exclusive competence of the EU:  
- Member States could not exercise concurrent power to that of the Community, 
neither on the national nor on the international spheres;248 
- National measures were possible only if authorised by the EU,249 or 
- If the EU has failed to act and measures were needed. In any case, the adoption of 
national measures could not be considered as if the powers of the Member States 
had been restored, nor could they amount to a new policy of the part of the Member 
States as the power remained at the European Economic Community (EEC) level.250 
This contrast with the CJEU’s approach to competence in the field of competition. For 
example, the CJEU held that: 
- EU law and national competition laws are applicable simultaneously to practices 
affecting trade between Member States,251 
- The CJEU has never considered that practices affecting trade between Member 
States were a matter of community competition rules alone. On the contrary, it has 
considered that the competence of the Member States was implied in Article 
103(2)(e) TFEU;252 
- In case of conflict between national competition law and the Treaty’s competition 
provisions, EU law prevails under the general principle of primacy of EU law;253 
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- Member States can keep stricter national competition laws;254 
- The obligation of Member States not to jeopardise the full and uniform application 
of community competition law by introducing or keeping into force legislation that 
may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertaking existed only 
where a clear competition policy of the Commission regarding a certain area already 
existed.255 
It is, therefore, in my view difficult to maintain that the CJEU considered EU competence on 
competition matters exclusive before the Treaty of Lisbon, and that Article 3(1)(b) TFEU 
keept things as they were before.  
2. The system of competences introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon  
We have seen that none of the arguments analysed in the previous section are able to sustain 
an exclusive legislative competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. An analysis of the 
competence of the EU under this provision must be done within the overall scheme of the 
Treaties. Only then can we have a full understanding on the scope of that competence.  
The Treaty of Lisbon grounded the system of EU competences on three fundamental 
principles, enshrined in Articles 4 and 5 TEU: the principle of conferral, the principle of 
subsidiarity and the principle of proportionality. The principle of conferral governs the limits 
of EU competence, while the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality govern the 
exercise of that competence.256 These principles have always been inherent to the EU 
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constitutional order,257 being introduced as “express organising principles”258 for the system 
of EU competences under the TEU. Of particular relevance in this context of establishing the 
competence of the EU is the principle of conferral. 
Under the principle of conferral,  
“[t]he Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it 
by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein.”259  
Furthermore, 
“[The] competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States”.260  
The areas of, delimitation of, and arrangements for, the exercise of the EU competences are 
determined by the TFEU.261 The EU competences are organized under the TFEU into four 
different categories: shared, exclusive, coordinating and complementary competences.  
Shared competence is the default position for EU competence. Under Article 4(1) TFEU, if a 
competence of the EU is found in the Treaties and the Treaties do not provide otherwise, 
that competence is shared. An exemplificative list of areas of shared competence is provided 
in Article 4 TFEU that includes, inter alia the internal market, economic, social and territorial 
cohesion, consumer protection, transport, energy and the area of freedom, security and 
justice. Under Article 2(2) TFEU where the Treaties confer to the EU a shared competence, 
both Member States and the EU may legislate and adopt legally binding acts.262  
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Areas under the exclusive competence of the EU are identified in Article 3 TFEU. They 
include, inter alia, “the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of 
the internal market.”263 Contrarily to the areas of shared competence, the list provided in 
Article 3 TFEU is closed. Only the areas that are specifically identified in the referred list are 
exclusive to the EU. Under Article 2(1) TFEU, “[w]here the Treaties confer on the Union 
exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if empowered by the 
Union or for the implementation of the Union’s act.”   
Article 5 TFEU establishes areas where the EU has a coordinating competence. Those areas 
are “economic policy”, “employment policy” and “social policy.” It has been argued that this 
competence is the result of the lack of consensus in the European Convention to place these 
areas under shared or complementary competence of the EU.264 Under this competence the 
EU may provide arrangements for the Member States to coordinate the exercise of their 
competences.  Under Article 6 TFEU, the EU has competence to carry out actions to support, 
coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States in areas of (a) protection and 
improvement of human health, (b) industry, (c) culture, (d) tourism, (e) education, vocational 
training youth and sport, (f) civil protection and (g) administrative cooperation. Conflicts 
under coordinating and supporting competences are solved by giving primacy to the 
Member States action. A harmonized intervention by the EU is even specifically excluded in 
the case of coordinating competences. Under Article 2(5) TFEU, legally binding acts of the EU 
in those areas cannot entail harmonization of Member States’ laws or regulations.  
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Articles 3 to 6 TFEU are not enough for the EU to act. The technique employed in the Treaties 
to attributing powers to the EU is highly specific.265  Under article 2(6) TFEUa legal basis 
enabling the EU to act must be found in the Treaties. 
Under Article 2(6) TFEU:   
“[t]he scope and the arrangements for the exercising the Union’s competence shall 
be determined by the provision of the Treaty related to each area.” 
The legal basis for EU action plays a two-fold determinant role on the analysis of the 
competence conferred on the EU. First, it determines its scope. Second, it determines the 
way that competence is to be exercised. Diversity in the EU legal order in general and in EU 
competition law in particular will be a function of these two variables.  
Under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU the EU has exclusive competence in “the establishment of the 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.” The scope of the 
exclusive competence under this provision will be determined by the provision of the Treaty 
related to this area.  
Competence outside the scope of the exclusive competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU is either (i) shared as per Article 4(2) TFEU, if a legal basis allowing the EU to act outside 
the scope of the exclusive competence is found in the Treaties, or (ii) it has remained with 
the Member States as per Article 4(1) TEU, since it has not been conferred to the EU under 
the Treaties.  
The impact the scope of EU competence has on the diversity allowed in the EU legal order is 
not of small importance. This is particularly true in EU competition laws as, under Article 
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3(1)(b) TFEU, the EU has exclusive competence in “establishing the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market.” 
 Exclusive competences of the EU have been “definitively and irrevocably forfeited by the 
Member States by their straightforward transfer to the Union.”266 In these cases Member 
States can only act as agents of the EU, under a “specific authorisation.”267 The EU must 
prescribe in what ways and according to which procedure Member States can act.268 
Competence allocated under the exclusive competence of the EU does not allow the 
existence of a plurality of sources of decision making, except if authorised by the EU, in which 
case Member States act as agents of the EU. Exclusive competence solves conflicts by 
conferring the final word on the EU, as only the EU may act. Diversity is therefore 
compromised, if not excluded. The larger the scope of an exclusive EU competence, the 
smaller is the scope of Member States competence, if any. Conversely, the smaller the scope 
of an exclusive competence is, the higher are the chances for a diverse outcome. If the EU 
finds a legal basis to act outside the scope of its exclusive competence, that will be in the use 
of a shared competence as per Article 4(2) TFEU. Shared competence allows a plurality of 
decision-making sources to co-exist. Both Member States and the EU may act, even if 
Member States “shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to 
cease exercising its competence.”269 Depending on the extent of the scope of the EU action, 
that exercise of competence can give the EU a de facto exclusive competence in a certain 
area.270 However, this is not the same as an exclusive competence being transferred to the 
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EU within the meaning of Article 2(1) TFEU. Member States may again exercise competence 
to the extent that the EU has decided to cease exercise of its competence.271 Moreover, 
Protocol (No 25) on the exercise of shared competence limits the pre-emptive effect of the 
Union’s action in certain area of shared competence to the “elements governed by the Union 
act in question and therefore it does not cover the whole area.” 
If there is no legal basis for EU action to act outside the scope of its exclusive competence, 
then the EU has no further competence to act.  Competence not conferred to the EU remains 
with the Member States, as per Article 4(1) TFEU, that are solely competent to act.  
The degree of diversity allowed will also depend on the modalities for exercising EU 
competence, that in turn is determined by the legal basis enabling the EU to act.  
3. Control by the Member States of the EU decision making 
process  
The arrangements for exercising EU competence may contain what Dashwood called 
“conservative elements.”272 These are elements that allow Member States to preserve their 
position and thus solve conflicts in their favour, allowing for more or less chances of 
accommodation of conflicting views. 273 Such is the case of the institutional balance, that 
allows the participation of the Member States at the decision-making process through the 
Council. This is a central conservative element allowing Member States to protect their 
interests in the decision-making process.  Another element is the principle of subsidiarity, 
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that requires the action to be taken at the lowest level possible and that allows the control 
of the EU action by the national Parliaments, in the case of legislative acts.  
Voting at the Council 
Member States participate in the EU legislative process through the Council and have thus 
the possibility to directly influence the legislative process. 274  The voting rules at the Council 
are thus the factors that have the highest, though not exclusive, impact on the individual 
control of the EU legislative process by the Member States.275 The Council has been 
described as the “fulcrum” of the decision making and of the legislative process of the EU,276 
reflecting the “stubborn determination of member governments in the EU to maximize their 
involvement in framing the decisions and shaping the legislation that would have a bearing 
on their polities.”277   
The higher the majority required, the more diversity or accommodation of conflicting views 
in EU law is favoured. This is because of two factors. Firstly, the action at the EU level 
becomes more difficult, therefore, regulatory competition is favoured.  Secondly, when the 
EU takes action, Member States have more opportunities to influence the final result and 
accommodate conflicting views when a high majority is required. There are three types of 
voting majorities in the Council for an act to be enacted: simple majority, qualified majority 
                                                             
274 The individual capacity of Member States to influence the outcome at the Council may vary from 
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and unanimity. The majority needed depends on the legal basis of the proposal.278 Under the 
simple majority each Member State at the Council has one vote. Fifteen votes are required 
for a measure to be adopted. Simple majority is said to not protect the interests of the 
Member States enough, and to favour smaller Member States over larger Member States as 
they have the same amount of votes. 279  Qualified majority vote (QMV) is the default rule. 
Under Article 16(3) TEU, if the legal basis for enacting an act does not specify a majority, the 
act must be approved under qualified majority. Under this modality each Member State of 
the Council is attributed a number of votes, depending on the Member State’s population. 
A measure needs 260 out of the 352 possible votes to be approved and at least 15 Member 
States must have voted for it. A new method to calculate the qualified majority entered into 
force on the 1st November 2014280 that lowered the thresholds for the adoption of a decision 
on an enlarged Council. Now a “double majority” is needed: at least 55% of the number of 
Member States and at least 65% of the EU’s population. This formula gives greater power to 
the larger Member States by introducing a population requirement as a central threshold for 
the first time. However, smaller Member States are protected from the larger state veto by 
the requirement that at least four states must vote against the measure.281  
A unanimity vote is the other extreme to the simple majority. Under this modality each 
Member State has a veto on any legislation being considered.  
The arrangements for exercising EU competence are capable of mitigating the impact of the 
competence conferred on the EU. For example, if the legal basis that provides an exclusive 
competence to the EU to act requires that action be approved under an unanimity vote at 
                                                             
278 Article 2(6) TFEU. 
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the Council, Member States will have a considerable margin to influence the final result. They 
can influence the EU decision making process in a way that accommodates their conflicting 
positions, for example allowing exceptions under national law. For example, the EU Merger 
Regulation282 which was adopted under an unanimity voting rule at the Council283contains 
references to the protection of Member States interests284 and mechanisms allowing the 
review of mergers with an European dimension to take place at national level and not at EU 
level.285 It also establish that “Member States may take appropriate measures to protect 
legitimate interests other than those taken into consideration by this Regulation and 
compatible with the general principles and other provisions of Community law” such as 
public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules.286  
 Also, the fact that a competence is shared it does not mean that regulatory autonomy is 
guaranteed. This is because, as we have seen, when the EU acts, Member States then cannot 
act.287 If the legal basis enabling the EU to act does not require the involvement of the Council 
or it does, but under a simple majority, an action by the EU is easily achieved, and Member 
                                                             
282 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] 
OJ L24/1. 
283 It has a double legal basis which included then Article 308 EC Treaty (now Article 352 TFEU) 
requiring unanimity vote at the Council.  
284 For example, whereas 19 of the Merger Regulation clarifies that Furthermore, the exclusive 
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287 Article 2(2) TFEU.  
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States will then be pre-empted from acting. Under this circumstance the possibilities for 
diversity in the EU legal under a shared competence are lower.   
Unanimity voting at the Council is the arrangement for exercising EU competence that 
protects diversity and accommodation of divergent views the most, for two main reasons. 
First, unanimity is hard to reach, making an action by the EU difficult.288 In the presence of a 
conflict of views, a unanimity rule transforms all Member States into “veto players”, i.e. 
actors whose agreement is necessary for the change of the status quo.289 Therefore, where 
a Treaty Article requires an act to be adopted unanimously, each Member State has a 
decisive say in the outcome of the legislative process. Either the Council adopts the proposed 
legislation to which each Member State can reconcile itself, or no measure is approved. Since 
under the unanimity rule it is more difficult for the EU to act, then regulatory competition is 
favoured, in the case of shared competence. Moreover, in cases where the EU acts, due to 
the veto power of the Member States the probability of Member States divergent views and 
conflicting interest being accommodated in the EU are higher, even if competence is 
exclusive to the EU.  
It can be argued that there is not that much difference between a qualified majority and 
unanimity as statistics show that even where measures only needed to be adopted by QMV 
they ended up being approved by unanimity.290 Chalmers, Davies and Monti raise this point 
to argue that the debate about vote weighting under the new QMV formula in force since 1 
November 2014 is overblown. This is because where unanimity is not required, Member 
States are aware of the possibility of beimg outmanoeuvred and so they try to construct 
                                                             
288 It was this barrier to action that took unanimity to be replaced by QMV. See Fritz Scharpf, 'The 
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common solutions reaching a consensus. 291 Literature on decision making at the EU Council 
mentions that this is due to a “preference for unanimity,”292 and the existence of a culture 
of compromise or consensus.293 However, I believe that to conclude from here that the 
degree of diversity obtained under a QMV or an unanimity voting procedure is the same, is 
a step too far. Tsebelis studied how the EU has tried to bridge qualified majority and 
unanimity over the years and how qualified majorities are transformed into unanimities. He 
named this process of transforming a qualified majority decision into a unanimous one as 
“q-unanimity” decision making process. 294  Tsebelis describes it as being a two-step process. 
The first step is to identify the point of a proposal that can achieve a qualified majority, i.e. 
that cannot be defeated by a different qualified majority. This is done by finding the points 
of a proposal that can achieve a qualified majority. These points constitute the “q. majority 
core.” Among all the points of the “q. majority core” a proposal will be made according to 
the preferences of the proponent, unless another preference is known to exist within the 
Council. In any case, the proposal will always be inside the points of the “q. majority core.” 
The second step is to extend the q. majority to q. unanimity. The proposal will be discussed 
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with those Member States that are dissidents within the Council. As from the point of view 
of the qualified majority supporting the proposal, the modifications have to be minimal, the 
negotiations will take place around the controversial point only and not on alternative 
proposals to the whole proposal. Discussions will take place on what exactly they object to 
regarding this point and what modifications can be made to eliminate objections. 
Modifications must remain minimal, so the pre-existent q. majority is not disturbed.  A way 
to achieve this is by eliminating objections through reducing the specificity of the measure. 
Tsebelis mentions that this is similar to that presented in law and economics295 literature and 
international law,296 according to which the precision of a legal text is a variable depending 
on the number of contractors and their heterogeneity. “Q. unanimity” to approe a proposal 
will thus be achieved.  
From Tsebelis’ conclusions we understand that the barriers to diversity remain higher under 
the QMV than under the unanimity procedure, even if the Council always aims at reaching 
decisions with unanimous support. In a QMV procedure, the proposal is always presented 
within the q. majority core and the negotiations around the focal points of dissent are 
conducted in a way that the pre-existing QM support is not put at risk. Unanimity in this 
context is only a preference, not a requirement. If unanimity at the Council fails, the measure 
can nevertheless be approved as qualified majority will most likely be attained. Moreover, 
as shown by Scharpf, the introduction of QMV was necessary to overcome the problem of 
the joint-decision trap created by unanimity. 297 QMV allows more flexibility in the system in 
order to secure the possibility of policy change.298 Therefore, EU action is still more likely to 
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occur under QMV, even if the Council aims at reaching unanimous support, than if unanimity 
was required by the legal basis. As such, even if EU competence to act is shared, regulatory 
competition is more likely to be restricted under majority voting, than under unanimity. 
Further, diversity allowed by the EU law is likely to be more diffuse and thus indirect, as the 
Member States are deprived from a veto power under a QMV, having less influence over the 
EU decision making process.    
The subsidiary exercise of EU competence 
Another conservative element present in the Treaties is the subsidiarity principle that is 
currently embodied in Article 5(3) TEU: 
“Under the principles of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level 
or at regional level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level. The institutions of the Union shall apply 
the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments ensure 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedures set 
out in that Protocol.” 
The principle of subsidiarity gives preference for the action to take place at the Member 
States level, and establishes mechanisms of control by the National Parliaments of the EU’s 
exercise of its legislative competence. It therefore favours diversity in the EU legal order.  
Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality should 
be read together with the Protocol (No 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union. Protocol (No 2) applies to only draft legislative acts299 and reinforces the 
non-judicial control of subsidiarity, by introducing a reasoned opinion procedure involving 
national Parliaments at an early stage of the legislative procedure. According to Article 6 of 
Protocol (No 2) introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, any National Parliament or any chamber 
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of national Parliament may, within eight weeks from the date of transmission of the draft 
legislative act, send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does not 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity. According to paragraph 3 of Article 7 of Protocol 
(No 2), if the Commission decides to maintain a proposal that was the object of reasoned 
opinions representing at least one third of all the votes allocated to national Parliaments, the 
Council, by a majority of 55% or by a majority of votes cast in the European Parliament, may 
block the legislative proposal.  
Some authors, such as Hofmann, Rowe and Türk argue300 that after Lisbon, the scope of the 
subsidiarity principle has changed and that it is not applicable to executive acts.301 If these 
views are right, this would have a negative impact on diversity in EU competition law. This is 
because, in case of conflicting views in implementing EU competition law, as well as in 
balancing competition against other public policy considerations, subsidiarity gives 
preference to the view of Member States over the conflicting EU view, as it favours action at 
national level.  
Their reasoning goes as follows: if under Article 5(3) TEU subsidiarity is to be applicable in 
accordance to the Protocol, the scope of the principle is delimited by the scope of the 
Protocol. As the Protocol is applicable only to legislative acts, such is the scope of application 
of subsidiarity as enshrined in Article 5(3) TEU. Protocols annexed to the Treaties form an 
integral part of the Treaties.  They are therefore primary law as per Article 51 TEU. As such, 
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protocols can make changes in the Treaties and in other provisions of primary law.302 This 
view seems supported by two other changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. First, the 
Treaty of Lisbon gives a formal definition of legal acts which are the acts adopted by 
legislative procedure.303 These acts are therefore distinct from delegated304 and 
implementing305 acts. So it is clear that when Protocol (No 2) only refers to legislative acts, it 
excludes delegated or implementing acts, as, according to the Treaty’s definition, they are 
not included in the notion of legislative acts. Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty established an 
autonomous legal basis concerning the exercise of the executive power of the EU, giving it 
constitutional foundations for the first time.306 According to Article 291(2) TFEU “[w]here 
uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed, those acts shall 
confer implementing power on the Commission, or in duly justified specific cases and in the 
cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Council.” 
This provision seems to embody subsidiarity considerations for the exercise of the executive 
power, replacing Article 5(3) TEU that becomes redundant when it comes to the executive 
function of the EU exercised on the basis of Article 291 (2) TFEU.  
However, I do not agree with this conclusion, and argue that the subsidiarity principle under 
the Treaty of Lisbon remains applicable to implementing acts of the EU. Article 291 TFEU has 
a conferral role that is distinct from and upstream to the subsidiarity principle. Article 291 
TFEU sets the condition for the “existence” of the implementing powers of the EU, while 
Article 5(3) TEU establishes the conditions for the “exercise” of those powers. The 
introduction of the subsidiarity principle made clearer the distinction between the 
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competences of the EU and the powers of the EU,307 or between the existence of 
competence and the use of such competence.308 The EU is based on attributed power, being 
the general principle that the EU only has the competence conferred on it by the Treaties. If 
before the introduction of the subsidiarity principle an EU action was only subordinated to 
the existence of a legal basis,309 the introduction of the subsidiarity principle rendered 
competence insufficient for the EU to take action.310 Subsidiarity is a threshold for the EU’s 
action based on the fact that, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, the 
action is better achieved at EU level. Apart from the legal basis for action, another condition 
must be met: the fact that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States. Therefore, Article 291 TFEU does not replace Article 5(3) 
TEU when it comes to the executive function of the EU. Furthermore, there are several 
arguments against the application of the principle of subsidiarity to EU legislative acts only 
that favour its applicability also to EU implementing act.  
4. Executive subsidiarity  
To limit the application of the subsidiarity principle to legislative acts raises some criticisms. 
First, despite the distinction introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon between legislative acts, on 
the one hand, and delegated and implementing acts on the other hand, I argue that the 
Protocol (No 2) does not limit the scope of the subsidiarity principle. The fact that the 
Protocol (No 2) is only applicable to legislative acts only means that the criteria established 
therein are not applicable to delegated and implementing acts and that these acts are left 
without political control by the national parliaments. Second, a limitation of the subsidiarity 
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principle to legislative acts is incompatible with a teleological interpretation of Article 5(3) 
TEU. Delegated and implementing acts are subordinated acts vis-à-vis legislative acts. If the 
authorising act must observe the subsidiarity principle it is difficult to argue that delegated 
and implementing acts do not. Finally, I will argue that the limitation of the subsidiarity 
principle to legislative acts does not take into consideration the role that subsidiarity plays 
as a general principle of EU law. I will explore these three points next. 
Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality 
Protocol (No 2) establishes guidelines for applying the principle of subsidiarity and for 
political control. The CJEU has expressly stated that the “Protocol lays down guidelines for 
the purpose of determining whether [the] conditions [laid down in Article 5(3) TEU and 
former Article 5(2) TEU] are met.”311 The protocol is not used to determine the scope of 
application of the principle of subsidiarity: that is determined by Article 5(3) TEU itself. A 
limitation on the application of the subsidiarity principle to certain acts of the EU does not 
flow from Article 5(3) TEU. Article 5(3) TEU refers to any action of the EU and it has been 
understood since the beginning that it is not limited to legislative action.312 The distinction 
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specific actions most efficiently. Again, no distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts was 
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introduced by Article 5(3) TEU should be interpreted as concerning the mechanisms of 
control as foreseen in the Protocol but not the type of EU action to which these principles 
are applicable.  
Up to this point the control of subsidiarity was limited to the ex-post judicial control by the 
European Courts under Article 230 TEU (now 263 TFEU) or under Article 234 TEU (now 267 
TFEU) in the case of an individual attack on the validity of EU action before a national court 
on the grounds of violation of subsidiarity principle.313 The mechanisms of control of the 
subsidiarity principle came under special attention during the drafting of the European 
Convention. The Working Group on Subsidiarity (Working Group I) identified the need to 
improve the mechanisms of control of subsidiarity, and in its final report314 stressed the need 
for ex-ante political monitoring of the respect of subsidiarity regarding the legislative 
initiatives of the EU. The system of ex-ante political monitoring covered only the legislative 
initiative of the EU and granted powers to the national parliament in this respect. The current 
wording of Article 5(3) TEU and of Protocol (2) matches the wording of the Draft Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Draft Constitutional Treaty) that resulted from the 
European Convention.315 On no occasion during the European Convention was the 
                                                             
made in the several references made therein to the subsidiarity principle. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
that contained a protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality also 
did not make a distinction between the acts.  For a complete reference to the history of the 
subsidiarity principle see Kendo Endo, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to 
Jacques Delors' (1994) 43 Hokkaido Law Review . 
313 Paragraph 1 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
annexed to the EC Treaty only mentioned that “[i]n exercising the power conferred on it each 
institution shall ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is complied with.” No mechanism of control 
was defined.  
314 Final Report of the Working Group on Subsidiarity, October 23, 2002, CONV 266/02. 
315 The subsidiarity principle is mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article I-11 “Fundamental principles” as 
follows: Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Union shall act if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by 
reason of scale and effects of the proposed action be better achieved at Union level. The institutions 
of the Union shall apply the principles of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on the application of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments shall ensure compliance with 
that principle in accordance with the procedures set out in the Protocol.  
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application of subsidiarity to all actions of the EU questioned. For example, the Final report 
of the Working Group on Complementary Competencies of the European Convention 
(Working Group V), referring to Legislative and Non-legislative actions of the EU in areas of 
complementary competences, identified the principle of subsidiarity among others, such as 
proportionality and primacy, as a principle governing the exercise of (all) competences.316 
After Lisbon, the mechanisms of control are of two types. First, the traditional ex-post 
mechanisms of judicial control by national and European Courts that applies to both 
legislative and non-legislative EU act.317 As regards legislative acts, this mechanism has been 
reinforced by Protocol (No 2). Under Article 8 of the Protocol, National Parliaments or a 
chamber thereof must now have the possibility to bring an action before the CJEU. Also, 
under the same provision of the Protocol, the Committee of the Regions may bring an action 
under Article 263 TFEU before the CJEU against acts for the adoption of which the TFEU 
provides that it be consulted.  Secondly, ex-ante mechanisms of political control applicable 
only to the EU’s legislative acts are introduced by the Protocol. The Protocol reinforced the 
non-judicial control of subsidiarity, by introducing a reasoned opinion procedure involving 
the national Parliaments at an early stage of the legislative procedure.318 For that purpose, 
the EU’s institutions are now required to send their draft legislations and amended drafts to 
the national parliaments. Member States now have access thought their National 
Parliaments to more information on the EU’s legislative process and can be involved in it. 
The fact that the Protocol applies to only draft legislative acts means that there is no 
mechanism for checks by national parliaments on non-legislative acts, even if they are felt to 
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317 Articles 263 and 267 TFEU.  
318 By the end of 2010 the Commission has sent out 82 draft legislative proposals falling within the 
scope of the Protocol and received 211 opinions. A total of 34 raised subsidiarity concerns, for five 
legislative proposals the Commission received more than one reasoned opinion, but in none of the 
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infringe subsidiarity.319 However, no conclusion on the scope of the application of 
subsidiarity principle as laid down in Article 5(3) TEU can be drown from this.  
Teleological interpretation of Article 5(3) TEU  
A teleological interpretation of Article 5(3) TEU favours the conclusion that the subsidiarity 
principle should also apply to delegated and implemented acts, as they are subordinate acts. 
The authorisation to issue a delegated or implementing act under Articles 290 or 291 TFEU 
constitutes the legal basis for a subordinate measure, thereby establishing a hierarchy 
between the authorizing act and the delegated/implementing act.320 If the authorising act 
must observe the subsidiarity principle it is hard to accept that the subordinated delegated 
or implementing acts do not. The argument that in any case the possibility that a delegated 
or implementing act violates subsidiarity is remote, as those acts must by their nature remain 
within the scope of their enabling legislation321 that is itself subject to subsidiarity, is weak. 
For example, as concerns delegated acts, though under Article 290 TFEU the legislative act 
must laid down the essential principles of an area and contain the substantive criteria such 
as the objectives, content and scope of the delegation of powers, some discretion is left to 
the enactment of the delegated act, particularly since the CJEU has consistently limited its 
review of legislative discretion to whether there has been a “manifest error of misuse of 
power” or whether the institution have manifestly exceeded the limits of discretion.”322 
Moreover, the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon “should not however mask the fact that delegated acts will often be 
legislative in nature, in the sense that they will lay down binding provisions of general 
                                                             
319 In this sense see Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (Fourth Edition 
edn, Oxford University Press 2008), 96. 
320 Hofman, Rowe and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, 121. 
321 Ibid, 127. 
322 Herwing C.H. Hofman, 'Legislation, delegation and implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon : 
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and Materials, 137. 
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application to govern a certain situation.”323 Finally, it shall also be noted that after the Treaty 
of Lisbon, delegated acts are not subject to the comitology procedure,324 thereby weakening 
the control of the delegated act by the Member States. This makes even more urgent the 
need of a subsidiarity control of the delegated act.  
As to implementing acts, under Article 291 TFEU, the discretion of the EU is not necessarily 
limited. Despite the choice between a delegated or implementing act being made at an early 
stage, in practice the distinction is that the implementing acts normally executes the 
legislative act without amendment or supplementation. As such, it is not possible to 
understand until the act is made whether it is delegated or implemented, as any draft 
measure may be changed prior to final enactment. This may take the measure from the 
category of delegated to implementing act and vice versa.325 Furthermore, the Commission 
has signalled that it will take subsidiarity concerns into account into in relation to delegated 
and implementing acts in the context of political dialogue with national parliaments.326  
Subsidiarity principle as a general principle of EU law  
The nature of the subsidiarity principle as a general principle of EU law makes it applicable 
to all acts of the EU, i.e. legislative or non-legislative acts, in the exercise of its shared powers. 
The peculiarity of subsidiarity is that it is a written principle that was put forward in writing 
by the Member States without having been discovered first by the CJEU.327 This may raise 
                                                             
323 Craig, EU Administrative law, 126. 
324 For an argument favoring the survival of comitology for delegated acts see Paul Craig, The Lisbon 
Treaty, Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press 2011), 58-59. Though, Craig considers 
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COM(2011) 345 final, p. 4.  
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questions as to whether the CJEU gives subsidiarity the nature of general principle of EU law. 
De Witte has raised doubts as to the classification of subsidiarity as a general principle of EU 
Law.328 He makes a distinction between EU general principles of EU law, that he defines as 
“unwritten principles, recognised by the European Court of Justice and its [General Court] 
which possess a higher law status by the fact that they may be invoked as standards for the 
review of [EU] acts.”329 As such, these principles are “an important instrument for the 
protection of the individuals, often business firms, against policies and administrative 
measures of the European [EU] and its Member States.”330 De Witte contrasts this category 
of general principles of EU law with another category of principles, the “general principles of 
institutional law”. The latter do not serve to protect the position of the individual, but to 
regulate the relations between institutions, both at horizontal level, i.e. between the 
institutions of the European Union, and at vertical level, i.e. between the institution of the 
EU and those of the Member States.331  Subsidiarity, according to de Witte’s classification, 
would be a vertical principle of institutional law, as it serves to regulate the relation between 
the EU and the Member States. De Witte questions the capacity of the “general principles of 
institutional law” to be “general principles of EU law” on the basis that there are doubts 
regarding the invocability of the former by individuals, either before national courts or 
European courts. General principles of institutional law would then be an independent 
source of legal obligation but without adding any legal value to these norms.332  Tridimas also 
makes a similar distinction between “systemic principles which underlie the constitutional 
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structure of the Union,” such the subsidiarityprinciple333  and “principles which derive from 
the rule of law,” that refer to the relation between individuals with public bodies. 334 
However, contrary to de Witte, Tridimas considers both types to be general principles of EU 
Law. In the same sense, Tridimas does not attach any consequence to the fact that 
subsidiarity was not first established by the CJEU. He considers that in terms of its 
materialisation, a general principle may be expressly stated or deduced by a process of 
interpretation on the basis of legislative texts, the objectives of the legislation, or the 
underlying values of the legal system.335 Subsidiarity, as well as proportionality and 
fundamental rights, have been expressly stated in the Treaty as part of the formalization of 
European Law, of which the origin can be traced back to the Maastricht Treaty.336 According 
to Tridimas, all have the nature of general principles and any act of an European Institution 
can be challenged on the grounds of breach of a general principle that also serves as an aid 
to interpretation. 337  
To access the nature of subsidiarity as a general principle of EU law it is thus paramount to 
assess the issue of its justiciability. Is subsidiarity a principle against which any act from the 
EU institutions may be challenged? Does it also serve as an aid to interpretation of EU law? 
The issue of the justiciability of the subsidiarity principle, was discussed at length before the 
introduction of the principle in the Maastricht Treaty.338  At the time of the Maastricht 
Treaty’s negotiations, there was an opposite stance between politicians and lawyers on the 
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question of its justiciability. On one side, the politicians and political bodies in the 
preparatory works of the draft Treaty of the European Union expressed a strong desire to 
subject the application of subsidiarity to judicial control.339 This was clear in the various 
reports of the Committee on Institutional Affairs, where the European Parliament considered 
that “judicial guarantees must be given with regard to respect of the principle of subsidiarity” 
and that “the Court of Justice should be given jurisdiction as a constitutional body, with the 
task of ensuring in particular that the division of competences between the European Union 
and the Member States is respected.”340 Also, the European Parliament stated in a Resolution 
on the principle of subsidiarity that “it is necessary to guarantee respect in law of the 
principle of subsidiarity by endowing the Court of Justice with the appropriate powers and 
allowing the EU Institutions and Member States to refer matters to it when they arise.”341  
This contrasts with the position of legal experts at the time, who were against incorporating 
the principle of subsidiarity into the EC Treaty other than in the preamble, as it would make 
it justiciable before the CJEU. For example, the House of Lords Selected Committee on the 
European Communities stated that it did “not believe that subsidiarity can be used as a 
precise measure against which to judge legislation. The test of subsidiarity can never be 
wholly objective or consistent over time - different people regard collective action as more 
effective than individual action in different circumstances. To leave legislation open to 
annulment of revision by the European Court on such subjective grounds would lead to 
immense confusion and uncertainty in Union law.”342 The issue of justiciability of the 
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subsidiarity principle was given a positive answer by the introduction of the principle into 
the Maastricht Treaty, and has been reinforced since then.343 The CJEU has also repeatedly 
stated its jurisdiction to judge possible violations of the principle of subsidiarity.344  
Conclusion 
The distribution of power between the EU and the Member States is constitutionally 
guaranteed. The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced a system of competences setting the 
jurisdictional boundaries of the Union and of the Member States. Yet, multi-level power 
distribution remains one of the most testing issues in structures like the EU that require 
careful consideration of multiple factors.345 Under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU the Union has 
exclusive competence to establish the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market. Yet, this chapter has shown that an isolated reading of this article reveals 
very little on the nature of the EU competence in the competition field and on the modalities 
for its exercise. It concludes that the existing debate in the literature on this matter does not 
provide a conclusive answer on how competence in the field of competition within the EU is 
allocated. This analysis will be pursued in chapters 3 and 4 that will explore the inner and the 
outer boundaries of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, respectively.  
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Chapter 3 - The outer boundaries of Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU – The conferral provision 
The debate on the nature of the EU competence in the field of competition has not yet been 
closed. Chapter 2 showed that current literature does not provide a conclusive answer to 
this question and that further analysis is necessary. This analysis is carried out in this Chapter 
3 and also in Chapter 4 that should be read jointly.  
The aim of Chapters 3 and 4 is to assess whether and to what extent the door to diversity by 
the legislative action of the Member States and their enforcement of EU competition law 
remains open under the constitutional arrangements on competence allocation between the 
EU and the Member States in the field of competition enshrined in the European Treaties.  
Contrary to other exclusive competences under Article 3(1) TFEU (e.g. customs union, 
monetary policy, common commercial policy), the EU exclusive competence under Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU has been established in a more narrower fashion. It regards only to the 
“establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.” 
The CJEU itself, when called upon to analyse the competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU, does not refer to the policy field of “competition”, but to the “area of competition 
rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.” 346 Section  1 of this chapter 
explores the limits to the EU competence in the field of competition that follow directly from 
the narrow formulation of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. Section 2 discusses who has competence to 
establish competition rules that are not necessary for the functioning of the internal market. 
The outer boundaries of the exclusive competence to the EU under Article 3(1)(b)TFEU are 
further explored in section 3 that asks whether the executive competence to enforce EU 
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competition law is within the scope of such exclusive competence to the EU. Finally, Section 
4, debates the nature of the EU executive competence to enforce EU competition law. 
1.  The exclusion of the competence to establish competition 
rules that are not necessary to the functioning of the 
internal market  
Under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU only the adoption of rules that are “necessary for the functioning 
of the internal market” is within the scope of the exclusive competence of the EU.347  We 
have seen that this expression has been causing some controversy. Dashwood considers that 
this provision simply states the obvious as only the EU has competence to adopt rules 
applicable throughout the internal market.348 Schütze and Townley considered that the 
Treaty might have fallen victim to a “logical fallacy” and classified the competence of the EU 
as exclusive since only the EU can enact competition rules that are applicable thought out 
the internal market.349 As argued by Townley that was not good reason for the Treaty’s 
drafters to consider competition in the internal market as the exclusive competence of the 
EU. It is rather a shared competence under Article 4(2)(a) TFEU. Against these views I argue 
that, if we consider the role of Article 3 TFEU in the EU’s system of competence, the wording 
of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is not “technically inept” and it is not a “logical fallacy.” Article 3 has 
a conferral role. It confers competence to the EU of an exclusive nature in the areas 
mentioned therein. Under the principle of conferral, the EU shall act not only within the 
limits of the competences that have been conferred upon it by the Treaties, but also to attain 
the objectives set out therein.350  The introduction of the expression “necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market” in Article 3(1)(b) TFEU has the important effect of 
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establishing (i) the limits of the transfer of competence from the Member States to the EU 
as regards “the establishing of the competition rules” and (ii) the objectives of that 
competence.   
The limits of the conferral of competence to “the establishing of the 
competition rules” 
The confinement of the EU competence to enact competition rules by reference to the 
“functioning of the internal market” is of particular importance and reach. “Exclusive 
competences are those which have been definitively and irreversibly forfeited by the 
Member States by reason of their straightforward transfer to the Union.”351 An exclusive 
competence of the EU excludes the Member States from acting within the same area, except 
if authorised by the EU to do it.352 If the EU’s exclusive  competence under Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU to “the establishing of the competition rules” had not been limited to the situation 
where those rules are “necessary for the functioning of the internal market” there would 
have been an unlimited transfer of competence to the EU to adopt competition rules. 
Member States would have lost the competence to regulate competition in their national 
territories. There has been a previous situation where the Member States had conferred full 
and unlimited competition in competition matters. That was the situation in the context of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as regards the coal and steel industries under 
the Treaty of Paris.353 It was received wisdom, confirmed by the CJEU,354 that under the 
Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) the contracting 
parties had fully transferred competence to the ECSC in matters of competition regarding 
these industries. The basic provisions on competition in the Treaty of Paris left no room for 
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national competition laws to be enacted and applicable to the coal and steel industries. This 
has been eloquently argued by Verstrynge who compared the transfer of jurisdictional 
competence in competition matters under the Treaty of Rome, with that of the Treaty of 
Paris, 355 signed by the same six signatories back in 1951.356 The ECSC Treaty included two 
articles on competition: Article 65, prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and Article 66, 
dealing with ‘concentrations’ and ‘misuses’ of economic power. The ECSC Treaty also 
established an institutional framework that included a Council, representing the 
participating Member States that would enact laws, a High Authority, that would be 
responsible for applying those laws to the coal and steel industries and a European Court 
with judicial functions to rule on disputes over the Treaty. 357 The subsequent EEC Treaty did 
not modify the transfer of jurisdiction under ECSC Treaty.358 Verstrynge pointed out that it 
was generally recognized that there had been a complete transfer of jurisdiction from the 
Member States to the ECSC under the Treaty of Paris. The wording of the competition 
provision of the EEC Treaty, Articles 65(1), 66(1) and 66(7) ECSC Treaty, was clear in leaving 
no room for the application of national antitrust laws to practices regarding the coal and 
steel industry.  
Under Article 65(1) ECSC Treaty: 
All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices tending directly or indirectly to prevent, restrict or distort 
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normal competition within the Common Market shall be prohibited (…)(Emphasis 
added) 
Under Article 66(1) ECSC Treaty: 
Any transaction shall require the prior authorisation of the High Authority, subject 
to the provision of paragraph 3 of this Article, if it has in itself the direct of the 
indirect effect of bringing about within the territories referred in the first paragraph 
of Article 79 as a result of action by any person or undertaking or group of persons 
or undertakings a concentration between undertakings at least one of which is 
covered by Article 80, whether the transaction concerns a single product or a 
number of direct products...” (Emphasis added) 
Article 66(7) ECSC Treaty provided that: 
If the High Authority finds that public or private undertakings which, in law or in 
fact, hold or acquire in the market for one of the products within its jurisdiction a 
dominant position shielding them against effective competition in a substantial 
part of the Common Market are using that position for purposes contrary to the 
objectives of this Treaty, it shall make to them such recommendations as may be 
appropriate to prevent the position from being so used. (Emphasis added) 
On these grounds Verstrynge argues that Member States had lost the power to enact and 
apply competition rules to coal and steel industries. It was also recognized that there had 
been an unlimited transfer of jurisdiction from the Member States to the EEC Commission 
that replaced the High Authority, to enforce Articles 65 and 66 ECSC Treaty.359  The 
Commission became the sole competent to apply antitrust rules in the context of the ECSC 
Treaty.360 This exclusive competence was also expressly recognised by the national laws in 
Germany361 and the UK,362 and in particular by the CJEU in 1961:363  
[U]nder Article 1 of the [ECSC] Treaty the Community is founded upon a common 
market, common objectives and common institutions. In the Community field, 
namely in respect to everything that pertains to the pursuit of the common 
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objectives within the common market, the institutions of the Community have been 
endowed with exclusive authority.364 
In contrast to the ECSC Treaty, the competition provisions of the EEC Treaty were limited to 
practices that “affect trade between Member States.” Article 85 EEC Treaty (now Article 101 
TFEU) prohibited  
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States (…).  
Article 86 (now Article 102 TFEU) prohibited 
 “[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it (…) in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States.”  
Spaak and Jaeger pointed out that it would have not been possible to grant the EEC such 
wide powers over the whole economy of the six Member States while leaving to the 
Governments of those States with the political responsibility involved.365  These authors 
considered that the EEC Treaty had a different logic from the ECSC Treaty. The ECSC Treaty 
established a community for two basic industries only: the coal and steel industries. In its 
efforts to allow a common basis for industrial expansion and further economic integration, 
the ECSC Treaty established a “pool” of coal and steel production. It is this pooling of 
production that explains why the ECSC Treaty gave the High Authority definite power over 
the matters it covers. The EEC Treaty established a community comprising all other sectors 
of the economy. On these grounds, Spaak and Jaeger argued that “this notion of ‘pool’ of 
production could no longer apply when it came to the entire economy of the six countries. 
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It is no longer a question of ‘partial integration, limited to basic industries.’”366 Also, they 
argued that the geographical location of the coal and steel industry, where the great majority 
of the enterprises were located with a triangle formed by the Ruhr, Lorraine, Norther France 
and Belgium, practically any action restricting competition would directly or indirectly affect 
trade between Member States.367 These differences may justify that under EEC Treaty the 
Governments have retained the power to regulate competition under their respective 
territory.368 At the time of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, some Member States 
already had national competition laws,369 and others enacted them later. The question on 
the relation between the national laws and the competition provisions in the EEC Treaty was 
soon raised. Did Member States retain competence to regulate competition in their 
territories?370 In Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,371 the CJEU recognised that Member 
States have retained competence to enact and apply national competition laws. As stated by 
the Advocate General in the case, there was nothing in the provisions of the EEC Treaty to 
indicate that “there exists a legal situation analogous to that in force in the ECSC where, it is 
well known, agreements concluded by coal and steel undertakings could only be examined 
under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty.”372  
The limited scope of powers conferred to the EU on competition under the Treaty of Rome 
could have been changed if the Treaty of Lisbon had not limited the exclusive competence 
                                                             
366 Ibid. 
367 Ibid, 489. 
368 Independently of the coordination in regard to the application of the rules of competition of the 
Treaty, Spaak and Jaeger considered that harmonization of the national laws may be arrived under 
Article 100 EEC Treaty, should this prove necessary to the establishment or functioning of the 
Common Market, see  ibid. 
369 Belgium, France and The Netherlands. 
370 The Italian law was the only national competition law addressing this issue directly, stating that it 
was only applicable where the Treaty’s provisions were not applicable. Art. 1 (1) Legge 10 ottobre 
1990, n. 287, GURI n. 240 del 13 ottobre 1990.  
371 Judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 
EU:C:1969:4 
372 Opinion of Advocate General Roemer of 19 December 1968, Walt Wilhelm and Others v 
Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, EU:C:1968:55. 
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of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU to establishing of the competition rules that are 
necessary “for the functioning of the internal market.” 
As previously submitted, the difference between the different types of EU competences is of 
a relational kind: exclusive competence excludes other authorities from acting within the 
same policy area.373 If Article 3(1)(b) TFEU had not restricted the exclusive competence of 
the EU to enact competition rules to those that are necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market, then Member States would have transferred to the EU unlimited 
competence to enact competition laws to be applicable to situations affecting their territory. 
They did not. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have remained applicable to situations that affect 
trade between Member States only, as the exclusive competence of the EU under Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU only confers power to the EU in order to enact rules “that are necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market.”  
The EU only has the powers that have been conferred to it. The competence not conferred 
on the EU remains within the residual competence of the Member States.374 Taking this into 
consideration, Article 3(1)(b) TFEU can neither be considered “technically inept” nor a 
“logical fallacy.” It serves the constitutional purpose of limiting the transfer of competence 
to the EU to establish the competition rules. The competence to establish competition rules 
that are not necessary for the functioning of the internal market has remained in the 
Member States.   
The objective of “the establishing of the competition rules”  
The reference in Article 3(1)(b) TFEU to the “functioning of the internal market” also serves 
the purpose of clarifying the objectives of the EU competence conferred thereby. The EU 
acts within the powers it has been conferred and it uses those to attain the objectives set 
                                                             
373 Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 163. 
374 Article 4(1) TEU.  
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out by the Treaties.375 The clarification that competition rules must be necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market is of particular importance if we recall the context of the 
negotiations of the Treaty of Lisbon as regards the field of competition. The Treaty of Lisbon 
“marked the first time in the chronicle of European integration that competition law’s role 
in the structure of the Treaties has been questioned.”376 Article 3(1)(g) of the EC Treaty 
provided that for the purpose of accomplishment of its tasks the activities of the Community 
shall include “a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted.” In 
Continental Can the Court recognized that the objectives pursued by Article 3(1)(g) EC Treaty 
were “indispensable” for the achievement of the Community’s tasks. The Draft 
Constitutional Treaty established under Article I(3)(2) that “[t]he Union shall offer its citizens 
an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal market 
where competition is free and undistorted.”377 However, this did not make it into the Treaty 
of Lisbon that merged the former Articles 2 and 3 EC Treaty into the new Article 3 TEU. The 
merger resulted in broader economic and non-economic objectives and tasks of the EU. 
Under Article 3(3) TEU:  
“The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a 
highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment.”  
                                                             
375 Article 5(2) TEU.  
376 Lianos, 'Competition law in the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon', 255.  
377 Lianos points out that jurisprudence of the Court at the time interpreted the freedoms of 
movement (free movement of goods, services, persons and capital) as equivalent to fundamental 
rights at the core of the European constitutional project. Therefore, this linked competition law to the 
goal of market integration, raising the rank of competition law to that of the fundamental freedoms 
of movement. Ibid See Judgment of 12 June 2003, Schmidberger, C-112/00, EU:C:2003:333; Judgment 
of 14 October 2004, Omega, C-36/02, EU:C:2004:614; Judgment of 18 December 2007, Laval un 
Partneri, C-341/05, EU:C:2007:809; Judgment of 11 December 2007, The International Transport 
Workers' Federation and The Finnish Seamen's Union, C-438/05, EU:C:2007:772 
and Judgment of 3 April 2008, Rüffert, C-346/06, EU:C:2008:189. 
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There is no reference to the principle of “undistorted competition” and “free 
competition”,378 and the concept of “social market economy” replaces the expression “open 
market economy with free competition.”  The reference to the internal market in Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU, jointly with Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition, brings 
competition rules into the internal market again. Once more, Article 3(1)(b) TFEU cannot be 
considered “technically inept.” It expresses the objectives of EU action under the exclusive 
competence conferred by that provision. Jointly with Protocol (No 27), this is of great 
relevance, as pointed out by Petite, “to avoid any risk of uncertainty as to settled law and to 
make fully clear that competition will continue to be one of the main policies aiming at the 
good functioning on the internal market(…).”379 Some authors, such as Lianos also see in this 
formulation the possibility for the EU to adopt a more “holistic” approach to competition, 
particularly to attain other objectives and public policies that might be frustrated by the 
application of competition law.380 This is particularly relevant if we take into consideration 
the discussion in Chapter 1 on the plurality of goals of the Treaties and consider that, as 
argued by Townley, the Treaty of Lisbon did not change the “force of teleological arguments 
for public policy balancing in EU competition law.”381 
2. The nature of the competence to establish the 
competition rules that are not necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market  
The competence to establish competition rules that are not necessary for the functioning of 
the internal market is not within the exclusive competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) 
                                                             
378 Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition annexed to the TEU and TFEU explicitly 
mentions that “the internal market as set out in Article 3 TEU includes a system ensuring that 
competition is not distorted. 
379 Michel Petite, 'EU commitment to competition policy is unchanged' Financial Times (27 June) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/72f53bd8-244a-11dc-8ee2-
000b5df10621.html?desktop=true&ft_site=falcon&siteedition=intl#axzz4sG5U4KX8> 
380 In this sense see Lianos, 'Competition law in the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon', 260.  
381 Townley, 'Constitutional limits to diversity (and Co-ordinated diversity) in EU competition law', 36.  
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TFEU. What is then the nature of this competence? We have seen in the previous chapter 
that, under the system of competences established by the Treaty of Lisbon, if a legal basis 
conferring powers to the EU to act outside the scope of an exclusive competence is found in 
the Treaties, that competence is shared under Article 4(1) TFEU. If there is no legal basis in 
the Treaties allowing the EU to act, it means that such competence has remained with the 
Member States as per Article 4 (1) TEU.  
There are no provisions in the Treaties that allow the EU to adopt competition rules that are 
not necessary for the functioning of the internal market. Even the general competences that 
the EU enjoy under Articles 114 and 352 TFEU are limited to the creation or functioning of 
the internal market.  
Therefore, the competence to establish competition rules that are not necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market has remained with the Member States, that have an 
exclusive competence in this area.  
3. Exclusion of the competence to enforce EU competition 
law  
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU limits the exclusive competence of the EU to “the establishing of the 
competition rules.” It is submitted that the enforcement of EU competition rules is excluded 
from the scope of the exclusive competence under Article 3(1) TFEU. This is because a 
decision to enforce EU competition provision cannot be considered to be within the notion 
of “rules.”  
The notion of “rule” 
What is a “rule” and what can be considered the action of “the establishing of the 
competition rules”? Those are relevant questions for the purpose of understanding the 
scope of the competences under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU.  
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The concept of “rule” has been the object of intense discussion in legal theory. From Hart’s 
positivism382 to Dworkin’s concept of rules,383 and Kelsen’s pure theory of law that argues 
that all public decision-making involves a normative dimension,384 the notion of “rules” has 
been contentious. It is not the object of this thesis to get into this discussion. The notion of 
“rule” for the purpose of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU needs to be ascertained from the logic of the 
Treaties. What is a “rule” is not directly defined in the Treaties. However, it can be inferred 
from the wording of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU directly that the concept of “rules” therein means 
acts of a legislative nature, as opposed to acts of an executive nature. To consider otherwise 
would be a violation of the principle of the separation of powers. Competence under Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU specifically concerns “the establishing of the competition rules.” Ever since the 
publication of Montesquieu’s “The spirits of laws,” in 1748 the separation of powers has 
constituted a structural guarantee of democracy conditioning the exercise of public 
authority. This is also true as regards the EU legal order.385 Montesquieu identified three 
governmental powers, known as legislative, executive and judicial powers.386  
                                                             
382 H.L.A. Hart, The concept of law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 1994). 
383 Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking rights seriously (Harvard University Press 1986). 
384 Hans Kelsen, General theory of law and state (Harvard University Press 1949). 
385 For a general overview of the principle of separation of powers in the EU see Koen Lenaerts, Le 
juge et la Constitution aux États-Unis d'Amérique et dans l'ordre juridique européen (Bruylant 1988), 
Chapter 3; Koen Lenaerts, 'Some reflections on the separation of powers in the European Community' 
(1991) 28 Common Market Law Review Robert Schütze, Sharpening the separation of powers through 
a hierarchy of norms? Reflections on the draft constitution Treaty’s regime for legislative and executive 
law-making (Working Paper 2005/W-01, EIPA 2005); Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 83-85.  
386 Montesquieu presents the main idea of separation of powers as follows:  
In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative, the executive 
in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard 
to matters that depend on the civil law. […] When the legislative and executive 
powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there 
can be no liberty; because apprehension may arise, lest the same monarch or 
senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 
Again, there is no liberty, if the judicial power be not separate from the legislative 
and the executive. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave 
with violence and oppression. 
Charles de Secondat Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 
Book XI, Chapter 6 (1748) Accessed last time 10 September 2017. 
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Traditionally there are two understandings of the principle of separation of powers: 
“organic” and “functional”. 387 The organic understanding of separation of powers results 
from a distinction between the organs that have the legislative, executive and judicial 
functions. The American constitution is typically given as an example of a constitution that 
embraces an organic understanding of separation of powers.388 The first three Articles of the 
constitution designate the organs in which the legislative, the executive and the judicial 
power are vested (the Congress, the President and the Supreme Court). Lenaerts argues that 
in the EU context, an organic approach is not possible. There is no clear identification under 
the Treaties of which EU institutions hold the several powers. This is because a closer analysis 
of their prerogatives under the Treaties389 does not indicate a clear cut line between the 
legislative and the executive branches of the EU government.390 Lenaerts claims that in the 
EU context the understanding of separation of powers is functional: 
[T]he legislative power relates to the function of enacting rules with a general and 
abstractly defined scope of application (this is what a Continental European lawyer 
would call the “lois matérielles”); the executive power relates to the function of 
applying the said legislative rules to individual cases or specific categories of cases; 
finally the judicial power relates to the function of settling the meaning legislation 
that arises on the occasion of the application of the legislative rules to individual 
cases or specific category of cases, and this on several possible grounds[.]391  
Having this into consideration, the distinction between legislative and executive powers is of 
particular relevance to understanding what “rules” under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU may include.392 
                                                             
387 Lenaerts, 'Some reflections on the separation of powers in the European Community', 12.  
388 Lenaerts, Le juge et la Constitution aux États-Unis d'Amérique et dans l'ordre juridique 
européenSchütze, European Constitutional Law, 83. 
389 Schütze identifies the following correlation of the EU institutions to governmental functions: 
Legislative: Parliament and Council; Executive: European Council and Commission; Judicial: Court and 
Commission. Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 86.  
390 Lenaerts, 'Some reflections on the separation of powers in the European Community', 12. 
391 Ibid, 12. 
392 This is true, even for legal philosophy scholars that embrace a large notion of “law” based on a 
functional conception of legislation. The Vienna School of Pure Law to which Kelsen is intrinsically 
associated to, claimed that all public decision-making involved a normative dimension and that 
therefore, the legislative function was not limited to the legislature, but was also exercised by the 
executive and judicial bodies. In Kelsen words:  
 111 
According to the EU functional understanding of separation of powers, “the establishing of 
the competition rules” corresponds to the exercise of legislative power. Therefore, “rules” 
within that provision constitutes acts of a legislative nature. Acts of an executive nature are 
excluded from the scope of the exclusive competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, 
as it relates to the function of applying such law to individual or specific cases.  
The EU executive powers do not match the EU legislative powers  
The exclusion of the executive power from an area of exclusive competence of the EU under 
Article 3 TFEU is not specific to the field of competition. I argue that, under the Treaties, the 
EU exclusive legislative powers do not necessarily match the EU’s exclusive executive 
powers. This can be illustrated, by the competence of the EU in the area of common 
commercial policy (CCP). CCP is included in the catalogue of exclusive competences of the 
EU. Article 3(1)(e) TFEU makes a simple reference to the whole area of “common commercial 
policy”, not circumscribing the EU powers in that area. It could thus be argued that the 
exclusive competence of the EU under that provision covers both executive and legislative 
competence. However, the legal bases for the acts of the EU in the area of CCP are found in 
Article 207 TFEU. This provision only allows the EU to adopt general measures of two types: 
international agreements (paragraph 1)393 and regulations (paragraph 2).394 Therefore, the 
EU’s executive competence to adopt individual decisions to enforce CCP law must be found 
                                                             
“The legislative function is opposed to both the executive and he judicial 
functions, (…).  Legislation (legilatio of Roman law) is the creation of laws (leges). 
If we speak of “execution” we must ask what is executed. There is no other 
answer but the statement that it is the general norms, the constitution and the 
laws created by the legislative powers, which are executed.” Kelsen, General 
theory of law and state, 255. 
393 Article 202 (1) TFEU “The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly with regard to changes in tariffs rates, the conclusion of tariffs and trade agreements 
relating to trade in goods and services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign 
direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The 
common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of principles and objectives of the 
Union’s external action.  
394 Article 202 (2) TFEU “The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulation in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedures, shall adopt the measures defining the framework 
for implementing the common commercial policy.” 
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elsewhere in the Treaty. While Article 290 TFEU can be the basis for the competence of the 
Commission to implement the CCP through acts of general application, the basis for the 
adoption of individual decisions must be founded in a general competence of the EU to 
execute EU law, which is Article 291 TFEU. This provision only grants a shared competence 
to the EU.395 In fact, Article 291(1) TFEU makes it clear that the implementation “is first and 
foremost the task of the Member States.”396 This is a corollary of the Member States’ duty 
of “sincere cooperation.” Under Article 4(3) TEU, Member-States must ensure that they fulfil 
their obligations resulting from actions of the EU’s institutions. According to Article 291(2) 
TFEU: 
“[w]here uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are 
needed, those acts shall confer implementing power on the Commission, or in duly 
justified specific cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the 
Treaty on European Union, on the Council.”  
Therefore, the primary competence to enforce EU law pertains to the Member States, that 
implement EU law through its legislative transposition into national law and, indirectly, 
through its own administrative structure.397 Under the principle of procedural autonomy, 
where no relevant EU rules exist, national law determines the conditions for the 
enforcement of EU law. Moreover, Member States have autonomy as to their internal 
organization, so long as EU law does not require otherwise for example, providing for certain 
administrative procedures or specific organisation of authorities.398 Under Article 291(2) 
TFEU, only where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding EU acts are needed, 
those acts shall confer implementing power on the Commission. The powers of the EU to 
                                                             
395 In this sense see Schütze, 'From Rome to Lisbon: Executive federalism in the (new) European 
Union', 1401. 
396 Hofman, Rowe and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, 237. 
397 Ibid, 99. 
398 Judgment of 15 December 1971, International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groenten en 
fruit, Joined Cases 51-54/71, EU:C:1971:128.  
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adopt individual decisions to implement the CCP are not exclusive. Those powers are 
subsidiary to the powers of the Member States. 
The exclusion of acts of executive nature from the exclusive competence of the EU under 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is of particular relevance in the field of competition. Since the Treaty of 
Rome, the EU has been given powers under Article 105 TFEU to apply the principles laid 
down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.399 What is then the nature of the executive competence 
of the EU under Article 105 TFEU?  
 
4. The nature of the EU executive powers under Article 105 
TFEU 
It is submitted that the EU’s executive competence under Article 105 TFEU is shared, as per 
Article 4(1) TFEU. Under this provision, unless stated otherwise in the Treaties, where the 
Treaties confer on the EU a competence that competence is shared.  
Against the shared nature of the EU competence to enforce EU competition provisions, 
Townley argues that, after the Treaty of Lisbon it has become clear that the enforcement of 
EU competition law is an exclusive competence of the EU.400 He mentions Article 3 TFEU as 
a legal basis for his conclusion.401 He also claims that in Akzo,402 the “CJEU accepted that 
competition is now an area of exclusive Union competence.”403 I do not agree with this view. 
It has been showed that Akzo does not relate to the EU’s power to enforce competition law. 
                                                             
399 The Treaty of Rome only conferred executive power to the Community – the power to adopt 
individual decisions – in three areas: agriculture (Article 43 EEC Treaty), transport (Article 79 and 80 
EEC Treaty) and competition (Articles 85 e seq. EEC Treaty). 
400 Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU 
Law too)', 208.   
401 Ibid, 227.  
402 Judgment of 14 September 2010, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, C-
550/07 P, EU:C:2010:512. 
403 Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU 
Law too)', 227.  
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Akzo is confined to the scope of the EU’s powers to adopt rules of proceedings that will be 
applicable to its investigations under Article 105 TFEU. Townley’s reading of Akzo is too 
broad, as the nature of the EU’s competence to enforce EU competition law under Article 
105 TFEU was not at stake in that case.  
As to Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, this provision alone cannot be the basis for an exclusive executive 
competence of the EU to enforce EU competition provisions. As submitted above, this 
provision excludes executive acts from its scope. Therefore, Article 3(1)(b) TFEU alone does 
not determine the exclusive competence of the EU to enforce EU competition provisions. 
There is, however, a possible reasoning that ought to be considered as, if not set aside, it 
could transfer to the EU executive competence to enforce EU competition provisions to the 
exclusive competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. Such argument could be framed 
as follows: under Article 2(1) TFEU “when the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive 
competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts.” 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU confers exclusive competence to the EU in the area of competition. A 
decision enforcing EU competition provision in specific cases is a “legally binding act,” as 
under the fourth paragraph of Article 288 TFEU “[a] decision shall be binding in its entirety. 
A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them.” 
Therefore, it could be argued that, as per Article 3(1)(b) TFEU read together with Article 2(1) 
TFEU, the adoption of individual decisions enforcing EU competition provisions would be 
within the scope of the exclusive competence of the EU.  
This argument however also does not stand. Such an interpretation of the Treaty would not 
only be against the principle of the separation of powers as previously submitted, it would 
also be against the principle of conferral, as established by Article 5(2) TEU. To argue that 
the competence of the EU under Article 105 TFEU to enforce the Treaty’s competition 
provisions is exclusive to the EU under Article 3(1)(b) by virtue of Article 2(1) TFEU is to 
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unduly extend the scope of the exclusive competence conferred on the EU by the Treaties. 
That is a violation of the principle of conferral. For conferral to be respected, Article 2(1) 
TFEU must be understood within the limits of the exclusive competence as conferred upon 
the EU under Article 3. Otherwise, this would amount to transform competences that were 
conferred as shared into exclusive ones. This is particularly well illustrated by the CCP area 
discussed above. We have seen that though specifically mentioned as an area of exclusive 
competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, the legal basis to enact executive acts of 
individual application is Article 291 TFEU. This Article establishes a shared competence. 
However, if we considered that the competence to adopt any legally binding act in the CCP 
area is exclusive to the EU under Article 3(1)(e) TFEU as per Article 2(1) TFEU, EU competence 
under Article 291 TFEU in the field of CCP would be exclusive. This conclusion is not 
compatible with the principle of conferral as it means transforming a shared competence 
under Article 291 TFEU into an exclusive one. This makes no sense. Article 2(1) TFEU must 
therefore be understood within the scope of the exclusive competence under Article 3 TFEU. 
Schütze404 also considers that the EU’s exclusive competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is 
partial and does not affect the competence of the Member States to implement EU 
competition law. Schütze seems to draw his conclusion, not from the scope of Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU, but mostly from the decentralized system of enforcement of EU competition law 
under Regulation 1/2003. Schütze mentions that Regulation 1/2003 ultimately introduced a 
“revolutionary new administrative regime”405 for the enforcement of European competition 
law. Under the previous regime established by Council Regulation (EEC) 17/62 First 
Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty (Regulation 17/62) Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU needed to be applied in an “uniform way by the Member States.”406 To achieve 
                                                             
404 Schütze, 'From Rome to Lisbon: Executive federalism in the (new) European Union'. 
405 Ibid, 1404.  
406 Council Regulation (EEC) 17/62 First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 
[1962] OJ 13/204, Recital 1. 
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this result, it required undertakings that sought application of Article 101(3) TFEU to notify 
their agreements to the Commission. The Commission was granted the “sole power to 
declare Article [101(1)] inapplicable pursuant to Article [101(3)] of the Treaty.”407 Member 
States could continue to apply Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU.408  This system changed with 
Regulation 1/2003 that introduced a system of shared executive competences.409 Schütze 
argues that even if the “pre-eminence” of the Commission is established in Article 11(6) of 
the Regulation, under the new system410  both the Commission and the national competition 
authorities can enforce EU competition law.411 However, this reasoning does not stand. 
Competence allocation is established by primary law.412 Secondary law cannot change the 
nature of the competence as established in the Treaties.  
Schütze’s reasoning however can lead to a different type of question on the nature of the 
competence under Article 105 TFEU. The question is whether, irrespective of the limited 
scope of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, the competence under Article 105 TFEU could be exclusive as 
per Article 105 TFEU directly, i.e. whether an exclusive competence could be conferred on 
the EU by Article 105 TFEU.  
I argue it could not as, again, that would be contrary to the principle of conferral. If a legal 
basis for EU action is found in the Treaties, if not specifically identified as exclusive under 
Article 3 TFEU that competence is shared as per Article 4(1) TFEU. Executive action is 
excluded from the scope of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, therefore is not within the scope of that 
competence. A legal basis for executive action can however be found in the Treaties: Article 
105 TFEU. Such competence is shared as per Article 4(1) TFEU. However, for sake of 
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411 Schütze, 'From Rome to Lisbon: Executive federalism in the (new) European Union', 1404. 
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completeness, let us consider further the argument on whether Article 105 TFEU establishes 
an exclusive competence of the EU.  
The Commission has been granted with exclusive powers to enforce competition law under 
specific conditions first set in Regulation 17/62 and now in Regulation 1/2003. Regulation 
17/62 provided for a centralised notification and authorisation system by the Commission 
for the enforcement of Article 101(3) TFEU. Under Article 4(1) of the Regulation, agreements 
falling under Article 101(3) TFEU in respect of which the parties sought application of Article 
101(3) TFEU had to be notified to the Commission.413 Regulation 1/2003 replaced this system 
with a system of direct effect of Article 101(3). Article 1(2) of this regulation establishes that 
“agreement, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article [101](1) of the Treaty which 
satisfy the conditions of Article [101](3) of the Treaty shall not be prohibited, no prior 
decision to that effect being required.” The centralised system of notification and 
authorisation was thus abolished. Regulation 1/2003 however, gives the Commission the 
possibility to “relieve the competition authorities of the Member States of their competence 
to apply Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty,” by initiating enforcement proceedings.414 
Regulations 17 and 1/2003 were adopted under Article 103 TFEU that, as seen above, 
delegates to the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, the competence to lay down the “appropriate regulations and 
directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles [101] and [102].” 
In this context, if the competence of the EU under Article 105 TFEU was shared could the 
directives and regulations adopted under Article 103 TFEU curtail or supress Member States’ 
competence in favour of the Commission? Or has the competence under Article 105 TFEU 
always been exclusive? I argue that competence under Article 105 TFEU has always been 
                                                             
413 Under Article 6(1) of Regulation 17/62 the exemption decisions pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU 
could not take effect at a date earlies than the date of notification. The condition of prior notification 
did not apply to the agreements falling within Article 4(2) of Regulation 17/62.  
414 Article 11(6) Regulation 1/2003. 
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shared and it has remained shared after the Treaty of Lisbon. Even if it was exclusive, it would 
be difficult to consider that it had remained exclusive under the Treaty of Lisbon.  
As to the issue on whether the Member States competence could be suppressed by acts 
adopted under Article 103 TFEU if the EU competence under 105 TFEU was shared, I argue 
that it could. This issue concerns the possibility of delegation of shared executive powers to 
the Commission. I will first analyse this issue in general, and then in relation to the executive 
powers in competition law in particular. The sub-delegation of shared executive powers to 
the Commission is a possibility expressly recognised since the Treaty of Lisbon. As seen 
above, Article 291 TFEU attributes shared implementing powers to the EU. Article 291(1) 
TFEU determines that the implementation of EU law is primarily the task of the Member 
States. Article 291(2) TFEU however expressly determines that all types of binding EU acts 
shall delegate implementing powers to the Commission where uniform conditions for the 
implementation of those acts are needed.415 Moreover, not only can the delegated powers 
be conferred by legislative acts under Article 289 TFEU, subject to the application of Article 
290 TFEU, but also by delegated acts under Article 290 TFEU. This means that the 
Commission can confer implementing powers on itself “in an act of sub-delegation of 
powers.”416  
The implementation by the EU of EU competition law has an autonomous legal basis from 
the general provision of Article 291 TFEU, that is established by Articles 103 and 105 TFEU. 
Article 103(1) TFEU expressly establishes that the Council shall lay down the regulation or 
directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Under the 
general rule of Article 291 TFEU, delegation is only possible where “uniform conditions for 
implementing legally binding Union acts are needed.” Article 103 TFEU does not circumscribe 
                                                             
415 In duly justified specific cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on 
European Union, Implementing powers should be delegated on the Council. 
416 Hofman, Rowe and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, 239. 
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the delegation to those specific circumstances. It mandates the Council to establish the 
appropriate rules to give effect to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  However, as to any other 
implementing act, general principles of proportionality and subsidiarity must be met. Recital 
34 of Regulation 1/2003 addresses those principles directly. 417 The possibility of sub-
delegation in some competition matters also seems to be possible. Under Article 105(3) TFEU 
“the Commission may adopt regulations relating to the categories of agreements in respect 
of which the Council has adopted a regulation or directive pursuant to Article 103(2)(b).” As 
the case of the sub-delegation under Article 291 TFEU, the Commission’s implementing acts 
under Article 105(3) TFEU may well sub-delegate competences to the Commission in regard 
to the type of agreements mentioned therein.  
Furthermore, it ought to be mentioned that the preparatory works of the Treaty of Rome 
regarding Article 103 TFEU show that the powers established therein were to regulate the 
exercise of shared competences.418 The proposal submitted by the Group de rédaction to the 
                                                             
417 Whereas 34 “The principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, as they have been applied 
by  Regulation 17/62, have given a central role to the Community bodies. This central role should be 
retained, whilst associating the Member States more closely with the application of the Community 
competition rules. In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set out in 
Article 5 of the Treaty, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve its 
objective, which is to allow the Community competition rules to be applied effectively.” 
418 Due to the fact that intergovernmental negotiations are traditionally not concluded on documents 
available to the public, the CJEU tends to consider that the possibility to use them to interpret the 
Treaty is only available in very limited circumstances. For example, in the judgment of 12 April 2005, 
Commission v United Kingdom, C-61/03, EU:C:2005:210, paragraph 29 the Court considered that the 
evidence on interpretation to be taken into consideration could not be limited to the historical 
background to the drawing of the Treaty as they were inconclusive. The issue at stake was the 
application of a provision of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC 
Treaty) (Article 30) requiring Member States to provide to the Commission information on atomic 
waste to military installations. The UK, which was dismantling a nuclear reactor used for military 
purposes, argued that it has no obligation under the EAEC Treaty to provide the Commission with data 
regarding the decommissioning of the reactor (paragraph 16). The UK argued that the Treaty itself 
only covered civil uses of nuclear energy and a provision of the chapter of the Treaty on health and 
safety could not have a wider scope than that of the provision of other chapters of the same Treaty 
(paragraph 23). The Court considered that in absence of an express provision excluding activities 
connected to defence from the scope of the Treaty, it was necessary to have regard to other factors 
in order to determine whether the Treaty is intended also to govern, at least in certain spheres, the 
use of nuclear energy for military purposes (paragraph 28). The Court considered that it could not 
limit itself to take into consideration as evidence the historical background of the Treaty, as the 
unilateral declarations made by the representatives of certain States who took part on the 
negotiations leading to the signature of the Treaty were not conclusive. It was apparent that those 
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first reading foresaw that the task to establish the rules necessary for the enforcement of 
the competition law by the Member States should be the task of the European Community. 
The majority of the delegations rejected this view, claiming that that should be a left to 
national laws and National Parliaments. France, joined by Germany, responded that the 
harmonisation of national regulation should be left to the National Parliaments. Belgium and 
Italy agreed with France and Germany, but mentioned that a deadline should be established 
for the National Parliaments to harmonise the laws. If the deadline was not met, the 
harmonisation should be done by the institutions of the European Community. Only the 
Netherlands considered that the harmonisation of national laws should be of the “immediate 
competence” of the Community’s institutions, but it then joined the position of Belgium and 
Italy. Eventually, the EU was given the task to establish the rules to enforce EU competition 
law; in the final version of Article 103 TFEU (then Article 87 EC Treaty). However, the shared 
nature of the powers to enforce EU competition law had never been in issue. This is clear in 
the proposal of the first regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in the Treaty, under then Article 87 EC Treaty (now Article 103 TFEU). The proposal 
was presented by the President of the Commission, Mr. Walter Hallstein, to the President of 
the Council, on the 31 October 1960. In the “exposé de motifs” it was expressly stated that 
the Commission and the Member States shared competences in this area: “[s]ince 1958, 
these aims had inspired the joint action of the Commission and the national competition 
authorities that shared the competence in this area.” The Commission also stressed that 
coordination between the Commission and the Member States for the enforcement of 
Articles [101] and [102 TFEU] was necessary in order to achieve a communauté de 
conception, which is a condition of a uniform policy. This points to the exercise of a shared 
competence under Article 105 TFEU.  In the light of the above, it can be concluded that the 
                                                             
representatives had different views on the issue and that they have decided to leave it unsolved. 
Therefore, the Court concluded from this that the guidance provided from that evidence was not 
sufficient (paragraph 29). 
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de facto exclusive competence of the Commission under Article 4 of Regulation 17/62 and 
under Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003 is not the expression of an exclusive competence 
conferred to the EU by the Treaties. It is rather the result of a delegation to the Commission 
of shared executive powers under those Regulations. As I will show next, this conclusion is 
coherent with the CJEU case law on case allocation in competition enforcement actions and 
with the CJEU case law on the exercise of EU exclusive competence by the Member States.  
The CJEU approach to case allocation in EU competition law enforcement  
The EU Courts have been called to analyse the compatibility of the allocation of EU 
competition enforcement cases between the EU and the Member States under the 
subsidiarity principle on several occasions. Under Article 5(3) TEU, the subsidiarity principle 
is applicable to shared competences.  In none of the cases have the EU Courts considered 
that the principle was not applicable. On the contrary, they have addressed the issue directly. 
For example, in van den Bergh Foods419 the Court of First Instance, now the General Court, 
considered that the decision of the Commission to initiate proceedings under Article 101 
TFEU, despite the existence of parallel proceedings before national courts, was appropriate 
in order to ensure that the European competition rules would be applicable coherently to 
the various forms of exclusivity practices by ice-cream manufacturers through the EU. As 
such the Court concluded that the Commission’s decision respected the subsidiarity 
principle.420 In SA Cimenteries CB421 the General Court, then the Court of First Instance, 
considered that is was compatible with the subsidiarity principle that the Commission 
dropped certain objections regarding a part of its investigation, leaving it to the discretion of 
                                                             
419 Judgment of 23 October 2003, Van den Bergh Foods v Commission, T-65/98, EU:T:2003:281. 
420 Judgment of 23 October 2003, Van den Bergh Foods v Commission, T-65/98, EU:T:2003:281, 
paragraph 199. 
421 Judgment of 15 March 2000, Cimenteries CBR v Commission, Joined cases T-25/95, T-26/95, T-
30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95, T-37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-42/95, T-43/95, T-
44/95, T-45/95, T-46/95, T-48/95, T-50/95, T-51/95, T-52/95, T-53/95, T-54/95, T-55/95, T-56/95, T-
57/95, T-58/95, T-59/95, T-60/95, T-61/95, T-62/95, T-63/95, T-64/95, T-65/95, T-68/95, T-69/95, T-
70/95, T-71/95, T-87/95, T-88/95, T-103/95 and T-104/95, EU:T:2000:77. 
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the competition authorities of the Member States to take, if necessary, the measures they 
deemed appropriate in order to bring to an end the practices in question.422 The Cimenteries 
case concerned a cartel investigation in the cement market. During the investigation 
proceedings, the Commission informed the national competition authorities that it had 
dropped the investigation of the national agreements and concerted practices and would 
only pursue the investigation of the practices that were Europe-wide. In the appeal of the 
Commission’s decision, the appellant claimed that by doing so the Commission had violated 
the principle of subsidiarity as the matter fell within the scope of the EU interest. In the 
France Télécom case the General Court, then Court of First Instance, also evaluated the 
competence of the Commission to subject Wanadoo to an inspection under Article 20(4) 
Regulation 1/2003 under the subsidiarity principle. The decision of the Commission to 
subject Wanadoo to an inspection came in the context of a reduction of the price of ADSL 
services offered by Wanadoo, as well as other internet providers, following a decision by the 
French Minister of the Economy, Finances and Industry, of December 2003, approving a 
reduction of the wholesale rates charged by France Télécom for access to and reception of 
IP/ADSL. Several internet providers, including Wanadoo, decided then to pass on to that 
reduction in their retail offers.  Previously, by a decision of January 2003, the Commission 
had considered that Wanadoo had abused its dominant position on the market for high-
speed internet access services provided to residential customers by employing predatory 
prices. It then fined Wanadoo and imposed on it a duty to refrain from any behaviour having 
an object or effect identical or similar to that of the infringement and a duty to report 
information up to the end of 2006 on several aspects of its ADSL services. On 11th May 2004 
the French Competition Council referred to the Commission a complaint received against 
Wanadoo for predatory pricing for investigation. On 18th May the Commission adopted the 
                                                             
422 Ibid, paragraphs 752 to 754. 
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decision ordering France Télécom and all undertakings controlled by it, including Wanadoo 
and all undertakings directly or indirectly controlled by Wanadoo, to submit to an inspection 
under Article 20(4) Regulation 1/2003. That inspection was completed on the 4th July. France 
Télécom appealed the decision on several grounds including violation of Article 10 of 
Regulation 1/2003 resulting, inter alia, from an infringement of the division of powers and 
duty to cooperate in good faith with the national competition authorities under Regulation 
1/2003. According to France Télécom, the French Competition Council would have been 
better placed to deal with the case. As such, the subsidiarity principle embodied in Article 10 
of Regulation 1/2003 had been violated. The Court however considered that Protocol (No 2) 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality does not call into 
question the powers conferred on the EU by the Treaty as interpreted by the CJEU. Such 
powers include the power to apply competition rules, and in particular the right to carry out 
inspections to assess any suspected infringement.423  
The EU Courts’ approach to the exercise by the Member States of EU exclusive 
executive competence  
The CJEU has recognised the possibility of the Member States to exercise the exclusive 
executive competence of the EU in two circumstances: as the exercise of the duty of sincere 
cooperation and as the exercise of delegated powers. In both situations, the EU Court 
imposes very restrictive conditions that are not compatible with the power it recognises to 
the Member States to enforce EU competition law.  
The exercise by the Member States of EU exclusive executive competence under their duty of 
sincere cooperation 
Article 4(3) TEU establishes that Member States “shall take any appropriate measure, 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligation arising out of the Treaties from 
the acts of the institutions of the Union.” The CJEU confirmed the possibility of the Member 
                                                             
423 Judgment of 8 March 2007, France Télécom v Commission, T-339/04, EU:T:2007:80, paragraph 89. 
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States to exercise exclusive competences of the EU under their duty of sincere 
cooperation.424 However, it attaches strict conditions for that exercise. In Pluimveeslachterij 
Midden-Nederland BV and Pluimveeslachterij C. Van Miert BV the Court confirmed the 
possibility of Member States to exercise competences that were exclusively attributed to the 
Commission, in a situation characterised by the absence of implementing measures by the 
EU. However, the Court also clarified that Member States action “must not be regarded as 
involving the exercise of the Member States’ own power, but as the fulfilment of the duty to 
cooperate […]. Consequently, the measures adopted by the Member States may only be 
temporary and provisional in nature and they only must cease to be applied as soon as 
Community measures are introduced.”425 In Bosch426 and subsequent case law the Court 
confirmed the direct effect of now Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU.427 As directly applicable, 
both national courts and competition authorities would be required to enforce those 
provisions under their duty of sincere cooperation, even if such competence was an exclusive 
competence of the EU. However, since 1962, the implementing measures necessary to 
enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have been enacted, under Regulation 17/62. The 
possibility for the Member States to enforce EU competition law as the exercise of an EU 
exclusive competence under their duty of close cooperation is thus set aside. However, it 
could nevertheless be said that since the implementing measures have been enacted, 
Member States enforce EU competition law under delegated powers, framed first by 
Regulation 17/62 and now by Regulation 1/2003. Though, as I will argue next, the approach 
                                                             
424 Judgment of 28 March 1984, Pluimveeslachterijen Midden-Nederland and Van Miert, Joined cases 
47/83 and 48/83, EU:C:1984:131. 
 
425 Ibid.  
426 Judgment of 6 April 1962, De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Bosch and others, Case 13/61, EU:C:1962:11. 
427 “As the prohibitions of Articles 85(1) and 86 [now 101(1) and 102 TFEU] tend by their very nature 
to produce direct effects in relations between individuals, these Articles create direct rights in respect 
of the individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard.” Judgment of 27 March 1974, 
BRT v SABAM, Case 127/73, EU:C:1974:25, paragraph 16.  
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of the EU Courts to the Member States’ powers to enforce EU Competition law is not 
compatible with the exercise of delegated powers.   
The exercise by the Member States of exclusive executive competence of the EU under 
delegated powers 
Member States can exercise an exclusive competence of the EU under delegated powers, 
subject to strict limits that have been defined by the Court. In Meroni428 the Court limited 
the possibility of delegation of exclusive power to “clearly defined executive powers the 
exercise of which can, therefore, be subject to strict review in the light of objective criteria 
determined by the delegating authority.”429 Though Meroni concerns the delegation of 
powers to EU agencies, such dictum is sufficiently general to apply to public authorities.430 
Furthermore, in Grosoli, which concerned the delegation of powers to the Member States in 
the field of Common Commercial Policy, the CJEU stated that delegation of administrative 
arrangements to the Member States cannot be regarded as going outside the confines of the 
technical and rules designed to ensure conformity with the general policy in question.431  
It is difficult to consider that the enforcement of EU competition law is limited to a technical 
exercise. As recognised by the EU Courts, the enforcement of EU competition law involves a 
degree of discretion432 and complex economic assessments.433 As such, it would be 
                                                             
428 Judgment of 13 June 1958, Meroni v Haute autorité, Case 9/56, EU:C:1958:7. 
429 Ibid.  
430 Meroni was held in the context of the ECST Treaty. However, the principle of institutional balance 
under which Meroni was ruled, is applicable within the legal system of the EC Treaty, making Meroni 
doctrine applicable under the Lisbon Treaty. See Koen Lenaerts, 'Regulating the Regulatory Process: 
delegation of powers in the European Community' (1993) 18 European Law Review , 41. 
431 Judgment of 12 December 1973, Grosoli, Case 131/73, EU:C:1973:158, paragraph 8. 
432 Townley has showed that value judgements are constantly made, as even if we it could be agreed 
that that the sole goal of competition law is consumer welfare goal, re-distributive and political (more 
than merely re-distributive), issues still arise. Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary 
Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU Law too)', 209.  
433 There is voluminous jurisprudence to the effect that the review of the General Court when hearing 
“must undertake a comprehensive review of the examination carried out by the Commission, unless 
that examination entails a complex economic assessment, in which case the review of the Court is 
confine at ascertaining that there has been no misused of powers, that the rule of procedure and the 
statement of reasons have been complied with, that the facts have been accurately stated and that 
there has been no manifest error of assessment of those acts…” Judgement of 27 September 2006, 
GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission, T-168/01, EU:T:2006:265. See Bo Vesterdorf, 'Certain 
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incompatible with delegation. Even if delegation could be accepted, under the Meroni 
doctrine, the exercise of delegated powers by the Member States should be subject to “strict 
review in the light of objective criteria determined by the delegating authority.”434 The EU 
Courts however, do not recognise to the Commission any specific power to direct Member 
States’ action when enforcing EU competition law compatible with the exercise of delegated 
powers. In LVM435 the General Court, then European Court of First Instance, stated that “the 
extents of the Commission’s obligations in the field of competition law must be considered 
in the light of Article [105(1)] of the Treaty, which constitutes the specific expression in this 
area of the general supervisory role conferred on the Commission by Article 155436 of the 
Treaty.”437 None of the provisions confers on the Commission any specific power to direct 
the Member States in their enforcement actions. The Court also recognised in LMV that the 
supervisory role conferred upon the Commission under Article 105 TFEU “also encompasses 
the duty to pursue a general policy designed to apply competition matters, the principles laid 
down by the Treaty (…).”438 I.e. the CJEU recognises that the Commission has policy control 
in the field of competition. However, once again, such control is not binding. The Commission 
has been enacting under Article 105 TFEU a number of guidelines, notices and 
communications on the interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The power of the 
Commission under Article 105(1) TFEU does not include however the power to determine 
                                                             
reflections on recent judgments reviewing Commission merger control decisions' in Mark Hoskins, 
William Robinson and David Alexander Ogilvy Edward (eds), A true European - Essays for judge David 
Edward (Hart 2003)  
434 Judgment of 13 June 1958, Meroni v Haute autorité, Case 9/56, EU:C:1958:7. 
435 Judgment of 20 April 1999, LVM v Commission, Joined cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-
313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, EU:T:1999:80. 
436 Article 155 EC Treaty was replaced by Article 211 TEU. This article was repealed by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, but is was replaced in substance by Article 17 (1) TEU.   
437 Judgment of 20 April 1999, LVM v Commission, Joined cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-
313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, EU:T:1999:80, paragraph 
148. In the same sense Judgment of 14 July 1004, Parker Pen v Commission, T-77/92, EU:T:1994:85, 
paragraph 63. 
438 Judgment of 20 April 1999, LVM v Commission, Joined cases T-305/94, T-306/94, T-307/94, T-
313/94 to T-316/94, T-318/94, T-325/94, T-328/94, T-329/94 and T-335/94, EU:T:1999:80, paragraph 
149 and Judgment of 7 June 1983, Musique Diffusion française v Commission, Joined cases 100 to 
103/80, EU:C:1983:158, paragraph 105. 
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the content of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Given the direct effect of these provisions, the 
Commission is bound by the interpretation of the CJEU of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. As 
pointed out by Wills “[o]n questions of interpretation on which the Court has not yet spoken, 
the Commission may provide its own interpretation, provided that these additions are 
coherent with the case law of the CJEU and that the communication does not create any 
confusion as to what is the Court’s case law and what is the Commission’s interpretation is 
binding.”439 
For example, in Visa the CJEU accepted the interpretation of the Commission on the notion 
of “potential competitor” for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU stated on its Guidelines on 
horizontal cooperation agreements because,  
It is clear that such a definition reproduces, and clarifies, the tests deriving from the 
case-law […]. Consequently, since that definition does not appear to be inconsistent 
with the relevant case-law, it can be taken into account in order to determine 
whether the Commission was justified in describing Morgan Stanley as a potential 
competitor.440 
Also, in Expedia441 the Court confirmed that Member States are not bound by the 
Commission notices on the interpretation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU except if they 
acknowledge the principles set out therein and that they will abide by them. In Expedia, the 
Court held that the Commission’s de minimis notice was not binding for both national 
competition authorities and the courts of the Member States. The Court considered that, 
because the notice did not contain any reference to declaration by the competition 
authorities of the member states that they acknowledge the principles set out therein and 
that they will abide by them, it could not bind them. The Court distinguished this with the 
situation regarding the Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of 
                                                             
439 Wouter P.J Wils, 'Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement, in Particular EU 
Antitrust Enforcement' ( 2011) 34 World Competition , 369. 
440 Judgment of 14 April 2011, Visa Europe and Visa International Service v Commission, T-461/07, 
EU:T:2011:181, paragraph 172.  
441 Judgment of 13 December 2012, Expedia, C-226/11, EU:C:2012:795, paragraph 26.   
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Competition Authorities442 that national competition authorities have acknowledge to be 
applicable to them. National competition authorities have signed a statement in the form of 
the Annex to that Notice, acknowledging the principles of the notice and declaring that they 
will abide by them. It could be argued that the lack of policy control by the Commission of 
the Member States action could be overcome by the exercise of an administrative control 
binding on the national competition authorities. However, as previously seen the 
Commission does not have such type of administrative control over the Member States 
administrative action in enforcing EU competition law.  
A specific supervisory power over the Member States administrative action can nevertheless 
result from secondary law. Such, however, is not the case regarding EU competition law 
enforcement by the Member States. Regulation 1/2003 establishes mechanisms of 
cooperation between the Commission and the national competition authorities that allow 
some sort of supervision. However, it does not give to the Commission the power to instruct 
national competition authorities over substantive outcomes.  For example, Article 11(4) of 
that Regulation requires the national competition authorities to inform the Commission no 
later than 30 days before the adoption of a decision requiring that an infringement be 
brought to an end, accepting commitments or withdrawing the benefit of a block exemption 
Regulation.443 It also establishes the possibility for the Member States to consult the 
Commission in any case involving the application of EU competition law.444 However, the 
Commission has no binding powers to commandeer the competition authorities of the 
Member States to achieve a certain result. In case of substantial disagreement with a 
                                                             
442 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ 
C101/43. 
443 Article 11(4) Regulation 1/2003. To that effect, national competition authorities shall provide the 
Commission with a summary of the case, the envisaged decision or, in the absence thereof, any other 
document indicating the purpose of the action. At the request of the Commission, the acting 
competition authority shall make available to the Commission other documents it holds which are 
necessary for the assessment of the case. The information supplied to the Commission may be made 
available to the competition authorities of the other Member States. 
444 Article 11 (5) of Regulation 1/2003. 
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national competition authority that refuses to change its view in a concrete case, the only 
possibility for the Commission is to initiate proceedings before the national authority adopts 
a final decision. The national authority will be then relieved of its powers to apply Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU.445  
Moreover, the Commission does not have the “monopoly” of control of the Member States 
enforcement action under Regulation 1/2003. A competition authority of a Member States 
can ask for a case of another competition authority under Article 101 and 102 TFEU to be 
discussed in an advisory Committee.446 For this purpose, the cooperation mechanisms set in 
place by Regulation 1/2003 establish that the information that is sent to the Commission no 
later than 30 days before the adoption of a decision under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can 
also be sent to the other national competition authorities.447  National competition 
authorities may also exchange between themselves information necessary for the 
assessment of a case that they are dealing with under Article 101 or Article 102 of the Treaty.  
Finally, it must be mentioned that also the Member States exercise a control over the 
Commission’s enforcement action under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Such situation is not 
compatible with the exercise by the Commission of an exclusive competence of the EU. 
Article 14 of Regulation 1/2003 establishes that the Commission shall consult an Advisory 
Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Position prior to the taking of an 
enforcement decision.448 The Advisory Committee is composed of representatives of the 
competition authorities of the Member States.449 The Advisory Committee shall deliver a 
written opinion on the Commission's preliminary draft decision450 that the Commission shall 
                                                             
445 Article 11 (6) of Regulation 1/2003. 
446 Article 14 (7) of Regulation 1/2003. 
447 Article 11(4) of Regulation 1/2003.   
448 A decision under Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 23, Article 24(2) and Article 29(1) of Regulation 1/2003 (Article 
14 (1) Regulation 1/2003). 
449 Article 14(2) of Regulation 1/2003. 
450 Article 14(3) of Regulation 1/2003. 
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take the utmost account of.451 Moreover, the Commission shall also inform the Committee 
of the manner in which its opinion has been taken into account.452  
The degree of control that the Commission exercises over the Member States’ enforcement 
action in the field of competition contrasts radically with the control it exercises in areas of 
decentralised enforcement by the Member States of EU exclusive competences. Such is the 
case for example, of the Member States delegated administrative action in financial 
management. The financial Regulation allows for a possible allocation of competences for 
budgetary implementation in the form of shared or decentralized management.453 
Implementation tasks may be delegated to the Member States under Article 58(b) of the 
Financial Regulation. In such case though the Commission assumes the “control of the 
control”454 in respect to the administrative system applying in the Member States. The 
Commission can apply clearance-of-accounts procedures or financial correction 
mechanisms,455 which enables it to assume final responsibility for the implementation of the 
budget. There is no such type of degree of control when it comes to the implementation of 
EU competition law.  
It follows from the above that the EU executive competence under Article 105 TFEU has 
always been shared and it remained shared after the Treaty of Lisbon as per Article 4(1) 
TFEU.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has identified relevant limits to the exclusive competence of the EU under 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. Firstly, it has been shown that Member States did not confer unlimited 
                                                             
451 Article 14(5) of Regulation 1/2003. 
452 Article 14(5) of Regulation 1/2003. 
453 Article 58 (b), European Parliament and of the Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 966/2012 on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) 1605/2002 [2012] OJ L 298/248 
454 Hofman, Rowe and Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union, 752. 
455 Articles 59(a)(6), 60(b)(6) of the Financial Regulation. 
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jurisdiction on the EU in the area of competition. Article 3(1)(b) TFEU limits EU exclusive 
competence to establish the competition rules only when they are “necessary to the 
functioning of the internal market.” No other provision in the Treaty allows the EU to act 
where the situation has no relevance to the functioning of the internal market. Therefore, 
such competence as per Article 4(1) TFEU has remained with the Member States.  
Secondly, this chapter concluded that the exclusive competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU 
has been framed in a way that it does not include executive competence in competition 
matters. That provision limits the exclusive competence of the EU to the area of “establishing 
of the competition rules.” This is a competence of a legislative nature. Accordingly, Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU does not encompass the competence to enforce EU competition rules. The EU 
has executive competence under Article 105 TFEU to enforce Article 101 and 102 TFEU. Such 
competence is shared with the Member States as per Article 4(1) TFEU. The subsidiarity 
principle, favouring an action at national level remains applicable and Member States 
enforce EU competition law in their own right. Therefore, constitutional arrangements 
regarding the enforcement of EU competition law do not require Member States to enforce 
EU competition law as mandated by the EU, as would be the case if that competence was 
exclusive to the Union. 
Pursuant to Article 2(6) TFEU, the scope of the competence conferred on the Union is 
determined by the legal bases relating to each area. The difference between the several 
types of EU competences is of a relational kind: exclusive competence excludes other 
authorities from acting within the same policy area.456 To complete the picture, it is 
necessary to explore further the scope of the legal basis provided by Article 3(10(b) TFEU. 
This analysis is pursued in the next chapter.  
                                                             
456 Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 163. 
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Chapter 4 - The inner boundaries of Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU - The enabling provisions  
This chapter carries forward the analysis of the scope of the EU exclusive competence in the 
field of competition discussed in the previous chapter, discussing the boundaries imposed 
by the legal bases enabling the EU to act in the use of its competence under Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU. To identify which provisions of the Treaties relate to the “establishing of the 
competition rules necessary for the function of the internal market” under article 
3(1)(b)TFEU is not a simple task as the following example illustrates well. Agriculture is a 
sector specifically identified in Article 4(2)(d) TFEU as being under the shared competence of 
the EU. Article 40(1)(a) TFEU requires the adoption of common rules on competition in the 
context of a common organisation of agricultural markets. This provision is a legal basis that 
enables the EU to establish competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market, insofar as the agriculture sector is engaged. Does this mean that competence under 
Article 40(1)(a) TFEU is exclusive under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, despite Article 4(2)(d) TFEU? Is 
it an island of exclusive power of the EU in a shared field? This is the type of challenge that 
the identification of the legal bases enabling the Union to act under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU 
raises and that will be dealt with in Section 1 of this chapter. Section 2 will then debate the 
boundaries to the legislative competence exclusive to the EU that follow from those enabling 
legal basis.  Finally, Section 3 explores the legal bases that may enable the EU to legislate on 
competition matters outside the scope of the legislative competence under Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU, i.e. in the use of a shared competence with the Member States.  
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1. The legal bases relating to the area of “the establishing of 
the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market” 
As per Article 2(6) TFEU, the scope and arrangement for the exercise of a competence are 
determined by the provisions of the Treaty related to each area. The inner boundaries of the 
exclusive competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is defined by these provisions. The question 
then is which provisions of the Treaty determine the scope and the arrangements for the 
exercise of the EU’s competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU?  
The CJEU dealt with this question in Spain and Italy v Council.457 The case concerned an 
appeal lodged by Spain and Italy against the EU Unitary Patent.  These Member States 
claimed, inter alia, that the creation of European intellectual rights to provide uniform 
protection of intellectual property rights as found in Article 118 TFEU was not within the 
ambit of one of the competences shared by the Member States and the EU. It was rather 
within the exclusive competence of the EU as provided for in Article 3(1)(b) TFEU concerning 
“the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market.”458 Therefore, they argued that the Council did not have competence to authorise 
the enhanced cooperation in question, because Article 20(1) TEU limits enhanced 
cooperation to areas of shared competence.459 The CJEU did not agree with this reasoning. 
It ruled that the competences conferred by Article 118 TFEU fall within an area of shared 
competence for the purpose of Article 4(2) TFEU and are therefore non-exclusive.460 The 
CJEU stressed that “it is to be borne in mind that the area of the “internal market” mentioned 
in Article 4(2)(a) TFEU refers, in accordance to the definition given in Article 26(2) TFEU, to 
                                                             
457 Judgment of 16 April 2013, Spain and Italy v Council, Joined cases C‑274/11 and C‑295/11, 
EU:C:2013:240. 
458 Ibid, paragraph 10. 
459 Ibid, paragraph 11. 
460 Ibid, paragraph 25. 
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“an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is ensured.”  
Article 26(1) TFEU provides that the EU is to “adopt measures with the aim of establishing or 
ensuring the functioning of the internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the Treaties.’”461 The CJEU considered that the expression “relevant provisions of the 
Treaties” makes it clear that competence failing within the sphere of the internal market is 
not limited to Articles 114 and 115 TFEU relating to the adoption of harmonisation measures. 
It also covers any competence attached to the objectives set out in Article 26 TFEU, such as 
the competences conferred on the EU by Article 118 TFEU.462 While it recognized that the 
rules on intellectual property are essential in order to maintain undistorted competition on 
the internal market, the Court considered that they do not constitute competition rules for 
the purpose of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU.463 The Court recalled that under Article 2(6) TFEU the 
scope and the arrangements for exercising the EU’s competence are to be determined by 
the provisions of the Treaties relating to each area.464 Therefore, the scope of the exclusive 
competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU must be found in Part Three, Title VII, Chapter 1 TFEU, 
in particular Articles 101 to 109 TFEU.465  
The reasoning of the CJEU could have been more developed. However, I agree with the 
result. The CJEU failed to explain why it considers that the EU Unitary Patent is not within 
the meaning of competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market under 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, despite accepting that it is essential to keep competition undistorted in 
the internal market.466 It simply stated that the expression “relevant provisions of the 
Treaties” in Article 2(1) TFEU makes it clear that competence falling within the sphere of the 
                                                             
461 Ibid, paragraph 20. 
462 Ibid, paragraph 21. 
463 Ibid, paragraph 22. 
464 Ibid, paragraph 23. 
465 Ibid, paragraph 23. 
466 Ibid, paragraph 22. 
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internal market also includes that conferred by Article 118 TFEU. As to why it was not within 
the exclusive competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, the CJEU took a formalistic 
approach. It only stated that because there was a section in the Treaty dealing with 
competition rules -  Part Three, Title VII, Chapter 1 TFEU - the scope of the competence under 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU needs to be determined against these provisions and not elsewhere in 
the Treaty. However, this is not a highly compelling reason. The competence under that 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is not defined in terms of a policy area, such as “competition,” but in 
terms of an action, i.e. “the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market”. The CJEU itself refers to “the area of establishing of 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market”467 and not the area 
of “competition.” The wording of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is very distinct from the rest of the 
subsections therein, which determine the exclusive competence of the EU in reference to a 
policy area: e.g. the “customs union” - Article 3(1)(a); the “monetary policy for the Member 
States whose currency is the euro” - Article 3(1)(c); the “conservation of marine biological 
resources under the common fisheries policy” - Article 3(1)(d) and the “common commercial 
policy” - Article 3(1)(e). In relation to these policy areas it is possible to identify with clarity 
“the provisions of the Treaties relating to each area” against which the scope of the exclusive 
competence shall be defined as per Article 2(6) TFEU. The part of the Treaty dealing with the 
policy area of “Customs Union” corresponds to Part III, Title II, Chapter 1 TFEU; the one 
dealing with “Monetary Policy” corresponds to Part III, Title VIII, Chapter 2 TFEU; the 
“Conservation of Marine biological resources under the common fishery policy” is covered 
by Part Three, Title III TFEU; and finally the “Common Commercial Policy” is under Part V, 
Title II TFEU. The same is not true when it comes to the area of “establishing of the 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.” It could therefore 
                                                             
467 Ibid, paragraph 24. 
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be argued that, irrespectively of its place in the Treaties, if a legal basis enabling the EU to 
enact acts of legislative nature on competition regarding internal market is found, that 
competence is exclusive as per Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. The CJEU rejected this approach.  
However sparse, I agree with the CJEU ruling in Spain and Italy v Council. To decide otherwise 
would be to accept the existence of an open textured exclusive competence of the EU under 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. This would run against the objectives of the clarification of the 
competences of the EU under the Treaty of Lisbon and, much more importantly, against the 
principle of conferral. To accept that reasoning would have the consequence of transforming 
competence in areas that are under the shared competence of the EU into an exclusive 
competence to the EU. An example of this is provided by the competence to adopt 
competition rules for the agricultural sector. Article 40(1)(a) TFEU requires the adoption of 
common rules on competition in the context of a common organisation of agriculture 
markets. Agriculture is a sector specifically identified in Article 4(2)(d) TFEU as being under 
the shared competence of the EU.  
The fact that there is a legal basis under the Treaties for establishing rules on competition 
affecting the internal market does not of itself establish that the EU has exclusive 
competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU; otherwise the adoption of common rules of 
competition under Article 40(1)(a) TFEU would be transformed into an exclusive competence 
without any express wording to that effect. This is not compatible with the principle of 
conferral, as Article 40 TFEU is within the part of the Treaty referring to the internal market, 
that is under the shared competence.468  
The Advocate General followed this same line of thought and provided a developed 
reasoning on why the scope of EU exclusive competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is to be 
found in the provisions within Part Three, Title VII, Chapter 1 TFEU – i.e. the section of the 
                                                             
468 Article 4(2)(d) TFEU.  
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Treaty dealing with “Competition Rules.”469  He started by stressing that the purposes of 
introducing a categorisation of competences between the EU and the Member States was 
the desire of the Member States that the sharing of competence between the EU and the 
Member States be clarified and made more transparent. To that aim the Treaty of Lisbon 
introduced a categorisation of competences that determined the sharing of competence 
between the EU and the Member States in accordance with the principle of conferral. The 
Advocate General then compared the wording of Article 3(1) TFEU with that of Article 4(2) 
TFEU, concluding that the areas under the exclusive competence of the EU are not merely 
indicative but exclusive. Whereas Article 3(1) indicates that “[t]he Union shall have 
competence in the following areas”, Article 4(2) TFEU indicates that “[s]hared competence 
between the Union and the Member States applies to the following principal areas.”470 
Finally the Advocate General considered that the principle of conferral could only be 
respected if the list of the exclusive competence of the EU provided for in Article 3(1) TFEU 
is exhaustive. This is because under that principle the EU can only act within the limits of the 
competences that have been conferred on it by the Member States. Competences not 
conferred on the EU belong to the Member States.471 The inner boundaries of the exclusive 
competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU must thus be determined by Part Three, Title VII, 
Chapter 1 TFEU.  
The question that now follows is what is the scope of the EU exclusive competence under 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU as per Part Three, Title VII, Chapter 1 TFEU? The answer will be given by 
the legal basis for action that can be found within that specific part of the Treaty allowing for 
the establishment of “rules”. It has been submitted that rules, for the purposes of Article 
                                                             
469 Opinion of Advocate General Bot of 11 December 2012, Spain and Italy v Council, Joined cases 
C-274/11 and C-295/11, EU:C:2012:782. 
470 Ibid, paragraphs 41 to 50. 
471 Ibid, paragraphs 51. 
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3(1)(b) TFEU, must be understood as acts of a legislative nature. 472 Therefore, only provisions 
that allow for the adoption of acts of a legislative nature will be considered for the purpose 
of determining the scope of the exclusive competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. However, 
before exploring those legal bases, a prior consideration as to the concept of legislative acts 
must be made. The Treaty of Lisbon introduced for the first time a distinction between 
legislative acts and non-legislative acts, depending on the procedures followed for their 
adoption. Under Article 289(3) TFEU, legal acts are those acts that are adopted by legislative 
procedure.473 A legislative act will be a legal act adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure 
under Article 289(1) TFEU, consisting in the joint adoption by the European Parliament and 
the Council of a regulation, directive or a decision on the proposal from the Commission. The 
ordinary legislative procedure is defined in Article 294 TFEU as that “which replicates, with 
certain modifications, the former co-decision procedure.”474 According to Article 289(3) 
TFEU, legislative acts can also be enacted under a special legislative procedure. By defining 
a legislative act depending on the procedures under which it has been enacted, the Treaty 
adopts a formal criterion to define legislative acts. Under this formal criterion, a quick 
reading of the provisions under Part Three, Title VII, Chapter 1 TFEU allows us to conclude 
that none of the provisions therein enables the EU to enact legislative acts. This is because, 
though several provisions therein allow for the adoption of legally binding acts (Articles 103, 
105(3), 106(3), 108(4) and 109 TFEU) they do not provide for such acts to be enacted under 
the ordinary or special legislative procedure. This remains true in respect of Article 103(1) 
TFEU which establishes a procedure for the adoption of regulations of directives by the 
Council that, in Turk’s words, is “indistinguishable from the special legislative procedure 
                                                             
472 It has been submitted that the notion of “rules” for the purpose of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU does not 
include individual decisions.  
473 There are two types of legislative procedures: “ordinary” (Article 289(1) TFEU) and “special” (Article 
289(2) TFEU). 
474 Alexander H. Türk, 'Lawmaking after Lisbon' in Andrea  Biondi, Piet  Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley 
(eds), EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012), 68. 
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under Article 289(2) TFEU.”475 This provision however does not amount to the special 
legislative procedure as provided for in Article 289(2) TFEU. This provision states that the 
special legislative procedure applies “in the specific cases provided for by the Treaties” and 
“the pattern throughout the Treaties is that where a special legislative procedure is intended 
to apply this is expressly signified in the relevant Treaty Article. There is no such signification 
in Article 103 TFEU.”476  Therefore, under the formal definition of legislative act as 
established by the Treaty of Lisbon the EU has no legislative powers under Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU as no provision within Part Three, Title VII, Chapter 1 TFEU allows the EU to adopt 
formal legislative acts.  
I argue however, that legislative acts in the EU legal order after the Treaty of Lisbon are not 
limited to formal legislative acts. Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the CJEU had already identified 
a hierarchy of legal acts. As held in Köster, Berodt & Co,477 
 “[B]oth the legislative scheme of the [TFEU], reflected in particular by the last 
indent of Article 155 [Article 211 EC] and the consistent practice of the Community 
institutions establish a distinction, according to the legal concepts recognized in all 
the Member States between measures directly based on the Treaty itself and 
derived law intended to ensure their application.” 
The CJEU establishes a hierarchy between acts based directly on the EC Treaty, i.e. basic acts, 
and implementing acts. As argued by Turk, the Treaty of Lisbon did not invent a hierarchy of 
norms between legislative and non-legislative acts, it simply made it more visible.478 It did 
not replace it.479 Legally binding acts of general application that find their legal basis directly 
in the Treaty are therefore acts of a legislative nature. 
                                                             
475 Ibid, 69. 
476 Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, 257. 
477 Judgment of 17 December 1970, Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel v Köster, 
Case 25/70, EU:C:1970:115, paragraph 6. 
478 Türk, 'Lawmaking after Lisbon', 66.  
479 In the same sense see Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, 259-60. 
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In this light, there are three provisions within Part Three, Title VII, Chapter 1 TFEU that can 
be identified as possible legal bases to establish “rules” on competition applicable to 
undertakings for the purposes of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU.480 They are Articles 103, 105(3) and 
106(3) TFEU. The scope of the exclusive legislative competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU 
will be given by these provisions. It is argued that none of them allows the EU to establish 
substantive principles of EU competition law.  
2. Exclusion of the competence to establish substantive 
principles of EU competition law  
EU action under Article 103 TFEU  
Article 103(1) TFEU states that: 
“The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in 
Articles 101 and 102 shall be laid down by the Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament.”  
Under Article 103(2) TFEU regulations or directives adopted by the Council to give effect to 
principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU “shall be designed in particular: 
a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 101(1) 
and in Article 102 by making provisions for fines and periodic penalty 
payments; 
b) to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 101(3), taking 
into account the need to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, 
and to simplify administration to the greatest possible extent on the 
other; 
c) to define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, the 
scope of the provisions of Article 101 and 102; 
                                                             
480 There are two other legal basis enabling the adoption of “rules” for the purpose of Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU: Articles 108(4) and 109 TFEU concerning State Aid. These provisions are in Section 2 of Part 
three, Title VII, Chapter 1 TFEU deals with the “Aids granted by States.” This is outside the scope of 
this thesis so they will not be analysed here.  
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d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in applying the provisions laid down 
in this paragraph; 
e) to determine the relation between national laws and the provisions 
contained in this Section or adopted pursuant to this Article.” 
Competence under Article 103 TFEU seems to be drafted in a wide manner. First, Article 
103(1) TFEU requires the Council to “give effect to the principles set out in Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU.” Secondly, the list of matters to be dealt with by the Council under Article 103(2) 
TFEU is considerably broad. As pointed out by Townley, it is an open list, not exhaustive of 
all the matters that can be covered by the action of the EU under Article 103(1) TFEU.481 It is 
submitted however, that the scope of the powers under Article 103 TFEU is rather limited to 
procedural implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It does not provide the EU with a 
general legislative competence on substantive rules of competition. This is because Articles 
101 and 102have direct effect.482  
Starting with the list of matters under Article 103(2) TFEU, a quick reading of sub-paragraphs 
(a) and (d) allows us to understand that powers therein concern the adoption of procedural 
rules for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU only. Those rules were first enacted 
under Regulation 17/62, which was later replaced by Regulation 1/2003. In Akzo,483 the CJEU 
confirmed that “the rules of procedure with respect to competition law, as set out in Article 
14 of Regulation 17/62 and Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003, are part of the provisions 
                                                             
481 Townley, 'Constitutional limits to diversity (and Co-ordinated diversity) in EU competition law', 20.   
482 Normally, the dimension of the direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 EEC Treaty is horizontal, i.e it 
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necessary for the functioning of the internal market whose adoption is part of the exclusive 
competence conferred on the Union by virtue of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU.”484 The exclusive 
competence of the EU to legislate on the procedural rules to be used by the Commission in 
its enforcement procedures has been considered by some authors as nothing more than 
logical, for accepting Member States’ power to legislate in this context would render the 
uniform and effective application of EU competition law by the Commission difficult.485 
In contrast, competences under Article 103(2)(b), (c) and (d) TFEU seem to go beyond the 
mere procedural aspects of the implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Under Article 
103(2)(b) TFEU the Council may adopt detailed rules for the application of Article 101(3). 
Those rules were first enacted in Regulation 17/62 which implemented a centralised 
notification and authorisation system by the Commission to enforce Article 101(3) TFEU. This 
was abolished by Regulation 1/2003 which introduced a system of decentralised, ex post 
enforcement. Such rules are of a procedural nature, determining the procedures under 
which an agreement can be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU. However, this provision 
also enables the Council to adopt block exemption regulations, as well as regulations 
empowering the Commission to do the same.486  
A block exemption regulation identifies types of agreements in relation to which the 
prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU does not apply. Some of these regulations covered 
                                                             
484 Ibid, paragraph 116. 
485 Monti, 'Legislative and Executive Competence in Competition Law', 110.  
486 E.g. Regulation (EEC) 19/65 of the Council on application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements and concerted practices [1965] OJ 36/533; Council Regulation (EEC) 2821/71 
on application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices [1971] OJ L 285/46; Council Regulation (EC) 487/2009 on the application of Article 81(3) of 
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[2009] OJ L148/ 1; Council Regulation (EEC) 1534/91 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty 
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OJ L 143/1; Council Regulation (EC) 246/2009 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies 
(consortia) [2009] OJ L79/1.  
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agreements in general, others covered agreements in specific sectors of the economy.487 It 
could be argued that under Article 103(2)(b) TFEU the EU was competent to establish the 
prohibitions of Article 101(1) and the exceptions under Article 101(3) TFEU. Such 
competence would be exclusive as per Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. Moreover, Article 103(2)(c) TFEU 
specifically authorises the Council “to define, if need be, in the various branches of the 
economy, the scope of the provisions under Article 101 and 102 TFEU.” Further, Article 
103(2)(e) and (c) TFEU appears to confer competence to the Council to determine the scope 
of Article 101 and 102 TFEU as regards the various branches of the economy and the national 
laws, respectively. This would imply a legislative competence to establish substantive 
principles of EU competition law. Such competence would be exclusive to the EU under 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. 
However, I argue that none of these provisions confers the power to the EU legislator to 
establish the competition principles under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, since that would be 
incompatible with the direct effect of these provisions, which remained unchanged under 
the Treaty of Lisbon.  
The impact of the direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU on the scope of the 
legislative powers under Article 103 TFEU 
Legislative powers under Article 103 TFEU are “to give effect to the principles set out in 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.”488 The direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU has two main 
consequences on the scope of the Council’s powers under Article 103 TFEU. First, a measure 
enacted under Article 103 TFEU cannot and does not determine the content of Articles 101 
                                                             
487 E.g. Commission Regulation (EU) 1217/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
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and 102 TFEU. Secondly, the relation between those provisions and national laws is governed 
by the primacy principle. 
The content of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is not determined by the measure adopted 
under Article 103 TFEU 
EU law defines direct effect  acts “as a potential source of directly enforceable rights and 
obligations for individuals and public authorities.”489. Direct effect of an act is not 
incompatible with the adoption of implementing acts.490 However, the scope of 
implementing powers is limited. There is a consistent body of case law of the CJEU that 
implementing measures of an act vested with direct effect are to “make easy” but they 
cannot in any way limit the content of the act they aim at implementing.491 That would be 
denying the direct effect of the act. As stressed by Advocate General Kokott in her opinion 
in Impact: 
“the mere fact that a [EU]-law provision is described as a “principle” […] and 
incorporates undefined terms […], does not mean that the provision lacks precision 
as to its substance and therefore is not directly effective. Instead, any doubts as to 
the interpretation of such terms can be resolved by means of a reference for 
preliminary ruling.”492 
Therefore,  
“[i]mplementing measures are to make easy but in any case dependent the 
enforcement of those basic principles. They cannot, in any way, relate to the actual 
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substance of the principles, limit the existence or restrict the scope of that 
principles.”493  
Legislative acts generally are to some extent vague and open textured.494 This is particularly 
true of competition rules. 495 However, this does not affect their nature as directly applicable 
acts. They are a direct source of rights and obligations for natural and legal persons as well 
as for public authorities. The consequence of the vagueness of an EU act vested with direct 
effect is not that its content needs to be determined by an implementing act. It simply means 
that it may require an interpretation to be applied in specific cases.496 The ultimate 
responsible for the interpretation of Article 101 and 102 TFEU is the CJEU, by virtue of Article 
19 TEU. As stated by the General Court in AC-Treuhand AG as regards the content of Article 
101 TFEU: 
“the interpretation of the undefined legal concept of “agreement between 
undertakings” ultimately falls to be determined by the Community 
judicature(…)”.497 
This represents an important limitation to the scope of the powers of the Council under 
Article 103 TFEU. Measures pursuant to Article 103 TFEU cannot “in any way relate to the 
actual substance” of the principles contained in those provisions498 and “they cannot 
therefore limit the existence or restrict the scope of [those principles].”499 
The approach of the CJEU to block exemptions evidences this point well. Block exemptions 
are acts adopted pursuant to Article 103 TFEU. As such, they cannot determine the content 
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of the prohibition of Article 101 TFEU. The first time the CJEU dealt with the legality of a block 
exemption regulation was in Italy v Council.500 The Italian government asked for the 
annulment of the Council Regulation 19/65 relating to the application of Article 101(3) TFEU 
(then Article 85(3) EEC Treaty) to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices. 
The CJEU upheld the above-mentioned regulation as “it had merely given the Commission 
procedural powers to grant exemption to specific categories of agreements and concerted 
practices.”501  
Italy based its request on three claims. First, it argued that Article 103 TFEU (then Article 87 
EEC Treaty) had been infringed as the Regulation laid down provisions concerning the 
exemptions in Article 101(3) TFEU without having first defined the scope of the prohibition 
imposed by Article 101(1) TFEU. By defining the exception before having explicitly stated the 
rule to which the exception is applicable, the Regulation breached Article 103 and the 
principle according to which everything which is not prohibited is permitted. Secondly, the 
Italian Government submitted that the Regulation breached Article 101 TFEU and that there 
had been a misuse of powers. This was because the Regulation assumed that all the 
agreements coming within the exempted categories properly fall within the absolute 
prohibition in Article 101(1) TFEU. Finally, it was argued that Regulation 19/65 breached 
Article 103 TFEU, as it treated exclusive dealing agreements as falling under Article 101 and 
not under Article 102 TFEU (then Article 86 EEC Treaty) on the abuse of dominance position. 
According to the Italian government, Article 101 was only applicable to agreements between 
businesses acting on the same level (i.e. horizontal agreements). Agreements between 
businesses operating at successive levels (i.e. vertical agreements) could only be analysed 
                                                             
500 Judgment of 13 July 1966, Italy v Council of the EEC and Commission of the EEC, Case 32/65, 
EU:C:1966:42.  
501 See also Joanna Goyder and Albertina Albors-Llorens, Goyder’s EC competition law (Oxford 
University Press 2009), 63.  
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under Article 102. By not respecting this, Regulation 19/65 had thus disregarded Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU.  
The CJEU did not accept the claims of the Italian Government and upheld the Regulation. It 
stressed that the Council had not enlarged the scope of Article 101 TFEU under Regulation 
19/65. It had merely established the procedural rules for the Commission to grant 
exemptions under Article 101 (3) TFEU. The CJEU begun by recalling the wording of Article 
103(1): the Council “shall…adopt any appropriate regulation or directives to give effect to 
the principles set out in Articles [101] and [102].” The Court stated that the Council could 
“apply an exemption set out in Article [101](3) by means of a regulation if it thinks it fits.” 
However, the CJEU stressed that the Council was in a position to do so “without bringing 
about any alteration in the principles set out in Article [101](1).”502  
As regards the second claim concerning the breach of Article 101 TFEU and misuse of powers, 
the Court stated that:  
“whilst it is true that to grant the benefit of Article [101](3) to a given agreement 
presupposes that this agreement falls within the prohibition imposed by Article 
[101](1), the authorization in Article [101](3) to grant this same benefit to 
categories of agreements does not imply that because a particular agreement 
comes within these categories it necessarily fits the description set out in Article 
[101](1).”503  
The CJEU pointed out that 
 “to define a category is only to make a classification.” [Therefore], “to grant 
exemptions by categories cannot amount, even by implication, to passing any pre-
conceived judgement on any agreement considered individually.”504  
The CJEU then concluded that the Regulation did not contravene these principles and that it 
did not “create any presumption of law concerning the interpretation to be given to Article 
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503 Ibid, at 405. 
504 Ibid, at 406. 
 148 
[101](1).”505 On these grounds, the CJEU concluded that the Regulation did not contravene 
Article 101 TFEU. Finally, the CJEU did also not accept the last argument of the Italian 
Government that the Council has misused powers as exclusive agreements fall within Article 
102 TFEU and not Article 101 TFEU. The CJEU accepted the view of the Council, that the block 
exemption did not enlarge the scope of Article 101 TFEU: 
“neither the wording of Article 101 nor that of Article 102 justifies interpreting 
either of these Articles with reference to the level in the economy at which the 
undertakings carry on business. Neither of these provisions makes a distinction 
between businesses operating in competition with each other at the same level or 
between businesses not competing with each other and operating at different 
levels. It is not possible to make a distinction where the treaty does not make 
one.”506  
The CJEU upheld the Regulation because the Regulation did not create any presumption of 
illegality, nor did it include principles different to those already established in Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. It therefore did not change the scope of those Articles.  
In subsequent cases, the CJEU has also held that parties to an agreement that does not satisfy 
the conditions laid down in a block exemption regulation may nevertheless argue that Article 
101(3) TFEU applies on an individual basis.507 This is because the content of the exemptions 
is not determined by the implementing acts, but follows directly from Article 101(3) TFEU, 
that is self-executing. Moreover, it has also stated that when an agreement does not satisfy 
the terms of a block exemption regulation it is necessary to assess whether the individual 
agreement falls within Article 101 (1) TFEU and if so, whether it benefits from Article 101(3) 
TFEU.508 The mere fact that an agreement does not fall within a block exemption regulation 
                                                             
505 Ibid, at 406. 
506 Ibid, at 407. 
507 Judgment of 18 December 1986, VAG France v Magne, Case 10/86, EU:C:1986:502, paragraph 41. 
508 E.g. Judgment of 30 April 1998, Cabour and Nord Distribution Automobile v Arnor "SOCO", C-
230/96, EU:C:1998:181, paragraphs 47; Judgment of 10 November 1993, Petrogal v Correia, Simões & 
Companhia and Correia, Sousa & Crisóstomo, C-39/92, EU:C:1993:874, paragraph 68. 
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does not create a presumption that the agreement is illegal.509 Therefore, the “non-
compliance with a condition necessary for the exemption cannot, in itself, give rise to 
damages pursuant to Article 101 TFEU or oblige a supplier to accept an applicant distributor 
into a distribution system.”510  
The large margin of action which the CJEU recognises the Council is given under Article 103 
TFEU is also coherent with the direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The CJEU 
considered that Article 103 TFEU does not place the Council under a duty to act. Under this 
provision the Court recognised that the Council had a great margin for action, notably “to 
decide whether a particular regulation is appropriate and it may come to such a decision on 
a given point without having to deal exhaustively with the whole of Articles [101] and 
[102].”511 It can decide what actions are to be taken and when.512 It does not need to deal 
with all the aspects of implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU at the same time.513 The 
Council can even differentiate its implementation measures depending on the economic 
sector and even within an economic sector. This is because the measures adopted under 
Article 103 TFEU do not determine the content of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU which are fully 
operative even in the absence of such provisions.514   
There is however an occasion when the EU legislator went beyond the mere procedural 
implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and enacted substantive competition 
principles, but it did so using its supplementary powers under Article 352 TFEU. According to 
this provision the EU may give itself the additional powers of action necessary for the 
                                                             
509 Judgment of 13 July 1966, Italy v Council of the EEC and Commission of the EEC, Case 32/65, 
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attainment of its objectives. This was the case with the first merger regulation, Regulation 
4064/89515, on the control of concentrations that was adopted under a double legal basis: 
Articles 87 and 235 EEC Treaty (now Articles 103 and 352 TFEU). This was because it covered 
situations which distorted competition but were not within the scope of Articles 101 and 102 
of the Treaty. Unlike the ECSC Treaty, the Treaty of Rome did not establish specific rules for 
merger control,516 and until 1989 when the first Merger Regulation was enacted, there were 
no general provisions allowing for a systematic merger control at EU level.517 The CJEU 
upheld the Commission’s view in Continental Can518 that, in certain circumstances Article 102 
TFEU could be used to prevent a dominant undertaking from abusing its dominant position 
by acquiring the competition and thereby reinforcing its dominant position. Article 101 TFEU 
has never been considered well suited for merger control. In BAT,519 the CJEU, “contrarily to 
previously received wisdom,”520 confirmed that Article 101 TFEU could be applicable to the 
acquisition by an undertaking of a minority shareholding in another. However, as argued by 
                                                             
515 Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [1989] 
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516 Article 66(7) Treaty Constituting the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty). 
 If the High Authority finds that public or private undertakings which, in law or in fact, hold or acquire 
in the market for one of the products within its jurisdiction a dominant position shielding them against 
effective competition in a substantial part of the common market are using that position for purposes 
contrary to the objectives of this Treaty, it shall make to them such recommendations as may be 
appropriate to prevent the position from being so used. If these recommendations are not 
implemented satisfactorily within a reasonable time, the High Authority shall, by decisions taken in 
consultation with the government concerned, determine the prices and conditions of sale to be 
applied by the undertaking in question or draw up production or delivery programmes with which it 
must comply, subject to liability to the penalties provided for in Articles 58, 59 and 64. 
517 A first legislative proposal was adopted by the Commission in 1973, but did not get consensus at 
the Council to be approved. For an overview of the legislative history on merger control, see John C. 
Cook and Christopher S. Kerse, EC Merger Control (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009). 
518 Judgment of 21 February 1973, DEPE - Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company 
v Commission, Case 6/72, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22.  
519 Judgment of 17 November 1987, BAT and Reynolds v Commission, Joined cases 142 and 156/84, 
EU:C:1987:490. 
520 Bellamy recalls that prior to BAT  judgement, there had been no case in which Article 101(1) had 
been applied to an acquisition of shares, and that that “the law was widely thought to be accurately 
summarised in the Memorandum on concentrations of enterprises in the Common Market (1966), in 
which the Commission states hat Article [101] (1) did not apply to an agreement which brought about 
a ‘concentration’ between undertakings. Christopher Bellamy, 'Mergers outside the scope of the new 
mergers regulation – implications of the Philip Morris judgement' in Barry E. Hawk (ed), Fordham 
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Bellamy, in the absence of specific provisions on merger control, there was little control over 
mergers and acquisitions under EU law, “unless, exceptionally, the transactions could be 
regarded as an abuse of dominance position contrarily to Article [102 TFEU] in accordance 
with Continental Can”521 or caught under Article 101 TFEU in the very limited cases covered 
by the BAT judgement. 522 However, the framework provided by Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
is limited and does not cover all the mergers that can distort competition in the internal 
market. “Only the strengthening of dominant position and not their creation can be 
controlled under Article [102 TFEU],”523 and BAT was limited to situations where the 
acquisition of a minority shareholding brings material influence short of control, or where 
there are arrangements for the commercial co-ordination of the policies of the company 
concerned.524 Therefore, when adopting the first Merger Regulation, the Council was clear 
on the need to base it “not only on Article [103] but, principally, on Article [352] of the 
Treaty:” (emphasis added) stating notably that: 
“Whereas Articles [101] and [102], while applicable, according to the case-law of 
the Court of Justice, to certain concentrations, are not, however, sufficient to cover 
all operations which may prove to be incompatible with the system of undistorted 
competition envisaged in the Treaty;  
Whereas a new legal instrument should therefore be created in the form of a 
Regulation to permit effective monitoring of all concentrations from the point of 
view of their effect on the structure of competition in the Community and to be the 
only instrument applicable to such concentrations;  
Whereas this Regulation should therefore be based not only on Article [103] but, 
principally, on Article [352] of the Treaty, under which the Community may give 
itself the additional powers of action necessary for the attainment of its objectives, 
and also with regard to concentrations on the markets for agricultural products 
listed in Annex II to the Treaty;” (emphasis added) 
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This was confirmed by the second merger regulation which was also enacted under the same 
double legal basis:  
“Articles [101] and [102], while applicable, according to the case-law of the Court 
of Justice, to certain concentrations, are not sufficient to control all operations 
which may prove to be incompatible with the system of undistorted competition 
envisaged in the Treaty. This Regulation should therefore be based not only on 
Article [103] but, principally, on Article [352] of the Treaty, under which the 
Community may give itself the additional powers of action necessary for the 
attainment of its objectives, and also powers of action with regard to 
concentrations on the markets for agricultural products listed in Annex I to the 
Treaty.”  
The Treaty of Lisbon establishes the exclusive competence of the EU to establish the 
competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market under Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU. However, the direct effect of Article 101 and 102 TFEU remains unchanged, and so it 
does the correspondent limits to the Union’s powers under article 103 TFEU.   
The relationship between EU law vested with direct effect and national laws is 
governed by the primacy principle 
The relationship between EU laws that are directly applicable and national laws is 
determined by the primacy principle.525 This is particularly relevant for the exercise of the 
powers under Article 103(2)(e) TFEU must respect the primacy of EU competition law. Act 
adopted under Article 103(2)(e) TFEU cannot restrict or extend the reach of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU vis-à-vis national laws as that is determined by the principle of primacy. Therefore, 
the Council cannot, for example, use its implementing powers under Article 103 TFEU to 
establish a general rule according to which national laws prevail over EU competition laws, 
as that will go against the primacy principle. Also, it cannot be used to alter the scope of the 
primacy of EU competition law as interpreted by the CJEU, as that would amount to a change 
of the scope of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. That would be the equivalent to the creation of 
                                                             
525 On the debate on whether supremacy is also applicable to EU measures that fail to satisfy the 
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new competition principles. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are directly applicable, therefore their 
scope is not and cannot be determined by implementing acts.  
The question that can then be asked is, what is the relevance and utility of Article 103(2)(e) 
TFEU?  
The relevance of this provision in the early stage of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome 
seemed to be quite limited. In the aftermath of Walt Wilhelm, which determined the parallel 
application of national and EU competition laws,526 the Parliament submitted a question for 
written answer by the Commission regarding the relationship between the EU competition 
provisions and national competition laws and the need to establish provisions under Article 
103(2)(e) TFEU regarding that relationship.527 
The Commission responded that there was no such need, as a rule already existed. It was the 
primacy principle as determined by the CJEU in Walt Wilhelm, and at that moment, that was 
enough.528  At that time, the Commission and the Member States held a discussion to access 
measures to be taken under Article 101(2)(e) TFEU to prevent conflicts from arising.529 The 
Commission noticed that the Court's judgment in Wilhelm showed how conflicts could be 
avoided or overcome in practice, and that it was up to the Member States to decide which 
of the two alternatives to select:  
“— In a case where a national decision regarding a restrictive practice would be 
incompatible with a decision adopted by the Commission upon the conclusion of 
proceedings initiated by it, the national authorities are required to respect the 
effects of the Commission decision.  
                                                             
526 Judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 
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527 Question for written answer to the Commission No 433/69, by Mr. Vredeling, of the 22 January 
1970. OJ N C28/4, 1970.  
528 Answer by the Commission, of the 26 February 1976, to the question for written answer to the 
Commission No 433/69, by Mr. Vredeling. [1970] OJ N C28/4.  
529 Third Report on Competition Policy, Annexed to the Seventh Report on Activities of the 
Communities, Brussels-Luxembourg, 1974, p. 19. 
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— In cases in which, during national proceedings, it appears possible that the 
decision whereby the Commission will put an end to proceedings in progress 
concerning the same restrictive practice, may conflict with the effects of the 
decision of the national authorities, it is for the latter to take the appropriate 
measures”530 
The Commission also observed that: 
 “[s]o long as the national proceedings have not reached a final legal conclusion, it 
should not be too difficult to take account of a subsequent Commission decision. If, 
on the other hand, the decision of the national authority has already acquired legal 
force, there will be considerable difficulty in overcoming the conflict. It is for this 
reason that it would be desirable, where consultation with the Commission has not 
completely eliminated the danger of conflict, for national authorities to keep their 
proceedings open until the Commission has taken its decision”.531 
As a result of the discussions, the Commission and the Member States concluded that it was 
not necessary to adopt a resolution pursuant to Article 103(2)(e) TFEU defining more 
precisely the relationship between the Community competition rules and the national legal 
provisions. Instead, they considered it more appropriate to improve the exchange of 
information between the relevant national authorities and the Commission, to proceed to 
mutual consultation where both EU and national competition laws apply, and generally to 
reduce the risks of conflict in individual cases by improving harmonization of national and 
Community policies on competition. 
This situation seems to have changed with the reform of the enforcement regime in May 
2004, with the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. While under the regime implemented 
by Regulation 17/62, the Commission had a central role in the enforcement of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU and the role of the national competition authorities was secondary, Regulation 
1/2003 changed this situation. National competition authorities are under the obligation to 
apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU when they apply national competition laws to facts that 
                                                             
530 Judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 
EU:C:1969:4, paragraphs 7 and 8.  
531 Forth Report on Competition Policy, Annexed to the Eight Report on Activities of the Communities, 
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affect trade between Member States.532 This means that, if this condition is fulfilled, every 
time a national competition authority opens an investigation under its national law, it must 
also open an investigation under EU law.  
This preeminent role attributed to the national competition authorities may reinforce the 
need to determine the relationship between national and EU powers of investigation. This 
involves the determination of the relationship between national and EU enforcement 
procedures. It could be argued that we do not need Article 103(2)(e) TFEU for the EU to be 
able to do that. That results already from the principle of procedural autonomy. It is 
established case law as regards the obligation of the Member States to implement EU law 
that: 
“in so far as Community [now Union] law, including its general principles, does not 
include common rules, according to settled case-law, the national authorities when 
implementing Community [now Union] regulations must act in accordance with the 
procedural and substantive rules of their own national law. However, as the Court 
has held, recourse to rules of national law is possible only in so far as it is necessary 
for the implementation of provisions of Community [now Union] law and in so far 
as the application of those rules of national law does not jeopardise the scope and 
effectiveness of that Community [now Union] law, including its general 
principles”.533 
The reach of the principle of procedural autonomy only covers the enforcement of EU law, 
not the enforcement of national laws. This is of particular relevance when it comes the 
enforcement of EU competition rules by the national competition authorities as they enforce 
EU competition law in parallel with the enforcement of national competition laws.534  Under 
procedural EU rules a Member State can be required to stop an investigation of a potential 
breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. However, EU procedural law cannot require Member 
                                                             
532 Article 3(1) Regulation 1/2003. 
533 Judgment of 9 October 2001, Flemmer and Others, Joined cases C-80/99, C-81/99 and C-82/99, 
EU:C:2001:525, paragraph 55, with references to Judgment of 6 May 1982, BayWa v Bundesanstalt 
für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, Joined cases 146, 192 and 193/81, EU:C:1982:146, paragraph 
29 Judgment of 21 September 1983, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH, Joined cases 205 to 215/82, 
EU:C:1983:233, paragraphs 17 and 22. 
534 Article 104(1) TFEU and Article 3(1) Regulation 1/2003.  
 156 
States to stop investigating the same facts under national laws. This is because EU procedural 
rules can only be applicable to the enforcement of EU law. Article 103(2)(e) TFEU however 
goes beyond what is established by the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member 
States. It allows the Council to determine the relationship between EU procedural rules 
applicable to the enforcement of EU competition provisions and the national procedural 
rules applicable to the enforcement of the national competition laws. Therefore, the Council 
is able, under Article 103(2)(e) TFEU to adopt a rule establishing that a national competition 
authority shall suspend its investigation under national competition law while the 
Commission investigates the same facts under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, i.e. to establish a 
priority of the investigation at the EU level over the investigation of the same facts at national 
level under national competition laws. This is because the under Article 103(2)(e) TFEU the 
Council can determine the relationship between EU (procedural) law and national 
(procedural) laws.  
EU action under Article 105(3) TFEU 
This provision has been added by the Treaty of Lisbon. Under this provision the Commission 
may adopt regulations relating to the categories of agreements in respect of which the 
Council has adopted a Regulation or Directive pursuant to Article 103(2)(b) TFEU. As pointed 
out by Jones and Sufrin, before the inception of Article 105(3) TFEU, the Commission could 
only act following specific ad hoc Council regulations.535 The powers of the Commission 
under this provision are for the adoption of delegated acts. Such powers are limited to those 
delegated by the Council under Article 103(2)(b) TFEU. Consequently, under the principle of 
nemo plus iuris transfere (ad alium) potest quam ipse habet,536 the Council cannot delegate 
such types of powers to the Commission under Article 105(3) TFEU. Therefore, Article 105(3) 
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TFEU does also not provide a legal basis for general legislative powers to establish 
substantive principles of EU competition law. 
EU action under Article 106(3) TFEU 
Under Article 106(3) TFEU,  
“[t]he Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and 
should, where necessary, address appropriate directives and decisions to the 
Member States.”  
Craig  argued that a relevant clarification introduced by Article 3(1)(b) TFEU has been that it 
brought under the exclusive competence of the EU the power to legislate on the relationship 
between public undertakings and competition rules in the overall functioning of the internal 
market.537 He claims that it is unclear whether competition rules that have an impact outside 
the “immediate area” of competition, such as Article 106 TFEU, would be under the exclusive 
competence of the EU together with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Craig submits that the 
“wording of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU is important in this respect. It determines that the EU has 
exclusive competence in establishing the competition rules necessary for the internal 
market.”538 According to Craig this indicates that the exclusive competence also attaches to 
Article 106(3) TFEU “given that this concerns the relationship between public undertakings 
and the competition rules in the overall functioning of the internal market.”539 Therefore, 
the exclusive competence under Article 3(1) TFEU “covers all competition rules relating to 
undertakings in the internal market, including as they apply within the context of Article 106 
TFEU.”540 Craig does not state the consequences that follow from his conclusions. However, 
they are not difficult to identify. Article 106 TFEU addresses the application of competition 
rules and other rules of the Treaties to State measures in respect to public undertakings 
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(Article 106(1) TFEU) and to undertakings granted special or exclusive rights or that are 
entrusted with services of general economic interest (Article 106(2) TFEU).541  
The CJEU held that Article 106(1) TFEU : 
“[n]ecessarily implies that Member States may grant exclusive rights to certain 
undertakings and thereby granting them a monopoly.”542  
When it comes to the Services of General Economic Interest [SGEI] under Article 106(2) TFEU, 
the CJEU had held that: 
“Member States have a wide discretion to define what they regard as SGEIs and 
that the definition of such services by a Member State can be questioned by the 
Commission only in the event of manifest error.”543 
Article 106(3) TFEU, as describes by Szyszczak is “an unusual provision” in the Treaty, as “it 
combines a supervisory element with a legislative element.”544 We have seen that when the 
EU has an exclusive competence, Member States can act only if authorised by the EU to do 
so. Taking this into consideration, it could follow from Craig’s conclusions that Member 
States could only decide on matters of choice between public and private ownership as well 
on the establishment of SGEI if authorised by the EU to do so, under the use of the legislative 
powers under Article 106(3) TFEU. This would mean a Copernic revolution on the role of 
sovereign States in national economies and provision of public services. The role States had 
in the reconstruction of the post-war Europe is well-documented. Szyszczak recalls that:  
“At the time of the Treaty of Rome,[…] (1957), the state, directly or indirectly 
intervened in a large part of the national economy. Often goods were provided 
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though state monopolies, in fields such as defense industries, energy and raw 
materials production.”545  
The original Article 222 EC Treaty, now Article 345 TFEU, recognised the tolerance to State 
intervention in the market. It established that:  
“The treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the 
system of property ownership.” 
It is a well-documented fact that there has been however, a changing role and nature of the 
State intervention in the market place since the foundation of the EEC in 1957.546 That 
change has been from the “fashion on nationalisation”547 towards an “increasing 
marketisation whereby Member States have turned to the market to provide services to the 
public, and the distinction between public and private providers has been partially 
eroded.”548 With the inception of Article 119 TFEU549 by the Treaty of Maastricht it is arguable 
that there is a preference for private over public undertakings. This provision determines 
that Member States shall conduct their economic policy in accordance with the principle of 
an open market economy with free competition.550 In this line, the approach of the CJEU to 
state monopolies has become quite rigorous during the 90’s requiring the economic 
preference of Member States to be subject to the principle of free competition.   
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549 Ex-Article 4 EC. 
550 Article 119 (1) TFEU  
For the purposes set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, the activities 
of the Member States and the Union shall include, as provided in the Treaties, the 
adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of 
Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of 
common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition. 
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Edward and Hoskins argue that it follows from the CJEU case law that “Member States have 
not retained complete sovereignty in relation to the creation of legal monopolies. Rather, 
the creation of such monopolies must be balanced with the principle of free competition.”551 
State intervention regarding State monopolies, exclusive rights and SGEI is motivated by 
what the Member States consider as “essential services” or “national interest”552 and what 
is the best way to protect them.  This is an area where the need for differentiation and 
diversity is recognised.553 In the words of Advocate General Jacobs in Albany, 
“Article [106](2) seeks to reconcile the Member States’ interest in using certain 
undertakings as an instrument of economic or social policy with the Community’s 
interest in ensuring compliance with the rules on competition and in the internal 
market.”554 (References omitted) 
An exclusive right of the EU to legislate on the relationship between EU competition rules 
and public undertakings under Article 106(3) TFEU would mean a loss of Member States’ 
competence to decide between public and private ownership balancing the public interest 
in any competition issues that may arise. 
I argue however that Craig’s reasoning is flawed and that Craig’s conclusions on the scope of 
the exclusive competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU as determined by Article 106(3) TFEU 
seems to overlook two important considerations. Firstly, the powers of the Commission 
under Article 106(3) TFEU, including the power to enact directives, “depends on the needs 
inherent in the duty of surveillance provided for in Article [106]”.555. Secondly, an exclusive 
                                                             
551 David Edward and Mark Hoskins, 'Article 90: deregulation and EC law, reflections arising from the 
XVI FIDE Conference' (1995) 1 Common Market Law Review , 160. 
552 Szyszczak, The regulation of the State in competitive markets in the EU, 1.  
553For example the Commission’s 2012 Communication on SGEI and state aid stated that:  
Since the distinction between economic and non-economic services depends on 
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554 Judgment of 21 September 1999, Albany, C-67/96, EU:C:1999:430, paragraph 436. 
555 Ibid, paragraph 14.  
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competence of the EU to legislate on the relation between EU competition provisions and 
the public undertakings and SGEI would be against a teleological interpretation of the 
Treaties. The Treaty of Lisbon merely reaffirmed the limits of the Commission powers under 
Article 106(3) TFEU.  
The limited scope of the Commission’s powers under Article 106(3) TFEU 
The powers of the Commission under Article 106(3) TFEU, including the power to enact 
directives, “depends on the needs inherent in the duty of surveillance provided for in Article 
[106]”.556The claim that Article 106(3) TFEU does not enable the Commission to determine 
the relationship between competition laws and public companies and SGEI may sound 
counter intuitive. The Commission was able, under Article 106(3) TFEU, to enact quite 
intrusive acts regarding Member States’ public monopolies. For example, the first directive 
enacted under this provision was the Transparency Directive.557 It imposed new obligations 
on the Member States among which was, for example, the duty of Member States to retain 
records for five years regarding public funds made available to public undertakings. After the 
confirmation of the legality of this directive by the CJEU, the Commission enacted two others 
under Article 106(3) TFEU. One directive concerned electronic terminal equipment - 
Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on competition in the markets in 
telecommunications terminal equipment.558 The other concerned electronic 
communications services – Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on 
competition in the market for telecommunications services.559 Both directives were upheld 
by the CJEU and triggered the full liberalisation of the telecommunication networks and 
services by the end of the 90’s. The directives were upheld because, in both cases, the CJEU 
                                                             
556 Ibid, paragraph 14. The duty of surveillance is understood here as the enforcement of Article 106 
TFEU.   
557 Commission Directive (EEC) 80/723 on the transparency of financial relations between Member 
States and public undertakings [1980] OJ L 195/35. 
558 Official Journal 1988 L 131, p. 73. 
559 Official Journal 1990 L 192, p.10.  
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considered that exclusive rights were contrary to the free movement provisions and could 
be abolished as the Commission had supervisory powers over such rights under Article 
106(3) TFEU. In France, Italy and the UK v Commission,560 the CJEU confirmed the validity of 
the above-mentioned Transparency Directive. However, the Court stressed that the powers 
to adopt directives “depends on the needs inherent in the duty of surveillance provided for in 
Article [106]”.561 The UK government argued that the Commission had no power under 
Article 106(3) TFEU, to impose new obligations on the Member States.562 On the opposite 
side, the Commission argued that one of its duties under Article 106(3) TFEU is to ensure 
that there is transparency in the relation between Member States and public undertakings. 
Therefore, it argued that it acted within the scope of its competence under Article 106(3) 
TFEU.  
The CJEU upheld the Directive. However, this was not without stressing that Article 106(3) 
TFEU:  
“operates in a specific field of application and under conditions defined by reference 
to the particular objective of that Article. It follows that the Commission’s power to 
issue the contested directive depends on the needs inherent in its duty of 
surveillance provided for in Article [106] (…).”563  
Later, in France v Commission,564 regarding the validity of the Commission Directive on 
competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment,565 the CJEU 
reaffirmed the limits of the Commission’s powers to enact directives under Article 106(3) 
TFEU.566  The French Government claimed that the Commission’s Directive restructured the 
policy on the telecommunications sector, and that such policy was within the scope of the 
                                                             
560Judgment of 6 July 1982, France, Italy and United Kingdom v Commission, Joined cases 188 to 
190/80, EU:C:1982:257. 
561 Ibid, paragraph 14.  
562 Ibid, paragraph 5. 
563 Ibid, paragraph 14.  
564Judgment of 19 March 1991, France v Commission, C-202/88, EU:C:1991:120. 
565 Official Journal 1988 L 131, p. 73. 
566Judgment of 19 March 1991, France v Commission, C-202/88, EU:C:1991:120, paragraph 21. 
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sole competence of the Council under Article 114 TFEU. It also claimed that the directive 
conflicted with Article 103 TFEU as only the Council has the power to establish rules for the 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in specific sectors.567  The CJEU reaffirmed the limits 
of the Commission’s power under Article 106(3) TFEU. The CJEU specifically stated that the 
powers under Article 106(3) TFEU are more restricted and precise than those under Article 
114 and 103 TFEU, as regard subject matter and purpose.568 The CJEU held that Article 114 
TFEU is concerned with “provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market.”569 Article 103 TFEU is concerned with the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
therefore the competition rules applicable to all undertakings across all sectors. Article 106 
TFEU is only concerned with public undertakings, or undertakings to which the States have 
granted special or exclusive rights and undertakings entrusted with the operation of services 
of general economic interest.570  
“It is only with regard to such measures that Article [106] imposes on the 
Commission a duty of supervision which may, where necessary, be exercised 
through the adoption of directives and decisions addressed to the Member 
States.”571  
Furthermore, the CJEU ruled that the elimination of a special right granted by the Member 
States can only be determined if it is shown to be incompatible with the provisions of the 
                                                             
567 Judgment of 19 March 1991, France v Commission, C-202/88, EU:C:1991:120, paragraphs 19-20. 
568 Ibid, paragraph 23-26. 
569 Ibid., paragraph 24. 
570 Under Article 2 of the Directive in question Member States which have granted special or exclusive 
rights to undertakings for the importation, marketing, connection, bringing into service of 
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Directive 88/301/EEC on competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment 
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571 Judgment of 19 March 1991, France v Commission, paragraph 24. 
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Treaty. Powers under Article 106(3) TFEU concerns State measures only, therefore anti-
competitive conduct engaged in by undertakings action on their own initiative can only be 
called in question by means of individual decision under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.572 The 
CJEU considered the provisions of the Directive573   regarding the termination of special rights 
invalid as it went beyond the Commission’s powers under Article 106(3) TFEU. The 
Commission failed to show in what respect the existence of such rights is contrary to the 
provisions of the Treaty.574  Consequently, the CJEU considered that Article 106(3) TFEU 
could not be used as a legal basis to regulate exclusive rights of undertakings or services of 
general economic interest.575 Article 106(3) TFEU concerns State Measures only. The 
anticompetitive effects of special rights or the provision of general economic interest must 
be dealt with by the Commission in an individual decision under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  
This case is also underlines the limits to the Commission’s powers under Article 106(3) TFEU 
that follow from the direct effect of the norm. The CJEU held that powers of the Commission 
under Article 106(3) TFEU include the possibility of specifying obligations arising under the 
Treaty. In France v Commission, the CJEU did make it clear that, under this provision, the 
Commission cannot determine the scope of the provisions with which the compliance is to 
be ensured, as “the extent of that power therefore depends on the scope of the rules with 
which compliance is to be ensured.”576 It is not the role of the EU legislature to determine 
the scope of the rights and obligations under Article 106 TFEU. This was confirmed in Spain 
and others v Commission.577 The CJEU held that for the Commission to enact a directive under 
Article 106(3) TFEU, it must show that the conduct that it prohibits would be a violation of a 
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575 Szyszczak, The regulation of the State in competitive markets in the EU, 136. 
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directly applicable provision of the Treaty. It is not enough to show that it directly contributes 
to the general aim of then Article 3(f) EC Treaty.578  It is clear from the above-mentioned 
case-law579 that the power of the Commission to act under the “legislative element” of 
Article 106(3) TFEU is quite narrow. As argued by Szyszczak, ”Article 106(3) TFEU does not 
allow the Commission to choose between various policy options.”580 Further, as pointed out 
by Ehlermann581 and Van der Woude582 Article 106 TFEU does not grant to the Commission 
a general control over the existence of special rights, but only the “assessment of ancillary 
restraints” that affect competition as the consequence of the existence of such rights. They 
can be exercised only to the extent that they are necessary for the supervisory power, i.e. it 
can only deal with conduct that it is a violation of a provision of the Treaty. Article 106(3) 
TFEU does not grant the Commission a general legal basis of a general legislative power. 
Directives under Article 106(3) TFEU cannot be enacted if the Commission fails to prove a 
breach under Article 106 TFEU. If there is no breach, the situation cannot be addressed in a 
directive under Article 106(3) TFEU. That would not be the exercise of a supervisory power. 
This may explain why the Commission took a different approach in the liberalisation of the 
energy sector. The liberalisation directives on the energy sector were enacted under Article 
294 TFEU and not under Article 106(3) TFEU.583 Previous individual procedures against 
                                                             
578 In this sense see Szyszczak, The regulation of the State in competitive markets in the EU, 136. 
579 It should be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon has no impact on the validity of the case law today. 
The Treaty of Lisbon did not change the direct effect of the Treaty’s provisions, or the scope of the 
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France, Italy, Spain and The Netherlands584 in this sector were quashed by the CJEU. It 
considered inter alia that the Commission had failed to show that special and exclusive rights 
granted to electricity companies infringed Article 106(2) TFEU. Therefore, when later the 
Commission triggered legislative initiative to liberalise of the energy market across the EU, 
Article 106 (3) TFEU could not be used as a legal basis as a breach to Article 106 TFEU could 
not be found. This initiative would not be within its supervisory powers therein. Article 
106(3) TFEU does not grant the Commission a general legislative power.   
Furthermore, the CJEU has confirmed that the Council may, under Article 103 TFEU, deal 
with the implementation of Article 101 and 102 TFEU regarding public undertakings, 
undertakings granted special or exclusive rights and services of general economic interest.585 
The powers of the Council under Article 103 TFEU are larger than the powers of the 
Commission under Article 106(3) TFEU.586 The former are not limited to the exercise of a 
supervisory role.  However, Article 106 is directly applicable. Therefore, implementing acts 
of the Council under Article 103 TFEU do not and cannot determine the scope and content 
of Article 106(1) and (2) TFEU.587  Therefore, as neither Article 103, nor Article 106(3) TFEU 
enable the EU legislature to determine the lawfulness of a monopoly, special rights or SGEI 
with the EU competition rules, such power is not within the scope of the exclusive 
competence of the EU legislature under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU.  
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The confirmation of the limited scope of Article 106(3) TFEU by the Treaty of Lisbon 
An exclusive general legislative power of the Commission on competition matters within 
Article 106 TFEU would be contrary to a teleological interpretation of the Treaty. On the one 
hand the Treaty confirms the limited scope of the Commission’s powers under Article 106(3) 
TFEU. On the other hand, it also confirmed the role of the Member States regarding state 
monopolies and the establishment of services of general economic interest.  
As to the scope of the Commission’s powers under Article 106(3) TFEU, its limited reach has 
been confirmed under the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty did not retain the modifications 
introduced to this provision by the Draft Constitutional Treaty. The Draft Constitutional 
Treaty had changed this provisions to read as follows:  
“The Commission shall ensure the application of this Article and shall, where 
necessary, adopt appropriate European regulations or decisions.”588 
This wording introduced two relevant modifications that would have enlarged the powers of 
the Commission under Article 106(3) TFEU. Firstly, the Commission could enact regulations 
instead of directives. Directives, contrarily to Regulations, are considered a “milder form of 
interference” with the Member State law.589 They are binding as to the result to be achieved, 
but “leave the choice as to form and methods used to implement them to the discretion of 
Member States.”590 Regulations “are the most centralising of all Union instruments and are 
used whenever there is a need for uniformity.”591 This would have given the Commission a 
more direct control over Member States in this area. Furthermore, the Commission would 
still be able to decide alone.592 Article 106 TFEU does not require the involvement of any 
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589 See Arved Deringer, The Competition Law of the European Economic Community (Commerce 
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other EU institution in the decision making process. Any chance of the Member States to 
influence the final result via their voting at the Council is excluded. The detailed framework 
ordinarily applicable to the adoption of a Regulation, which involves the other EU institutions 
as set down in Articles 289 to 297 TFEU, would not be applicable here. The Commission 
would not be inhibited by needing to consult with other institutions.593 Moreover, if it did 
consult, it would not be bound by their comments and opinions. It could have decided on 
the content of the Regulation alone and against the views of the Council and the Parliament 
that are institutions where Member States have a seat.  
Secondly, the expression “directed to the Member States” was eliminated under the new 
wording of the provision. This would have given the Commission the power to direct 
decisions to undertakings and to enforce EU competition provisions outside the framework 
provided in Article 105 TFEU and Regulation 1/2003. Cooperation with the Member States 
within the ECN for the enforcement of EU competition rules to SGEI would be at risk. The 
Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of 
Competition Authorities that established the rules for cooperation within the ECN, is 
applicable in the framework established by Regulation 1/2003. This regulation concerns the 
powers of the Commission within Article 105 TFEU and not those within Article 106(3) TFEU.   
These changes, however, did not make it into the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 106(3) TFEU 
remains the same. The constituent legislator of the Treaty of Lisbon rejected the 
reinforcement of the Commission’s powers under Article 106(3) TFEU.   
                                                             
opportunity to act even where there is no political consensus. See Jones and Sufrin, EU Competition 
Law: Text, Cases & Materials, 645.  
593 In practice the Commission consults that EU Parliament and the Member States, but they do not 
have the opportunity to against the measure in the Council. This means that the Commission has the 
opportunity to act even where there is no political consensus. See ibid.  
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The principle of ownership neutrality and the discretion of Member States regarding 
SGEI 
An exclusive general legislative power of the Commission on competition matters within 
Article 106 TFEU would also be incompatible with a teleological interpretation of the Treaty. 
Souter claims that the structure of the Treaties translate this diversity of approaches to 
Member State intervention in the economy. He speaks about a  
“strategic compromise where the ‘liberal’ Member States obtained the four freedoms and 
the competition rules, and the ‘statist’ Member States obtained the exceptions to the above 
and special provisions for public enterprises, state monopolies and SGEI, although in 
practice all Member States rely on both set of rules.”594 
Article 106 is not the only provision which pertains to State Monopolies.595 The Treaty of 
Lisbon left unchanged Article 345 TFEU which establishes the principle of ownership 
neutrality. It also left unchanged Article 119 TFEU596 which requires compatibility of public 
ownership with competition in the market.  
As argued by Jones and Suffrin, “[t]he answer to the question as to which, if any, areas of 
activity the normal principles of competition law should apply, belongs in the political rather 
than the legal realm.”597 An exclusive general legislative power of the Commission under 
Article 106(3) TFEU would mean that the decision for private or public ownership, balancing 
the public interest concerns and any competition issues that may arise would be on the 
exclusive hands of the Commission. This would be contrary to the principle of ownership 
neutrality, under Article 345 TFEU.  
In respect of SGEI, there are also provisions other than Article 106 TFEU dealing with them. 
Article 14 TFEU contains the general provision regarding SGEI. It states that: 
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596 Ex-Article 4 EC. 
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“Without prejudice to Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union or to Articles 93, 
106 and 107 of this Treaty, and given the place occupied by services of general 
economic interest in the shared values of the Union as well as their role in 
promoting social and territorial cohesion, the Union and the Member States, each 
within their respective powers and within the scope of application of the Treaties, 
shall take care that such services operate on the basis of principles and conditions, 
particularly economic and financial conditions, which enable them to fulfil their 
missions. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish these 
principles and set these conditions without prejudice to the competence of Member 
States, in compliance with the Treaties, to provide, to commission and to fund such 
services.” 
Powers under Article 14 TFEU are shared, which is incompatible with an exclusive general 
legislative power of the EU under Article 106(3) TFEU. Further, the role of national law in the 
context of SGEI has been stressed by the Treaty of Lisbon, with the inclusion of Article 36 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Protocol (No 26) on 
services of general interest. 
Under Article 36 of the Charter: 
“The Union recognises and respects access to services of general economic interest 
as provided for in national laws and practices, in accordance with the Treaties, in 
order to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union.” 
Protocol (No 26) on services of general interest confirms the discretion of national, regional 
and local authorities on the establishment of SGEI, which goes against an exclusive 
competence of the EU. Article 1 of this protocol states as follows: 
“The shared values of the Union in respect of services of general economic interest 
within the meaning of Article 14 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union include in particular: 
- the essential role and the wide discretion of national, regional and local 
authorities in providing, commissioning and organising services of general 
economic interest as closely as possible to the needs of the users; 
- the diversity between various services of general economic interest and the 
differences in the needs and preferences of users that may result from different 
geographical, social or cultural situations; 
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- a high level of quality, safety and affordability, equal treatment and the promotion 
of universal access and of user rights.” 
An exclusive general legislative competence of the Commission to decide on the relation 
between competition rules with matters SGEI would be incompatible with Member States 
discretion in this area.  
3. The nature of the competence to establish the substantive 
principles of EU competition law necessary the functioning 
of the internal market  
We conclude from the previous section that Part III Title VII Chapter 1 TFEU contains no legal 
basis conferring a general legislative power to establish substantive principles of EU 
competition law. Therefore, such power is not within the exclusive competence of the EU 
under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. We have seen that under the system of EU competences as 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, if a competence is found in the Treaties and the Treaties 
do not provide otherwise, that competence is shared.598 Where a competence is not 
conferred upon the EU then that competence remains with the Member States.599The 
question that must be asked is whether there is a legal basis in the Treaties that confers to 
the EU a general legislative power to establish substantive principles of EU competition law.  
I argue that such legal basis exists and it is determined by Protocol (No 27) on the internal 
market and competition.  
The conferral role of Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition 
and the enabling provision under Article 352 TFEU 
Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition specifically indicates that:  
“The High Contracting Parties, 
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Considering that the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on 
European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted, 
Have agreed that: 
To this end, the Union shall, if necessary, take action under the provisions of the 
Treaties, including under Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.” 
Article 352 (1) TFEU establishes that: 
“If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies 
defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and 
the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent 
of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Where the 
measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.” 
The use of Article 352 TFEU to establish substantive principles of EU competition law without 
any express wording to that effect would be against the principle of conferral.600 As stated 
by the CJEU in Opinion 2/94: 
“Article [352] is designed to fill the gap where no specific provision of the Treaty 
confers on the [EU] institutions express or implied powers to act, if such powers 
appear non the less to be necessary to enable the [EU] to carry out its functions 
with a view to attaining one of the objectives laid down by the Treaty. That 
provision being an integral part of an institutional system based on the principle of 
conferred powers cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of [EU] power 
beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the Treaty as a whole 
and, in particular, by those that define the tasks and the activities of the [EU]. On 
any view, Article [352] cannot be used as a basis for the adoption of provisions 
whose effect would, in substance, be to amend the Treaty without following the 
procedure which it provides for that purpose.”601 
                                                             
600 There are two other express constitutional limits to the use of Article 352 TFEU. First, under Article 
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Article 352 TFEU cannot be used to alter the overall scheme of competence as established 
under the Treaties. We have seen that the power to establish substantive principles of EU 
competition law is not within the scope of the EU competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. 
Competence not conferred to the EU remains with the Member States.602Therefore, the use 
of Article 352 TFEU to adopt EU competition law without express wording to that effect, 
would “serve as a basis for widening the scope of [EU] power beyond the general framework 
created by the provisions of the Treaty as a whole.” That would be against the principle of 
conferral.603 Protocol (No 27) is primary law as per Article 51 TEU. It can make changes in the 
Treaties and in other provisions of primary law.604 As such, Protocol (No 27) is part of the 
general framework created by the Treaties regarding EU competences. It confers on the EU 
a shared competence in the area of competition policy that is not covered by the EU exclusive 
competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU . The use of Article 352 TFEU in the area of 
competition policy that is not covered by the EU exclusive competence under Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU respects, therefore the principle of conferral.  
On the (im)possibility of using Article 114 TFEU to adopt measures of 
approximation of national competition laws 
The wording of Protocol (No 27) can take us to another question: whether Article 114 TFEU 
could also be used as a legal basis for measures of approximation of national competition 
laws.  
Protocol (No 27) regards “the internal market and competition law.” It confirms that “that 
the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes a system 
ensuring that competition is not distorted.” The Treaties “contain a ‘general’ provisions 
empowering he Union to adopt the ‘the measures of the approximation of the provisions 
                                                             
602 Article 4(1) TEU.  
603 Opinion of the Court of 28 March 1996, Adhésion de la Communauté à la CEDH, Opinion 2/94, 
EU:C:1996:140, paragraph 30. 
604 Judgment of 27 June 2001, Leroy and Others v Council, Joined cases T-164/99, T-37/00 and T-38/00, 
EU:T:2001:170, paragraph 67.  
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laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in the Member States which have as 
their object the establishment and the functioning of the internal market’ (Article 114(1) 
TFEU).”605 In that light, it could be argued that Article 114 TFEU empowers the EU to adopt 
measures of approximation of national competition laws, if that is deemed necessary for the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.   
I do not agree with this conclusion, though. Firstly, I argue that to use Article 114 TFEU for 
that purpose would run against the principle of conferral. Secondly, I argue that the use of 
Article 114 TFEU to harmonise national competition laws would be excluded by the 
constitutional limits to the use of this provision.  
The use of Article 114 TFEU to harmonise national competition laws is against the 
principle of conferral 
In Spain and Italy v Council,606 the CJEU made it clear that rules which attach to the objectives 
set out in Article 26 TFEU, such as those adopted under Article 114 TFEU, are not competition 
rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market, even if they contribute to 
maintaining undistorted competition in the internal market.607 Therefore, Article 114 TFEU 
cannot be used as a legal basis for harmonising national competition rules. That would be 
against the system of competences as implemented by the Treaty of Lisbon and Article 114 
TFEU would be transformed into an “instrument of general governance.”608  
The use of Article 114 TFEU to harmonise national competition laws is excluded by 
constitutional limits  
Even if the CJEU had not excluded competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market from the scope of Article 26 TFEU and the use of Article 114 TFEU could be 
envisaged in the abstract, constitutional limits to the use of that provision would exclude its 
                                                             
605 Lenaerts and others, European Union Law, 117.  
606Judgment of 16 April 2013, Spain and Italy v Council, Joined cases C‑274/11 and C‑295/11, 
EU:C:2013:240. 
607 Ibid, paragraph 22. 
608 Derrick Wyatt, 'Community Competence to Regulate the Internal Market' (2007) Working Paper 
No 9/2007 University of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series  46. 
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use to harmonise national competition rules. The CJEU has reaffirmed the relevant 
constitutional limits to the use of Article 114 TFEU in the Tobacco Advertising case,609 even if 
sometimes those limits are more strictly enforced by the CJEU than other authorities.610 The 
first limit is that EU law must harmonise national laws. EU legislation that left unchanged 
existing national laws cannot be regarded as aiming to unify national laws. The second 
relevant limit is that there must be an appreciable distortion of competition and that EU 
legislation shall contribute to the elimination of obstacles to free movement or distortions 
of competition.  
As to the first limit to the use of Article 114 TFEU – that EU law must harmonise national laws 
– this has recently been confirmed by the CJEU in European Parliament v Council of the EU.611 
This case concerned the challenge to Regulation 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003, on the Statute 
of a European Cooperative Society,612 by the EU Parliament on the grounds of the legal basis 
chosen by the Council. The “contested Regulation lays down a single statute applicable to 
the European cooperative society (SCE) in order, inter alia, to remove all barriers to cross-
border cooperation of companies while taking account of the specific features of 
cooperatives.”613 According to Recital 2 of the Regulation:  
“The completion of the internal market and the improvement it brings about in the 
economic and social situation throughout the Community mean not only that 
barriers to trade should be removed, but also that the structures of production 
should be adapted to the Community dimension. For that purpose it is essential that 
companies of all types the business of which is not limited to satisfying purely local 
                                                             
609 Judgment of 5 October 2000, Germany v Parliament and Council, C-376/98, EU:C:2000:544. 
610 Case law up-holding the EU action under Article 114 TFEU includes, for example, Judgment of 13 
July 1995, Spain v Council, C-350/92, EU:C:1995:237; Judgment of 9 October 2001, Netherlands v 
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of 10 February 2009, Ireland v Parliament and Council, C-301/06, EU:C:2009:68; Judgment of 8 June 
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611 Judgment of 2 May 2006, Parliament v Council, C-436/03, EU:C:2006:277, paragraph 44.  
612 Regulation 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003, on the Statute of a European Cooperative Society [2003] OJ 
L207/1. 
613Judgment of 2 May 2006, Parliament v Council, C-436/03, EU:C:2006:277, paragraph 2.  
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needs should be able to plan and carry out the reorganisation of their business on 
a Community scale.”  
The Parliament asked the CJEU for the annulment of the Regulation on the grounds that it 
has been enacted under the wrong legal basis. According to the Parliament, Article 114 TFEU 
was applicable, and Article 352 TFEU was incorrectly applied.614 The Parliament pointed out 
that the diversity of the various company laws of the Member States hinders the activities 
of cooperative societies, mostly as regards the transfer of their registered offices and cross-
border mergers. As such there was a need to harmonise national laws. The Parliament was 
of the opinion that such harmonisation could be carried out under Article 114 TFEU by 
supplementing national law with European legal forms. In the case of the European 
Cooperative Society, the approximation of the laws of the Member States was necessary in 
order to create and manage cross-border cooperatives.615 The Commission supported the 
Parliament in its claim and added a further argument. The contested regulation seeks to 
improve the conditions for the establishment of the internal market as it contributes to the 
removal of barriers to the free movement of services by introducing a legal form which 
allows the cooperative society to operate beyond national borders.616 The Council argued 
that the contested regulation creates a new legal form, of a European dimension, additional 
to cooperative society under national law. It also considered that the fact that the EU act is 
aimed at establishing the functioning of the internal market is not sufficient to trigger the 
use of Article 114. According to the Council, approximation measures necessarily imply 
substitution of national laws.617  
The CJEU upheld the Regulation. It started by reaffirming that Article 114 TFEU empowers 
the EU legislator to adopt measures to improve the conditions for the establishment and 
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functioning of the internal market, and they must genuinely have that object, contributing 
to the elimination of obstacles to the economic freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.618 The 
CJEU also reaffirmed that recourse to Article 114 TFEU is possible to prevent the emergence 
of obstacles to trade resulting from heterogeneous developments of national laws.619 The 
CJEU however considered that it was apparent from the content and purpose of the 
contested regulation that it aimed at introducing a new legal form in addition to the national 
forms of cooperative societies. The CJEU considered that in such circumstances the 
contested regulation cannot be regarded as aiming to approximate national laws already in 
existence but has as its purpose the creation of a new form of cooperative society in addition 
to the national forms.620 
What are the consequences that result from this as to the possibility of enacting measures 
of approximation of competition laws under Article 114 TFEU? 
First and foremost, it has been demonstrated in more detail that Member States did not 
transfer unlimited competence to the EU on competition matters. Member States retain 
exclusive competence on competition matters over their territory for situations that do not 
affect trade between Member States. As such, EU law cannot harmonise the national 
competition laws that fall under the exclusive competence of the Member States. The 
consequence of this is that EU competition law can only create new rights but it cannot 
replace national laws. Any EU legislation, even if it has the aim of improving the conditions 
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market, must leave the national laws 
under the scope of exclusive competence of the Member States intact. The merger 
regulation that creates the EU system for merger control is a good example of this and was 
correctly enacted under former Article 308 EC Treaty (now Article 352 TFEU). EU merger 
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regulation coexists with national merger control. It could not replace national law in its 
entirety as the situations that do not affect trade between Member States are outside of EU 
jurisdiction. The national law applicable to restriction of competition that affects trade 
between Member States and that is applicable to situations that do not affect trade between 
Member States may well be the same. However, this is because that is the choice of the 
national legislator and not because the latter has been harmonised under Article 114 TFEU. 
The fact that the situations left outside the scope of EU law are purely national situations is 
irrelevant, as in Österreichischer Rundfunk, the CJEU considered that Article 114 TFEU could 
be used to harmonise situations that are purely national with no cross-border effects.621 
However, the limited scope of conferred powers in competition matters makes it impossible 
for the EU to harmonise the law that is within the scope of exclusive competence of the EU. 
Consequently, EU law cannot aim at approximating national laws but can only create new 
competition principles in addition to the national ones.622 Therefore, an action under Article 
114 TFEU is excluded.  
As to the other limit – that there must be an appreciable distortion of competition and that 
the EU legislation shall contribute to the elimination of obstacles to free movement or 
distortions of competition - I also argue that harmonisation under Article 114 TFEU is set 
aside for competition matters as the EU legislature itself does not consider the existence of 
a harmonised law in the EU necessary. For the competence under Article 114 TFEU to be 
triggered it is not enough for there to be disparities between national laws. As stated by the 
CJEU in the Tobacco Advertising case: 
“[i]f a mere finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk of 
obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition 
liable to result therefrom were sufficient to justify the choice of Article [114] as legal 
                                                             
621 Judgment of 20 May 2003, Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, Joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 
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basis, judicial review of compliance with the proper legal basis might be rendered 
nugatory.”623 
Article 114 TFEU cannot be interpreted as meaning that the EU legislator may rely on that 
article with a view to eliminating the smallest distortions of competition. This would be 
incompatible with the principle of conferral.624 Article 114 does not therefore confer to the 
Union legislator a general power to regulate the internal market. Measures under Article 114 
TFEU must be  
“intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market and must genuinely have that object, actually contributing to the 
elimination of obstacles to the free movement of goods or the freedom to provide 
services, or the removal of distortions of competition.”625  
It is hard to argue that harmonised national competition laws are necessary to create a level 
playing field in the internal market. Three main arguments support this statement. First, as 
confirmed by the CJEU, stricter national competition laws are not in conflict with EU 
competition law. Additionally, Regulation 1/2003 itself contradicts the need for harmonised 
national competition laws. Under Article 3(2) Regulation 1/2003 Member States can enact 
and apply stricter national competition laws regarding unilateral conduct. Finally, the CJEU 
considers that the Member States can have different approaches on the relevance of public 
policy considerations in the context of EU competition law. In such a context is difficult to 
argue that harmonised national competition laws are necessary to create a level playing field 
in the internal market.  
The possibility of using Article 114 TFEU in the area of competition is therefore set aside.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter established that the boundaries of the EU’s exclusive competence under Article 
3(1)(b) TFEU is determined by the legal provisions enabling the Union to exercise such 
competence.  It concluded that the legal bases against which the scope of Article 3(1)(b) 
TFEU is to be found  are Articles 103, 105(3) and 106(3) TFEU. The analysis of these provisions 
pursued in this chapter demonstrated that EU exclusive legislative competence to establish 
the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market do not include the 
competence to establish substantive principles of EU competition law. Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU are directly applicable. This has an impact on the scope of the powers of the Council 
under Article 103 TFEU to implement the substantive principles of those provisions whose 
content is ultimately determined by the CJEU. Therefore, the Council has no competence 
under Article 103 TFEU to establish substantive competition principles under Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU. Accordingly, the Commission also cannot do it under Article 105(3) TFEU as it 
acts following a delegation of powers from the Council under Article 103 TFEU. As to the 
powers of the Commission under Article 106 TFEU, they are specifically limited to the 
situation where there is a violation of Article 106. Given the direct effect of Article 106 TFEU, 
it is the CJEU that determines the content of that Article and not the Commission. The 
Commission is limited in enforcing that provision only to the extent permitted by the 
interpretation of the CJEU. It has no powers to enact competition principles applicable to 
public undertakings and undertakings with special rights. Such competence has been 
conferred on the Union by Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition, which 
in turn provides for Article 252 TFEU as the legal basis for the Union to act. This has an 
important two-fold consequence. Firstly, the legislative competence to establish substantive 
principles of EU competition law is shared. The legislative action of the Member States in this 
area is not excluded by the exclusive competence of the EU under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. 
Secondly, for an action to be taken under Article 352 TFEU unanimity in the Council is 
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required. As was showed in Chapter 2, unanimity strongly protects the accommodation of 
diversity in EU decision making process.  
Reaching this stage of the thesis, the overall conclusion is that Article 3(1)(b) TFEU includes 
very little and excludes very much; it excludes more competence from its scope than what 
includes. The constitutional arrangements on competence allocation do not exclude the 
action of the Member States neither to enforce EU competition rules nor to establish 
substantive principle of EU competition law. Those competences remain shared under the 
Treaty of Lisbon.   
In the light of these conclusions we will turn now in chapter 5 to the limits imposed by 
general principles of EU law to the capacity of the Member States to diverge from the Union 




Chapter 5 – Limits to diversity resulting from 
the general principles of EU law of direct 
effect, primacy and ne bis in idem  
Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the questions “(i) is the application of national competition law 
possible?”, “(ii) are Member States able to give their own interpretation of EU competition 
law even if it risks diverging from the approach favoured by the Commission?” from a point 
of view of the constitutional arrangements on competence allocation enshrined in the 
European Treaties. We arrived at a positive answer to these questions as Member States and 
the EU share competence to legislate on EU substantive competition principles and to 
enforce EU competition provisions. The existence of a shared competence was identified as 
a condition for diversity in EU competition law. Yet, the pursuit of the research question “Is 
diversity in EU competition law is possible from a constitutional point of view” is not 
complete without the analysis of a third question “(iii) how do the general principles of EU 
law limit diversity in EU competition law?” as these principles have the potential to affect 
the competence of the Member States.  This is now analysed in Chapter 5. 
This analysis is relevant as a plurality of decision-makers might lead to a conflict of laws or of 
interpretations of EU (competition) law. Two major general principles of EU law are relevant 
here: the principles of direct effect and primacy of EU law. Where the EU law is directly 
applicable in the legal order of the Member States it should prevail over conflicting national 
law. Due to the centripetal force of these principles in favour of the EU law over the national 
laws, the chances for diversity are generally seen as very limited, if not impossible. Weiler 
calls direct effect a “proxy for Governance,” as it entitles the legislative and administrative 
branches of the Union to reach individuals as objects and subjects of the laws, with no need 
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for the Member States to act as intermediaries.626 Some authors consider that diversity 
would be excluded by the direct effect of the EU competition provisions as no discretion in 
the implementation of self-executing norm is possible under Van Gend en Loos test,627 
therefore, no different interpretation of EU competition law would be possible. Section 1 of 
this chapter discusses the impact of direct effect of EU competition provisions on diversity in 
EU law and why it does not exclude diversity in EU competition law.  
Section 2 moves forward to discuss how the primacy of EU law over conflicting national laws 
affects diversity in EU competition law. Primacy of EU law requires national laws conflicting 
with EU law, including EU competition law, to be set aside. The relevant question here is 
when is national law inconsistent with a EU law? Constitutionalists refer to this question as 
the question of pre-emption. This section will explore the different theories of pre-emption 
identified in the literature and discuss their application by the CJEU in the field of EU 
competition law.  
When enforcing EU law, Member States are bound by the fundamental rights of the 
European Union.628 Fundamental rights may have an impact on the way the EU and Member 
States’ competence intertwine. Such is  the case of the ne bis in idem principle , enshrined in 
Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Grosso modo, this 
principle determines that no one shall be tried or punished twice for the same crime. Session 
3 of this chapter explores the application of the ne bis in idem principle in the context of the 
parallel enforcement of EU competition law, and discusses why a reading of the ne bis in 
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idem principle as a limit to the parallel application of national and EU competition laws is 
contrary to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights..  
1. Direct effect of EU Competition provisions  
“We understand the principle of direct effect to be the capacity of Union law to produce 
independent legal effect within the national legal systems.” 629 It “refers to the capacity of 
any provision of Union law, provided it satisfies certain threshold criteria, to create legal 
rights and/or obligations and/or powers which must be recognised and enforced within the 
domestic legal system.”630 It is generally recognised that Van Gen den Loos case gained its 
place in the EU legal history as “[e]ver since […] it is clear that individuals may derive rights 
directly from Union (then Community) law.”631 Van Gen den Loos is from 1963. The capacity 
of EU law to be applicable directly in the national legal orders had however been confirmed 
since 1962 as regards Article 101 and 102 TFEU. In Bosch,632 the CJEU determined that parties 
to a contract could claim before a national court that their agreement was void under Article 
101 (2) TFEU for breach of Article 101 (1) TFEU as that provision was fully applicable since 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome. The CJEU also confirmed the direct effect of Article 
102 TFEU later in BRT633 and Silver Line.634  The CJEU stated that “in respect of abuse of a 
dominant position; such abuse is simply prohibited by the Treaty and it is for the competent 
national authorities or the Commission, as the case may be, to act on that prohibition within 
                                                             
629 Dashwood and others, Wyatt and Dashwood's European Union law, 235.  
630 Ibid, 244.  
631 Lenaerts and others, European Union Law, 809.  
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the limits of their powers.”635 Therefore “[i]t must therefore be concluded that the 
prohibition laid down in Article 102 of the Treaty is fully applicable (…).”636   
The birth of direct effect of Article 106 TFEU was more complex. The Article 106(1) TFEU 
provision is only applicable in conjunction with other provisions of the Treaty. The direct 
effect of this provision depends therefore from the direct effect of the rule the Member 
States have infringed. We have seen that Articles 101 and 102 are directly applicable. 
Therefore, nationals can claim before the national courts the violation of Article 106(1) TFEU 
if the measures adopted by a Member State do not comply with any one of those 
provisions.637  
As to Article 106(2) TFEU, the CJEU started to exclude the direct effect of this provision. In 
Muller, 1971, the CJEU stated that: 638 
“The supervisory power conferred to the Commission includes the possibility of 
specifying, pursuant to Article [106](3), obligations arising under the Treaty. The 
extent of that power therefore depends on the scope of the rules with which 
compliance is to be ensured. Furthermore, the CJEU also considered that while 
Article [106] (3) of the Treaty empowers the Commission to specify in general terms 
the obligations arising under Article 106(1) by adopting directives, the Commission 
can also exercise that power to define in concrete terms the obligations imposed on 
the Member States under the Treaty”.639 
This ruling was repeated in 1983.640 The CJEU has later reviewed its position and in 1991, in 
ERT ruling the CJEU has specifically stated that: 
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“it is for the national court to determine whether the practices of such an 
undertaking are compatible with Article [106] and to verify whether those 
practices, if they are contrary to that provision, may be justified by the needs of the 
particular task with which the undertaking may have been entrusted.”641 
Jones and Sufrin break Article 106(2) TFEU in four questions: “is the undertaking ‘entrusted’ 
with a task?; is that task a ‘service of general economic interest’?; would the task be 
obstructed by complying with the Treaty rules?; and would a derogation from the Treaty 
rules have an effect on trade contrary to the interest of the Union?”642 
They argue that, regarding the first two questions, the CJEU has consistently maintained that 
a national court may decide whether or not an undertaking has been entrusted with a service 
of general economic interest.643   As to the third question, they considered that, despite 
Muller, the CJEU has repeatedly confirmed that it is for the national courts to determine 
whether the application of competition rules would obstruct the undertaking’s tasks and that 
therefore, also this part of Article 106(2) TFEU has direct effect. They argue however, that 
the fourth question is more problematic, as it requires the assessment of whether the 
interest of the EU would be adversely affected. They consider that a decision by the 
Commission on this aspect would be better suited than a decision of a national court.  
Against this view Buendia Sierra argues that this is not a fourth requirement but rather part 
of the proportionality test to which the first sentence of Article 106(2) TFEU is subject .644   
I consider that realistically, whether the “EU interest” is an autonomous requirement or part 
of the proportionality test is of little relevance if the Commission was the only entity capable 
of doing such assessment. If only the Commission was able to determine whether the 
                                                             
641 Judgment of 18 June 1991, ERT v DEP, Case 260/89, EU:C:1991:254, paragraph 34.  
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interest of the Union was at stake, it would be the only authority with jurisdiction to say 
whether the grant of an exclusive right is lawful under Article 106(2) TFEU. The Commission 
seems to consider that this is the case and that is the only authority with jurisdiction to 
determine whether the exception under Article 106(2) applies.645 I do not agree, and argue 
that the CJEU however, has contradicted this interpretation of the Commission, confirming 
the direct effect of Article 106(2) TFEU.646  In BRT the CJEU recognised the direct effect of 
Article 106(2) TFEU. In this case the question of positive action by the national court under 
Article 106(2) TFEU, i.e. the grant of an exception thereof, was however not at stake. The 
CJEU considered that an undertaking to which the state has not assigned any task and which 
manages private interests, including intellectual property rights protected by law, is not 
covered by Article 106(2) TFEU.647 However, in Silver Line,648 as argued by Van der Woude, 
the CJEU developed the jurisprudence in BRT to include positive action by national 
authorities and national courts.649  The CJEU considered that Article 106(2) TFEU can be 
applicable to air carriers who are obliged by the public authorities to operate on routes that 
are not commercially viable but that must operate for reasons related to general public 
interest. For that, national authorities responsible for the approval of tariffs and the national 
courts deciding on any dispute related to the tariffs, must be able to determine the exact 
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648 Judgment of 11 April 1989, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Others v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
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nature of the needs in question and the impact in the structure of the tariffs applied to the 
airlines.650 Later, in ERT, the CJEU was particularly clear on the possibility of Member States 
granting exceptions under Article 106(2) TFEU, stating that:  
“33 (…) it should be observed that, according to Article [106] (2) of the Treaty, 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest 
are subject to the rules on competition so long as it is not shown that the application 
of those rules is incompatible with the performance of their particular task (…). 
34 Accordingly it is for the national court to determine whether the practices of 
such an undertaking are compatible with Article [102] and to verify whether those 
practices, if they are contrary to that provision, may be justified by the needs of the 
particular task with which the undertaking may have been entrusted.”651 
The CJEU reconfirmed the direct effect of 106(2) TFEU in in Técnicos Oficiais de Contas.652 
This case concerned a preliminary ruling by the Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa regarding, inter 
alia, the compatibility with Article 101 TFEU of the Training Credits Regulation enacted by 
the national professional association of accountants. This Regulation put in place a system 
of compulsory training for chartered accountants in order to guarantee the quality of their 
services. This training was divided between institutional and professional training, and the 
institutional training was reserved exclusively to the professional association. The 
Portuguese competition authority had found that such division of the training market was 
incompatible with Article 101 TFEU. The professional association appealed the decision and 
argued, inter alia, that it has a public service mission derived directly from the law, as such 
its activities were outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU. In addition, it claimed that the 
creation of a system of compulsory training for charactered accountants is a service of 
general economic interest within the meaning of Article 106(2) TFEU.653  
                                                             
650Judgment of 11 April 1989, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Others v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs, Case 66/86, EU:C:1989:140, paragraph 56. 
651 Judgment of 18 June 1991, ERT v DEP, Case 260/89, EU:C:1991:254. 
652 Judgment of 28 February 2013, Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas, C-1/12, EU:C:2013:127. 
 
653Ibid, paragraph 28. 
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The CJEU, reaffirming previous jurisprudence, expressly confirmed the direct effect of Article 
106(2), stating that: 
“106 (…), undertakings falling within the scope of Article 106(2) TFEU may rely on 
that provision of the Treaty to justify a measure contrary to Article 101 TFEU only 
if the restrictions on competition, or even the exclusion of all competition, are 
necessary in order to ensure the performance of the particular tasks assigned to 
them.” 654 
The CJEU was of the view, however, that regulations such as the one at stake constitute a 
restriction on competition, as prohibited under Article 101 TFEU. The capacity of Article 
106(1) and (2) TFEU to  have direct effect unquestionably ended up by being confirmed by 
the CJEU.  
Diversity is not anathema to the direct effect of EU (competition) law 
Some authors claim that direct effect precludes diverse outcomes in EU law enforcement. 
Van Gerven argues that in relation to rights which EU law confers on individuals, the answer 
must necessarily be that their content should be the same throughout the EU.655 This would 
jeopardize any chance of diversity in the enforcement of EU law directly applicable in the 
Member States.  
In the same sense, Oudu argues that the direct effect test under Van Gen den Loos was 
motivated by the aim of promoting uniformity in application in all Member States.656 It 
excludes discretion as to the content of the norms. In this light, he argues that Article 101(3) 
TFEU “involves so much discretion that a centralised system of enforcement657 was the only 
                                                             
654 The CJEU quoted Judgment of 25 June 1998, Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp and Others v 
Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, C-203/96, EU:C:1998:316, 
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EU:C:2013:127, para 106.  
655 Gerven, 'Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures', 526. 
656 Odudu, 'Article 81(3), discretion and direct effect', 22. 
657 Odudu is referring to Article 9(1) Regulation 17/62. 
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way to ensure a consistent interpretation.”658 These claims for uniformity are based on the 
genesis of the test developed in Van Gend en Loos. It is commonly accepted that it follows 
from Van Gend En Loos that “[t]he decisive test for determining whether or not a given 
provision has direct effect is its content.”659 Under the Van Gend En Loos’ test a provision 
needs to be “clear, negative, unconditional, containing no reservation on the part of the 
Member States, and not dependent on any national implementing measures.”660  Even if this 
test has been said to have suffered an “undeniable dilution over the years,”661 as today a 
norm is considered to have direct effect if “sufficiently operational in itself to be applied by 
a court,”662 Lenaerts and Van Nuffel point out however that “[t]hough the Court has not 
invariably formulated that test in the same way, it refers to a provision which is sufficiently 
precise (“clear”) and requires no further implementation (involving a margin of discretion) 
by Union or national authorities in order to achieve the effect sought in an effective manner 
(“unconditional”).663  
I do not agree with the conclusion that diversity is excluded by the direct effect character of 
the EU competition law provisions. I base my reasoning in four major arguments. Firstly, it is 
misleading to analyse direct effect of articles 101 and 102 TFEU on the grounds of Van Gen 
en Loos. Secondly, uniformity in the implementation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU could not 
be aimed by the CJEU at the time it confirmed their direct effect. Thirdly, direct effect allows 
some discretion in EU competition law enforcement. Finally, diversity is not incompatible 
                                                             
658 Odudu, 'Article 81(3), discretion and direct effect'. 
659 Lenaerts and others, European Union Law, 810. 
660 Judgment of 5 February 1963, Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen, Case 26/62, 
EU:C:1963:1. 
661 Bruno de Witte, 'Direct effect, supremacy and the nature of legal order' in Paul; de Búrca Craig, 
Gráinne (ed), The evolution of EU law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011), 332. 
662 Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven of 27 October 1993, Banks v British Coal, C-128/92, 
EU:C:1993:860, paragraph 27. 
663 Lenaerts and others, European Union Lawreffering to the Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven 
of 27 October 1993, Banks v British Coal, C-128/92.  
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with justiciability of EU law directly applicable. Therefore, direct effect allows diversity even 
when it does not allow discretion.  
Direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU has not its genesis on Van Gend en Loos 
test  
The arguments against diversity of EU law directly applicable in the Member States are 
grounded on the Van Gen den Loos test that has the content of the norms at its core. I argue 
however, that the genesis of direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is distinct and it is not 
inferred from the content of these provisions. Therefore, the argument that it follows from 
Van Gend en Loos test that the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU must be uniform, 
falls.  
The different genesis of direct effect can be observed if we do a chronological and 
comparative readings of the CJEU approach to direct effect of EU law in Bosch and Van Gend 
en Loos. This observation is then confirmed by the approach of the CJEU to the direct effect 
of the competition provisions under the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, 664 in 
Banks.665  
Chronologically, Bosch precedes Van Gend en Loos. The former dates from 1962, the later 
from 1963. So, it cannot be said that Bosch reads from Van Gend en Loos. Also the CJEU has 
not changed its approach or mentioned Van Gend en Loos in subsequent cases dealing with 
direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.666  
This chronologic observation per si is of little significance if the CJEU approach in both cases 
had been the same. However, a comparative reading of the cases shows it was not.  
                                                             
664 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, entered into force 23 
July 1952, expired on 23 July 2002. 
665 Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven of 27 October 1993, Banks v British Coal, C-128/92, 
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666 E.g. See Judgment of 30 April 1974, Sacchi, Case 155/73, EU:C:1974:40, paragraph 431 and 
Judgment of 11 April 1989, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Others v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs, Case 66/86, EU:C:1989:140, paragraph 32. 
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Bosch and Van Gend en Loos have the same constitutional background, which make them 
particularly suitable for comparison, as there is no specific context of the referring 
jurisdiction that could explain the difference in the CJEU approaches. They were both 
referrals from Dutch Courts. The Netherlands is a Member State with a constitutional monist 
tradition when it comes to the effect of international treaties in its legal order. Unlike the 
Member States with a dualist tradition, in the Netherlands the provisions of international 
treaties do not need to be incorporated by a provision of national law to become part of the 
national legal system, as long as the provisions according to their terms are self-executing. 
Under Article 65 of the Dutch constitution at that time, “Provisions of agreements which, 
according to their terms, can be binding on anyone shall have such binding force after having 
been published.” Article 66 of that Constitution established that “Legislation in force with 
the Kingdom shall not apply if this application would be incompatible with provisions of 
agreements which are binding upon anyone and which have been entered into force before 
or after the enactment of such legislation.”667 In both cases the underlying issue was to 
understand whether the provisions at stake – i.e. Article 101 TFEU  (then Article 85 EEC 
Treaty), in Bosch and Article 30 TFEU  (then Article 12 EEC Treaty),  in Van Gend en Loos - 
could be considered self-executing. As stated by the Dutch Supreme Court in the order 
accepting the reference in Bosch to be done by The Hague Court of Appeal: “as is clear from 
Article 66 [of the Dutch constitution], the question of whether a provision of a Treaty binds 
the nationals of the Member States is, at least in Dutch law, a question that can only be 
answered on the basis of the interpretation of those treaty provisions.” Therefore, the Dutch 
Supreme Court considered Bosch was on a question of the Treaty’s interpretation, it was a 
good question to refer to the CJEU.668 The received wisdom was that the self-executing 
nature of treaty provisions had to be deduced from the intention of the contracting 
                                                             
667 Translated provided by de Witte, 'Direct effect, supremacy and the nature of legal order'. 
668 Ibid, 332. 
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parties.669 As I will show next, as regards Articles 101 and 102 TFEU the CJEU had an easy way 
out to show the intent of the parties on the self-executing nature of these provisions without 
needing to get into their content.  
Bosch was a preliminary ruling concerning the validity of an agreement under Article 101(2) 
TFEU after the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome.670 The reference to the CJEU was made 
in a case concerning an appeal against the decision of a court in Rotterdam regarding the 
validity under Article 101 TFEU, of an exclusive agreement between Robert Bosch Gmbh, a 
German manufacture of electrical devices, and its distributor for the national market, the 
company Van Rijn. In the proceedings, the defendant claimed that the exclusive agreement 
breached Article 101(1) and it was void under Article 101(2). The court in Rotterdam rejected 
that claim and considered that Article 101 would only be enforceable once the common 
market had been achieved, i.e. at the end of the transitory period.671 The decision was 
appealed to the Court of Appeal in The Hague which made a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU asking:  
“[w]hether the prohibition on export imposed by Robert Bosch Gmbh of Stuttgart, 
on its customers and accepted by them by way of contract, is void by virtue of Article 
[101] (2) of the TFEU as far as exports to The Netherlands are concerned.”672 
The CJEU peremptorily considered that: 
The answer to this question must in principle be in the affirmative.673  
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This is because: 
“Articles [104] and [105] of the treaty, which confer powers on the national 
authorities and on the commission respectively for the application of article [101], 
presuppose its applicability from the time of entry into force of the treaty.” 674 
Under Article 104 TFEU:  
“Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance of Article 103, the 
authorities in Member States shall rule on the admissibility of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices and on abuse of a dominant position in the 
internal market in accordance with the law of their country and with the provisions 
of Article 101, in particular paragraph 3, and of Article 102.”  
Under Article 105 (1) TFEU: 
“Without prejudice to Article 104, the Commission shall ensure the application of 
the principles laid down in Articles 101 and 102. On application by a Member State 
or on its own initiative, and in cooperation with the competent authorities in the 
Member States, which shall give it their assistance, the Commission shall 
investigate cases of suspected infringement of these principles. If it finds that there 
has been an infringement, it shall propose appropriate measures to bring it to an 
end.” 
One year after Bosch, in Van Gend en Loos, the CJEU was questioned on the direct effect of 
Article 30 TFEU also by a Dutch Court, the Tariefcommissie, an administrative specialised 
court.675 The Tariefcommissie referred a question to the CJEU in the context of a dispute 
about an import tax:  
                                                             
674 Ibid. 
675 The CJEU received strong opposition from some Member States, including from The Netherlands, 
regarding the competence of the CJEU to decide on the matter. The Government of The Netherlands 
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“Whether Article [30 TFEU] has direct application within the territory of a member 
state, in other words, whether nationals of such a state can, on the basis of the 
article in question, lay claim to individual rights which the courts must protect.”676 
In order to assess whether Article 30 TFEU was self-executing, the CJEU did not try to 
reconstruct the intent of the contracting parties to the Treaty.677 Instead the CJEU held that: 
“[t]o ascertain whether the provisions of an international treaty extend so far their 
effects it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of 
its provisions.”678   
It then inferred from the special nature of the Community legal order that: 
“Community law therefore not only imposes the obligations on individuals but it 
also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. 
These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also 
by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon 
individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the 
Community.”679 
The CJEU then sought to get into the content of Article 30 TFEU to understand whether it 
imposed “a clearly defined” obligation as the right was not “expressly granted by the Treaty.” 
The CJEU concluded that:  
“[t]he wording of Article [30 TFEU] contains a clear and unconditional prohibition 
which is not a positive but negative obligation. The obligation, moreover, is not 
qualified by any reservation on the part of states which would make its 
implementation conditional upon a positive legislative measure enacted under 
national law. The very nature of this prohibition makes ideally adapted to produce 
direct effect in the legal relationship between Member States and their subjects.”680  
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Bosch and Van Gend en Loos concerned the same type of question: the self-executing nature 
of Treaty’s provisions. Article 101 TFEU and Article 30 TFEU respectively. The approach of 
the CJEU to the question however, was different.  
In Bosch the CJEU was able to infer the self-executing nature of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
from the overall scheme of the Treaty. Article 104, together with Article 105 TFEU, required 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to be enforced from the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, 
irrespectively of whether implementing measures had been adopted. Under Article 104 TFEU 
the parties expressed their clear intent to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU since the entry 
into force of the Treaty. In Van Gend en Loos, the analysis regarding the self-executing nature 
of Article 30 TFEU required a different type of approach. There was no equivalent provision 
to Article 104 TFEU in the context of the Customs Union, from which the CJEU could infer the 
intent of the contracting parties to be bound by Article 30 TFEU, since the entry into force of 
the Treaty, irrespectively of implementing measures. The CJEU needed to infer the self-
executing nature of this provision from “the spirit, the general scheme and the wording of 
its provisions.”681 The content of the provision was central to the matter as it was the 
element which determined the self-executing nature of Article 30 TFEU. 
The approach of the CJEU in Banks,682 concerning the direct effect of the competition 
provisions of ECSC Treaty, confirms the distinct approach of the CJEU in Bosch. In Banks, the 
CJEU followed the Van Gen den Loos test. Despite the similar content of the ECSC Treaty 
competition provisions with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the CJEU arrived at a distinct 
conclusion on their direct effect.683  
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unfair competitive prices. Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty corresponded to Article 101 TFEU, and 
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The comparative analysis of Bosch and Van Gen den Loos shows that direct effect of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU was affirmed by the CJEU because “Articles [104] and [105] of the treaty, 
(…), presuppose its applicability from the time of entry into force of the treaty,” 684 and not 
because they contain “a clear and unconditional prohibition which is not a positive but 
negative obligation.” 685   
The use of the Van Gend en Loos test as regards competition provisions of the ECSC Treaty 
comes from the fact that in the ECSC Treaty there is no equivalent provision to Article 104 
TFEU, from where the intent of the contracting parties on the self-executing nature of the 
competition provisions could be inferred. On the contrary. It was generally recognized that 
in the context of the ECSC Treaty there had been a complete transfer of jurisdiction from the 
Member States to the ECSC in competition matters regarding the coal and steel sectors, and 
that the Commission was the sole authority competent to enforce the competition provision 
of the ECSC Treaty. 
Banks was a referral from the High Court of Justice of the United Kingdom, in the context of 
a dispute between two private parties on the validity of their agreement in the light of ECSC 
Treaty. Banks was a private company engaged in the production of coal using some methods 
of extraction under licences granted to it by British Coal. British Coal was a statutory 
corporation, wholly owned by the Government. Pursuant to the Coal Industry 
Nationalization Act of 1946, British Coal had the sole right to work and get coal in Great 
Britain and to grant licenses to third parties686 These could be either “royalty licences”, 
whereby the licensee would pay a royalty per tonne of coal produced and could sell the coal 
                                                             
prohibited agreements between undertakings, decisions of undertakings and concerted practices that 
restrict or distort competition within the common market of coal and steel. Article 66(7) of the ECSC 
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684 Judgment of 6 April 1962, De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Bosch and others, Case 13/61, EU:C:1962:11 
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to third parties, or “delivered licences,” whereby the licensee is obliged to sell it to British 
Coal at a price specified in the agreement. In 1991, Banks had brought an action for damages 
against British Coal before the High Court of Justice. It contested that the level of royalty set 
by British Coal under royalty licences was excessive and prevented Banks from making a 
reasonable profit, and that the price paid by British Coal under delivered licenses was 
unreasonably low. The High Court of Justice stayed proceedings and referred several 
questions to the CJEU, including: 
“Are articles 4(d), 60, 65, and/or 66(7) of the ECSC Treaty directly effective and such 
as to give rise to rights enforceable by private parties which must be protected by 
national courts?” 687 
The CJEU excluded the applicability of Article 60 ECSC Treaty.688 It then proceeded with the 
analysis of the other provisions in question. The CJEU, stated that “it was necessary to see 
whether Articles 4(d), 65 and 66(7) ECSC Treaty are clear, unconditional provisions which 
confer directly on individuals’ rights which the national courts must protect.” 689 Contrary to 
the opinion of the AG, the CJEU considered that none of the provisions had direct effect as 
they were not unconditional. They all need a decision of the Commission establishing that 
that there had been a breach.  
Article 4(d) was not applicable alone, therefore, could not have direct effect.690 
“As regards Article 65, the second subparagraph of its fourth paragraph confers on the 
Commission sole jurisdiction, subject to the review by the Court of First Instance and the 
Court of Justice, to rule on the compatibility of Article 65 of any agreement prohibited by the 
first paragraph. Accordingly, as long as such incompatibility has not been established by the 
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Commission itself, individuals may not plead, in proceedings before national courts, that an 
agreement is incompatible with Article 65.”691  
The Court considered the same as regards Article 66 as its paragraph 7 “reserves to the 
Commission the power to verify whether public or private undertakings which, in law or in 
fact, hold or acquire in the market for one of the products within its jurisdiction a dominant 
position shielding them against effective competition in a substantial part of the common 
market are using that position for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Treaty. The 
conferral of sole jurisdiction on the Commission precludes individuals from relying directly 
on that provision in proceedings before the national court. 692  
Uniformity could not have been a consideration when the CJEU declared the 
direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
Irrespective of the test followed by the CJEU, a uniform implementation of these provisions 
could not have been a consideration when the CJEU declared the direct effect of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU, for two main reasons. Firstly, the lack of legislative measures under Article 
103 TFEU regarding the powers of the Commission to apply Article 101(3) TFEU had an 
impact on the provisional validity of anti-competitive agreements. Secondly, the absence of 
the primacy of EU law compromised consistency in EU competition law enforcement. 
The possibility of a consistent application of Articles 101 at the time their direct effect was 
confirmed was expressly recognized by the CJEU. After inferring direct effect of these 
provisions from Articles 104 and 105 TFEU, the CJEU stated: 
“Articles [104] and [105] are, however, not of such a nature as to ensure a complete 
and consistent application of article [101] so that their mere existence would permit 
the assumption that article [101] had been fully effective from the date of entry into 
force of the treaty and in particular that the annulment envisaged by article [101] 
(2) would have taken effect in all those cases falling under the definition of article 
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[101] (1) and in respect of which a declaration under article [101] ( 3 ) had not yet 
been made.”693 (emphasis added) 
The lack of capacity of Articles 104 and 105 TFEU to achieve a “complete and consistent” 
application of Article 101 TFEU was clear in the sector of air transport. The (provisional) 
validity under Article 101 TFEU of a tariff price agreement differed if the agreement was 
covered by the scope of the Regulation pursuant to Article 103 with a view to organizing the 
Commission’s powers to grant the exemptions under Article 101(3). In Silver Line694 the CJEU 
dealt with a preliminary reference by the German Federal Court of Justice, 
Bundesgerichtshoft, regarding notably the compatibility of certain tariff fixing agreements 
applicable to scheduled passenger flights under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Regulation 141695 
excluded the air transport from the application of Regulation 17/62, which contained the 
Commission’s powers to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Article 101 and 102 TFEU 
remained nevertheless applicable to the sector, under the enforcement system established 
by Articles 104 and 105 TFEU. 696 Those rules were eventually enacted by the Council in 1987. 
They included inter alia, Regulation 3975/87 which laid down the procedures for the 
application of the rules of competition to undertakings in the air transport sector, and 
Regulation 3976/87 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of 
agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector.697 These measures, however, 
were only applicable to international air transport between Community airports.  Air 
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transport services between airports in a given Member State or between these airports and 
a third country were therefore excluded. 
The CJEU was called to assess the validity of tariff fixing agreements under Articles 101 and 
02 TFEU. As to the application of Article 101 TFEU the CJEU held that it was necessary to 
make a distinction between tariff fixing agreements covering flights between airports of 
Member States and those covering flights between the airports within the same Member 
State or between a Member State and a third country  
Regarding the application of the Article 101 TFEU to international air transport services 
between airports of different Member States, the CJEU considered that those agreements 
were automatically void under Articles 101 (2) TFEU only in one of the following three 
eventualities:698 
(i) no application has been submitted to the Commission under 
Article 5 Regulation 3975/87;  
(ii) the application received a negative response from the 
Commission within the 90-day time limit,  
(iii) the time-limit expired without any response on the part of the 
Commission but the six-year period of validity of the exemption 
has expired or the Commission withdrew the exemption within 
the six-year period.  
As the new Regulations did not apply to air transport services between airports within the 
same Member State, or to international air transport services between an airport of a 
Member State and an airport of third country, the provisional arrangements under Articles 
104 and 105 TFEU remained applicable. Therefore, tariff agreements regarding these air 
transports remained applicable. As such, they were only to be considerable void under 
                                                             
698 Judgment of 11 April 1989, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Others v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung 
unlauteren Wettbewerbs, Case 66/86, EU:C:1989:140, paragraph 26. 
 202 
Article 101(2) TFEU where either the authorities of the Member States in which the 
registered office of one of the airlines concerned is situated or the Commission, acting under 
Articles 104 and 105 respectively, have ruled or recorded that the agreement is incompatible 
with Article 101 TFEU.699  
This was different for Article 102 TFEU.700 The CJEU held that “[i]n contrast, no exemption 
may be granted, in any manner whatsoever, in respect of abuse of a dominant position; such 
abuse is simply prohibited by the Treaty and it is for the competent national authorities or 
the Commission, as the case may be, to act on that prohibition within the limits of their 
powers.”701 The CJEU then stated that “[i]t must therefore be concluded that the prohibition 
laid down in Article 102 of the Treaty is fully applicable to the whole of the air transport 
sector.”702  
The inconsistency of the application of Articles 101 TFEU to the air transport sector was 
notorious. The fact that the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU should be done under the 
Regulations regarding the application of the Treaty’s competition provisions to this sector, 
or under Articles 104 and 105 TFEU had an impact on the provisional validity of the tariff 
fixing agreements at the time. Also, even if Article 102 TFEU remained fully applicable to the 
sector, the investigation of the agreements not covered by the abovementioned Regulations 
by the Commission was done under article 105 TFEU. This article provides neither 
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Article 101(3). Such exemption is to be given by the institution that has been given jurisdiction under 
the implementing rules adopted by the Council under Article 103 TFEU. 
701 Ibid. 
702 Ibid, paragraph 33. 
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investigatory powers to the Commission nor powers to impose pecuniary sanctions. The 
Commission is dependent on the cooperation with the Member States. The action of the 
Commission is much more limited and the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU in these 
circumstances was very much dependent on the enforcement priorities of the Member 
States.  
Furthermore, the consistent application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU could also not have 
been a consideration in the absence of an established principle of supremacy of EU law. 
Bosch precedes Costa v ENEL (1964),703 which first determined the primacy of EU law over 
national law, as well as Walt Wilhelm (1968), that confirmed the primacy of the Treaty’s 
provisions on competition over national laws. It is true that Van Gend en Loos also preceded 
Costa v ENEL and so this situation is not specific to the case law of direct effect of Treaty’s 
competition provisions. However, this has particular consequences for the prospect of the 
uniform application of EU competition law. This is because Article 104 TFEU requires the 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by Member States to be done in parallel with their 
national competition laws. At the time Bosch was decided, it was generally accepted by the 
doctrine that the relevant national authorities ought to enforce their national competition 
laws even if conflicting with the Treaty’s competition provisions.704 Baardman argued back 
in 1960, that because Article 104 TFEU requires national competition authorities to apply 
both national and EU competition law without a hierarchy between the two legal orders 
being pre-determined by the Treaty, EU competition law could be overruled by national 
laws.705 The view of the majority was that an agreement to be valid it needed to pass the test 
of both national and EU competition provisions, even if it was possible to achieve conflicting 
                                                             
703 Judgment of 15 July 1964, Costa v E.N.E.L., Case 6/64, EU:C:1964:66. 
704 For further discussion on this point, see Michel Waelbroeck, 'Le problème de la validité des 
ententes économiques dans le droit prive du marché commun ' (1962) Revue critique de droit 
international privé . 
705 Ibid, 423. 
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results. Waelbroeck pointed out that this was also the view of some national courts such as 
the Dutch ones.706 Therefore, in the absence of an established primacy principle, which 
would only occur two years after Bosch, uniformity in EU competition law was hardly an 
objective that CJEU could aim for when ascertaining the direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU.  
Direct effect allows (some) discretion 
When an EU norm has direct effect the ultimate arbiter of its content is the CJEU, therefore 
implementing measures cannot involve a margin of discretion as to the content of the 
provision.707  On his work, Discretionary Powers: A legal study of Official Discretion, Galligan 
stated that there is discretion when there is “an express grant of power conferred on officials 
where determination of the standards according to which power is to be exercised is left 
largely to them.”708 In its broader sense, discretion is “to have a sphere of autonomy within 
which one’s decisions are in some degree a matter of personal judgement and assessment.” 
709 The Treaty’s competition provisions are open textured and require interpretation.710 
Under Article 19 TEU, the CJEU is the ultimately responsible for this interpretation. 
Therefore, neither the Commission nor the court or authorities of the Member States have 
discretion as to the content of the Treaty’s competition provisions. It is also arguable that 
regardless of direct effect, in the context of an administrative enforcement system of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU, i.e. where the fines for the breach of these provisions are determined by 
the same administrative authority that was in charge of the investigation of the 
                                                             
706 Michel Waelbroeck, 'L’application des règles de concurrence du Traité de Rome aux Pays-Bas' 
(1962) Revue du Marché commun 115 115. 
707 Lenaerts and others, European Union LawLenaerts et al., European Union Law, 810 refering to the 
Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven of 27 October 1993, Banks v British Coal, C-128/92, 
EU:C:1993:860.  
708 Denis Galligan, Discretionary Powers: a Legal Study of Official Discretion, (Clarendon Press 1990), 
1.  
709 Ibid, 8.  
710 See generally Hart, The concept of law. Vagueness in law can be preferable to precision, see V. Fon 
and F. Parisi, 'On the optimal specificity of legal rules' (2007) 3 Journal of Institutional Economics ; V. 
Fon and F. Parisi, The Economics of Lawmaking (Oxford University Press 2009). 
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infringement, the same limit would also follow from the right to a fair trial. This is required 
by Article 6(1) European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, now formally part of the Treaty on European 
Union.711 Article 6(1) ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights does not 
oppose that enforcement model, however, it requires that the decisions finding such 
infringements and imposing fines, must be subject to a review by a court exercising full 
jurisdiction.712 This is because a decision imposing fines in competition cases involves a 
"criminal charge" for the purposes of Article 6(1) ECHR. It is well established that Article 6(1) 
requires that the tribunal determining the "criminal charge" must not only be independent 
and impartial, but must also have full jurisdiction to examine and determine all questions of 
fact and law relevant to the dispute before it.713 A full jurisdictional review is incompatible 
with discretion as the court can replace the judgement of the enforcer.714  
                                                             
711 Article 6 TEU.  
712 Jussila v Finland, App. No 73053/01 (ECHR, 23 November 2006) and Sigma Radio Television Ltd. V 
Cyprus, App. No 32181/05 (ECHR, 27 September 2011). Article 6(1) normally requires that the matter 
is adjudicated upon at first instance by an independent and impartial tribunal having full jurisdiction 
to examine the facts and the law. However, in Jussila  v Finland the European Court of Human Rights 
held that there may be a distinction between "hard core" criminal offences and other "criminal" 
offences "not strictly belonging to the traditional categories of criminal law", citing administrative 
penalties arising from customs law, competition law or tax surcharges, where the criminal-head 
guarantees "will not necessarily apply with their full stringency."  
713See e.g. Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyer v. Belgium, App. No 6878/75; 7238/75 (ECHR, 23 
June 1981), 
paragraph 23; Chevrol v France, App. No 496336/99  (ECHR 2003-III, 13 February 2003), paragraph 77; 
A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, App. No 43509/08 (ECHR, 27 September 2011), paragraphs 59 to 
61 and dissenting judgment of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v. Italy, 
paragraph 8. The General Court itself has held that the Commission is not a "tribunal" for the purposes 
of Article 6(1), but that the judicial control exercised by the General Court over the Commission’s 
decisions satisfies the requirements of Article 6(1), see e.g. Judgment of 14 May 1998, Enso Española 
v Commission, T-348/94, EU:T:1998:102 and Judgment of 11 March 1999, Aristrain v Commission, T-
156/94, EU:T:1999:53, paragraphs 27-30. 
714 For a discussion on whether the jurisdictional review of the Commission decisions enforcing Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU under Article 31 Regulation 1/2003 satisfy the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) 
ECHU and Article 47 ECFR see E.g. Christopher Bellamy, 'ECHR and competition law post Menarini: An 
overview of EU and national case law' e-competition <http://awa2013.concurrences.com/business-
Articles-awards/Article/echr-and-competition-law-post#nh21>; Ian S.  Forrester, 'A Bush in Need of 
Pruning: the Luxurian Growth of “Light Judicial Review” ' in Clause-Dieter; Marquis Ehlermann, Mel 
(ed), European competition law annual 2009 : the evaluation of evidence and its judicial review in 
competition cases (Hart Publishing 2010); Ian S. Forrester, 'Due process in E.C. competition cases : a 
distinguished institution with flawed procedures' (2009) 34 European Law Review 817; Wouter P.J. 
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If discretion to implement norms is suppressed when they have direct effect, can we aim at 
diversity in the enforcement of EU competition law? I argue we can. “Discretion is a matter 
of degree.”715 I argue that direct effect allows some discretion, such as to set positive and 
negative priorities for the enforcement of Article 101 and 102 TFEU. Discretion can be 
narrower or wider, depending on the constraints imposed by applicable legislative, 
constitutional or Treaty provisions.716 However, it is “unlikely ever to be unlimited”, for “the 
rule of law requires that no discretion should be unconstrained so as to be potentially 
arbitrary.”717 The CJEU has recognised a broad discretion to the Commission when it acts 
under Article 105 TFEU. To fulfil its task of implementing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the 
Commission has discretion to select the cases which it investigates and in which it continues 
the proceedings up to the stage of a final decision. In Automec the CJEU specifically stated 
that: 
“(…) it should be observed that, in the case of an authority entrusted with a public 
service task, the power to take all the organizational measures necessary for the 
performance of that task, including setting priorities within the limits prescribed by 
the law, where those priorities have not been determined by the legislature, is an 
inherent feature of administrative activity. This must be the case in particular where 
an authority has been entrusted with a supervisory and regulatory task as extensive 
and general as that which has been assigned to the Commission in the field of 
competition. Consequently, the fact that the Commission applies different degrees 
of priority to the cases submitted to it in the field of competition is compatible with 
the obligations imposed on it by Community law.”718 
When it comes to the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the national competition 
authorities, they are bound in the same way as the Commission by those provisions and the 
block exemption regulation as interpreted by the CJEU. In the same way as the Commission, 
                                                             
Wils, 'The Compatibility with Fundamental Rights of the EU Antitrust Enforcement System in Which 
the European Commission Acts Both as Investigator and as First-Instance Decision Maker' (2014) 37 
World Competition . 
715 Wils, 'Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement, in Particular EU Antitrust 
Enforcement', 355.  
716 Ibid, and text around footnote 4. 
717 Ibid, and text around footnote 4. 
718 Judgment of 18 September 1992, Automec v Commission, T-24/90, EU:T:1992:97, paragraph 77.  
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national competition authorities are not deprived by direct effect of the discretion to set 
priorities. Therefore, national procedural rules that establish the possibility for the 
competition authorities of the Member States to set priorities for their enforcement 
activities are compatible with direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Some national 
competition authorities have no discretion to set priorities and, for example, to reject 
complaints on grounds of lack of priority interest.  Such is the case of the French Competition 
Authority719 and the case of the Portuguese Competition Authority before the review of the 
competition act of 2003.720 In the UK, the England and Wales High Court has confirmed in 
Cityhook that the Office of Fair Trading (now Competition and Markets Authority)721 has a 
broad discretion to set priorities as to how best allocate its limited resources to enforce the 
competition provisions efficiently.722  
Discretion to set priorities of the enforcement allows diversity. Generally the reasons for 
setting priorities are related to the need to efficiently managed limited resources. For 
example, the CMA Prioritisation Principles specifically indicate that:  
“In order to make the best use of our resources in terms of real outcomes for UK 
consumers, we need to ensure that we make appropriate decisions about which 
projects and programmes of work we undertake across all areas of our 
responsibility.”723 
Additionally, the Portuguese Competition Act has to have in consideration the probability of 
success in proving the infringement, when establishing priorities and deciding to proceed 
with an investigation.724 This is to avoid allocating resources to cases where the possibility of 
finding evidence and proving the infringement is very limited.  
                                                             
719 Bruno Lasserre, 'An interview with Bruno Lasserre' (2010) 13 Global Competition Review . 
720 The possibility to establish priorities and to reject complaints for priority considerations has been 
expressly established under the Competition Act of 2013, Article 7 Law 19/2012.  
721 The CMA has also adopted prioritisation principles, that area available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cma-prioritisation-principles 
722 Judgment of 20 January 2009, Cityhook v OFT [2009] EWHC 57 (Admin).  
723 Point 1.4 CMA Prioritisation Principles.  
724 Article 7(2) Law 19/2013.  
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There may however also be reasons directly related to the content of the competition 
provisions that influence prioritisation such the “over-inclusiveness of the antitrust 
provisions.”725  Wils argues that it is inherent in the nature of rules that they may be over-
inclusive, covering some cases which do not fit under the rational justifying the rule.726 
Competition authorities having discretion as to which cases they pursue could use it not to 
enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in cases that they find do not fit under the rationale of 
those provisions. This allows diversity, as different authorities can have different views in 
that regard. An example that illustrates this and how priorities can determine a difference 
on the enforcement is provided in the context of the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU. In 
2005, DG COMP submitted to public consultation a paper on the application of Article 102 
TFEU (then Article 82 EC Treaty) to exclusionary abuses.727  The Bundeskartellamt and the 
German Ministry of Economics and Technology, though generally supporting the initiative of 
the Commission, considered that “the possible aim of the Commission to use the discussion 
paper for a basis of guidelines on Article [102 TFEU] seems to be quite ambitious.”728 A line 
of disagreement with the Commission was the fact that the Commission considered that the 
enforcement of Article 102 TFEU should be with a focus on the protection of consumer 
welfare. The German institutions rejected the idea of moving to the protection of consumer 
welfare or consumer interests as the primary objective of competition law.  They argued that 
this “view is supported by the case law of the CJEU which states that Article [102], like the 
other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect the 
immediate interests of individual competitors or the consumers, but to protect the structure 
                                                             
725 Wils, 'Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement, in Particular EU Antitrust 
Enforcement', 376. 
726 Ibid. 
727 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses, December 2005, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf. 
728 Written Statement of the German Bundeskartellamt and the German Ministry of Economics and 
Technology on the DG Competition Discussion paper on the Application of Articles 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Bonn 2006, p. 2. 
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of the market and thus competition as such.”729 This disagreement is relevant for the 
uniformity of enforcement of Article 102 TFEU. The choice of the welfare hampered has an 
impact on the findings of an infringement. For example, in a case of predatory prices, if the 
emphasis is placed on consumer welfare, proof of the possibility of recouping of losses is 
necessary. If there is no possibility of recoupment, “consumers and their interests should in 
principle not be harmed.”730 However, if the focus is placed on the harm of the competitive 
process, the possibility of recouping losses need not be demonstrated in order for an 
infringement to be found.731 The CJEU considered in France Télécom that “Article [102 TFEU] 
refers not only to practice which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also to those 
which are detrimental to them through their impact on an effective competition structure.” 
The prioritisation on enforcement grounded on the type of welfare affected affects 
uniformity. Monti illustrates this: 
“national courts and national competition authorities are bound to follow the 
European Court of Justice's (CJEU's) interpretation of Article [102] and are not 
bound by the Guidance Paper. It means that there may be a risk of divergent 
analysis of similar practices if the Commission applies a different standard from the 
national authorities. Granted the Commission may take steps to ensure that there 
is a uniform interpretation of Article [102], but it may not prevent divergent views 
on the interpretation of abuse if this is how the national courts or authorities wish 
to proceed.”732 (References omitted)  
 
Monti then adds: 
 
“Having said that, one of the effects of the European Competition Network has been 
that National Competition Authorities try to develop common approaches, and this 
may lead National Competition Authorities to follow the Commission's approach.”  
                                                             
729 Written Statement of the German Bundeskartellamt and the German Ministry of Economics and 
Technology on the DG Competition discussion paper on the Application of Articles 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses, Bonn 2006, p. 5. 
730 See Opinion of Advocate General Mazák of 25 September 2008, France Télécom v Commission, C-
202/07 P, EU:C:2008:520, paragraph 74. 
731 Judgment of 2 April 2009, France Télécom v Commission, C-202/07 P, EU:C:2009:214, paragraph 
105. 
732 Monti, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy', 8. 
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Unlike Monti, however, I am not so convinced that that has happened when it comes both 
to priority setting. The 2009 Commission’s Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003 
identifies “the ability of Member States’ competition authorities to formally set enforcement 
priorities” as a relevant aspect of divergence between Member States enforcement systems 
which “may merit further examination and reflection.”733 The ECN has published “ECN 
Recommendation to the powers to set priorities.”734 However, the entire document is about 
the “ability of the Authorities to prioritise and plan their work” and the recommendations 
are only on procedural matters, such as the possibility to open and close cases ex officio and 
the possibility not to initiate a case and reject complaints if they do not consider them to be 
a priority. There is neither a recommendation on the type of criteria that competition 
authorities should use to prioritise, nor on the coordination of those criteria. The diversity of 
criteria that can be used to prioritise is identified in the document: 
“Prioritisation criteria used by Authorities may include, among others, public 
interest, consumer welfare, market efficiencies, or other substantive, institutional 
or procedural considerations.”735  
It is probable that a coordinated view on the priorities would be easier to achieve on a sector 
by sector basis. However, there is not much work on sectoral grounds done by the ECN and 
the one that there is shows and assumes divergence.  For example, ECN resolution of Heads 
of the European Competition Authorities on  The reform of the Common Agriculture Policy,736 
1ST  paragraph states that:  
“European Competition Authorities are also ready to engage as appropriate in 
further work with all the stakeholders on those topics to ensure consistency and 
                                                             
733 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council, Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM(2009)206 of 29 April 2009, para 33. 
734 European Competition Network, ECN recommendation on the power to set priorities, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.html 
735 European Competition Network, ECN recommendation on the power to set priorities, paragraph 
3.  
736 Resolution of the Heads of the European Competition Authorities of 21 December 2012, The 
Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/agriculture/resolution_nca_en.pdf 
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common approach in the application of competition rules, including market 
definition.”  
Discretion is not incompatible with justiciability  
“Competition policy cannot be implemented in a vacuum.”737 This is particularly true when 
it comes to Article 101 (3) TFEU. Its open texture allows public policy concerns such as 
environment protection, employment or industrial policy to be taken into consideration 
when granting an exemption.738 Does direct effect have an impact on the balance of public 
policy considerations when implementing EU competition law? Can different Member States 
arrive at different conclusions grounded on their different approaches to public policy’s 
consideration? Townley argues they can.739 He says that this is true for the free movement 
rules where the CJEU considers that, “when public policy balancing in the free movement 
rules, Member States have a margin of appreciation according to their ‘social circumstances 
and to the importance attached by those states to a legitimate objective under Community 
law […] the measures which are likely to achieve concrete results.’”740 On the contrary, 
Odudu considers that balance implies discretion which would be against direct effect. I do 
not agree. I argue that under the standards defined by the EU competition law as interpreted 
by the CJEU, the relevant authorities have a ‘margin of appreciation’ that allows diversity in 
the enforcement of EU competition law provisions. The CJEU considers that the Member 
States can have different approaches on the relevance of public policy considerations. In Mac 
Quen,741 regarding the compatibility of a Belgium law that reserved the practice of certain 
medical acts to medical doctors with the exclusion of opticians, the CJEU stated that: 
                                                             
737 Monti, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy'. 
738 For a detailed discussion see e.g. Rosita Bianca Bouterse, Competition and integration: what goals 
count ? (Kluwer 1994), Chapters 1-4; Goyder and Albors-Llorens, Goyder’s EC competition law; Monti, 
'Article 81 EC and Public Policy'; Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy. 
739 Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU 
Law too)'. 
740 Ibid, 216, and ECJ case law mentioned in footnote 131 therein. 
741 Judgment of 1 February 2001, Mac Quen and Others, C-108/96, EU:C:2001:67. 
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“It should be borne in mind in this regard that the fact that one Member State 
imposes less strict rules than another Member State does not mean that the latter's 
rules are disproportionate and hence incompatible with Community law (Case C-
384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141, paragraph 51, and Case C-3/95 
Reisebüro Broede [1996] ECR I-6511, paragraph 42)”.742 
In Wouters, the CJEU considered that: 
“the fact that different rules may be applicable in another Member State does not 
mean that the rules in force in the former States are incompatible with Community 
law (see to that effect, Case C-108/96 Mac Quen [EU:C:2001:67], para 33). Even if 
multi-disciplinary partnership of lawyers and accountants are allowed in some 
Member States, the Bar of the Netherlands is entitled to consider that the objectives 
pursued by the 1993 Regulation cannot, having regard in particular to the legal 
remedies by which members of the Bar and accountants are respectively governed 
in the Netherlands, be attained by less restrictive means (see, to that effect, with 
regard to the law reserving judicial debt-recovery activity to lawyers, case C-3/95, 
Reisebüro Broede v Gerd Sandker [EU:C:1996:487], paragraph 41).”743 
More recently, in Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas the CJEU redefined Wouters test 
requiring that the regulation does not impose “discriminatory conditions to the detriment of 
competitors.”744 Therefore, diversity in the enforcement of EU competition law can thus be 
lawfully achieved without national competition authorities having discretion, if it is done 
within the standards established by the CJEU in interpreting the content of EU competition 
law. Not all goals can be considered, though. It must be a legitimate goal. In Wouters the 
goal of the restriction was to ensure the proper practice of the legal profession. It has been 
argued that in Wouters the question was one of public policy, so the measure could be said 
to have a public law character.745 Townley points out that if ‘[p]ublic law character is 
necessary, this could significantly restrict diversity’s scope.’746 However, as showed by 
                                                             
742 Ibid, paragraph 33.  
743 Judgment of 19 February 2002, Wouters e o., C-309/99, EU:C:2002:98, paragraph 108. 
744 Judgment of 28 February 2013, Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas, C-1/12, EU:C:2013:127, 
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745 In this sense see Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University 
Press 2012) 132. 
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Townley,747 this is not the case, as in subsequent decisions, the CJEU has made no reference 
to such a requirement. For example, in Meca Medina no public actors were involved,748 and 
Tecnico Oficiais de Contas the CJEU did not consider it to form part of the standard: 
“However, not every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the 
freedom of action of the parties necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in 
Article 101(1) TFEU. For the purposes of application of that provision to a particular 
case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which the decision 
of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects. More 
particularly, account must be taken of its objectives (see, to that effect, Wouters 
and Others, paragraph 97).”749  
Furthermore, public policy has been considered in the context of EU law with direct effect, 
without a public law character.750 
Diversity in the enforcement of the Treaty’s competition provisions can nevertheless be 
achieved, even if Member States (or the Commission) have no discretion over the content of 
those provisions. Diversity is not incompatible with justiciability. 
2. Primacy of EU Competition Law  
The previous section concludes that diversity in EU competition law can be attained via 
nationally diverse interpretation,  different balance of public interest within Articles 101 (3) 
TFEU or by different priorities of enforcement established by the national competition 
authorities, as direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU does not constitutes a barrier to 
such diversity.  
                                                             
747 Ibid 
748 Judgment of 18 July 2006, Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission, C-519/04, EU:C:2006:492. 
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The question that is analysed in this section now is whether diversity can be introduced via 
national laws. Member States remain competent to legislate in the field of competition. How 
far can Member States enact national competition laws contrary to EU competition rules?  
The CJEU affirmed the primacy of EU competition law over conflicting nation laws in Walt 
Wilhelm.751 “Primacy denotes the capacity of [a] Union law to overrule inconsistent norms 
of national law.”752  
If under the principle of primacy of EU law  conflicting national laws must be set aside, the 
possibility of existing diverse national competition law applicable to situation that affect 
trade between member states is jeopardised.  This claim for national competition laws 
uniform with EU competition rules law seems strong, particularly if we take into 
consideration the context under which the supremacy of EU competition law was affirmed 
by the CJEU. Until the CJEU had the occasion to pronounce on the relation between national 
and EU competition law, a majority of commentators considered that an agreement to be 
valid needed to pass both national and EU competition law tests. Before the CJEU had the 
opportunity to rule on the relationship between EU competition provisions and national 
laws, commentators were divided between the supporters (the majority) and opponents 
(the minority) of the double barrier theory, defending the existence of a shared or an 
exclusive competence of the EEC in competition matters, respectively.753  
The double barrier theory was supported mainly by German authors,754 but not 
exclusively.755 They argued that a cumulative application of the Treaty’s competition 
                                                             
751 Judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 
EU:C:1969:4 
paragraph 4.  
752 de Witte, 'Direct effect, supremacy and the nature of legal order', 341.  
753 For a general discussion on this point see Michel Waelbroeck and Aldo Frignami, Commentaide J. 
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provisions and the Member States national competition laws was possible. The double 
barrier theory proceeded on the basis that an agreement may produce effects both within a 
Member State and in trade between Member States. It should therefore be subject to both 
national and EU law. Moreover, they argued that the Treaty assumed the co-existence of 
both sets of laws, as under Article 101 (2)(e), the Council should adopt implementing 
measures designed in particular “to determine the relationship between national laws and 
the provisions contained in these sections or adopted pursuant to this Article.” 
The proponents of the double barrier theory argued that a cumulative application gave raise 
to no incompatibility between the Treaty’s competition provisions and national provisions, 
as both set of laws have different objectives. Moreover, they argued that the Treaty did not 
limit the power of the Member States to legislate on restrictive practices, even if they affect 
the entire Community. Therefore, for a practice to be lawful, it needed to respect both 
competition provisions of the EEC Treaty and Member States’ competition law, i.e. it needed 
to pass the double barrier. This was also the theory applied by national courts. The 
proponents of the single barrier theory opposed to this view and argued that the EEC had an 
exclusive competence on competition.756 They argued that the EEC competence on 
competition excluded all competence of the Member States. Member States keep their 
competence only to the restrictive agreements and abuses that do not affect trade between 
Member States.757 As such, a practice to be lawful only needed to respect either competition 
provision of the EEC Treaty if it affected trade between Member States, or national 
competition laws if trade between Member States was not affected. Catalano, a vocal 
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supporter of the single barrier theory, argued that the EEC had been given a general 
regulatory competence on competition matters, thus excluding Member States intervention. 
First, this was because under Title I, Part III EEC Treaty competition rules were the object of 
the “common rules” of the “Community policy”. Furthermore, Catalano also pointed out that 
Articles 2 and 3 EEC Treaty gave competence to the EEC to establish the Common Market 
(Article 2) which “includes a system of ensuring that competence is not distorted (Article 3(f) 
EEC Treaty). According to Catalano, when the Treaty established the Customs Union and the 
internal market, it did not limit only in order to abolish tariffs and quantitative restrictions, 
it also aimed to protect freedom of circulation of merchandise by ensuring that a system of 
undistorted competition is in place. Finally, another formal argument advanced by Catalano 
was that Article 87 EEC Treaty granted normative powers to the Council to implement the 
principles established in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty. In this context, only EEC 
competition rules would be applicable to a practice affecting trade between Member States. 
Therefore, it would be enough for a practice to be lawful under EEC competition law as 
national law would not be applicable, independently of whether it provided the same 
solution or not. National competition law would only be applicable outside the scope of 
application of EU competition law that was determined by the notions of “trade between 
Member States” and the “common market.” Catalano argued that at a first sight the concept 
of “trade between Member States” seemed to be incompatible with the concept of the 
“common market”, because the latter has the effect of abolishing national frontiers. 
Therefore, once the “common market” is achieved, it would not be accurate to speak about 
“trade between Member States”, as the former has as an objective to abolish national 
frontiers.758 However, this would not endanger the application of the EEC competition rules 
as the Treaty does not mention imports or exports, only “trade between Member States.” 
                                                             
758 Ibid, 273.  
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This notion of “trade between member states,” has a direct line with the freedom of 
circulation of goods that is a constituent part of the common market.759  Member States 
remain competent to enact new legislation on competition regarding acts that do not affect 
trade between Member States and that do not affect competition in the internal market.760  
The CJEU settled the question of the relationship between the Member States’ and the 
Treaty’s competition provisions in Walt Wilhelm, by giving precedence to the EU competition 
provisions over national laws.761 The facts of the case were as follows: in November 1967, 
the Bundeskartellamt fined four undertakings and three executives for participating in an 
agreement in breach of Section I of the German Competition Act.762 In May 1967, the 
Commission had also initiated proceedings against the same German undertakings and 
others that were involved in the same cartel for violation of Article 101 TFEU (then Article 
85(1) EEC Treaty) . The decision of the Bundeskartellamt was appealed to the Berlin Court of 
Appeals. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the Bundeskartellamt and national courts 
had no jurisdiction over the agreement as the Commission has initiated proceedings 
regarding the same agreement. The Berlin Court of Appeals submitted several questions for 
preliminary ruling, including on the possibility of parallel proceedings. Of particular relevance 
here are the first and third questions. In the first question the German court asked whether, 
when a procedure has already been initiated by the Commission under Article 14 of  
Regulation 17/62 of 6 February 1962, it is compatible with the Treaty for the national 
authorities to apply to the same facts the prohibition laid down to by the national law on 
cartels.763 The third question related to the risk of a different legal assessment of the same 
                                                             
759 Ibid, 274 
760 Catalano argues that once the common market is achieved the space of application of national 
competition laws would be very limited and most likely only in what concerns abuse of dominance, 
ibid, 275.  
761 Judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 
EU:C:1969:4. 
762 Decision of 28th November 1967m WuW/E BKartA 1979.  
763 Judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 
EU:C:1969:4, paragraph 2. 
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facts and to the possibility of distortion in the common market to the detriment of those 
subject to the same national law. In this respect the Berlin Court of Appeals made reference 
to        Article 9  Regulation 17/62; to Article 101(3)(f)764 and to General Principles of 
Community law.  
The CJEU replied to these questions in its judgment of 13th February 1969, answering 
questions one and three jointly. It considered that Article 9(3) of Regulation 17/62 only 
regards the competence of the national authorities to apply Articles 101(1) and 102 of the 
Treaty where the Commission has taken no action of its own. Therefore, that provision was 
not applicable to the situation where the national authorities were applying national 
competition law only.765 The Court then stated that Community and national law on cartels 
consider cartels from different point of view. Therefore, the same agreement could be the 
object of two sets of parallel proceedings, one before the Commission under Article 101 
TFEU, the other before the national authorities under national law.766 The Court stated 
further that its interpretation is confirmed by Article 103(2)(e) TFEU. According to the CJEU 
it follows from this provision that “in principle the national cartel authorities may take 
proceedings also with regard to situations likely to be the subject of a decision by the 
Commission.”767 The Court then made an important reservation to the parallel proceedings. 
It stated that, if the ultimate general aim of the Treaty was to be respected, the parallel 
application of Community and national competition law can only be allowed in so far as “it 
does not prejudice the uniform application throughout the common market of the 
                                                             
764 Now Article 101 TFEU.  
765 Judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 
EU:C:1969:4 
paragraph 3. 
766 Ibid, paragraph 3. 
767 Ibid, paragraph 4. 
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Community rules on cartels and of the full effect of the measures adopted in implementation 
of those rules.”768  
As argued by Freeman, the CJEU followed, at least in part, the interpretation of the double 
barrier theory,769 that proceed on the basis that an agreement may produce effects both 
within a Member States and in trade between Member States, and should therefore be 
subject to both national and Community law. The cumulative application of national and EU 
law is possible, but cum grano salis: “conflicts between Community law and national 
competition law cannot be solved otherwise than on the basis of the principle of precedence 
of Community law.”770 The “uniform application throughout the [internal] market” must be 
guaranteed.771  If conflicting national law must be set aside under the primacy principle of 
EU law, must conflicting national competition with EU competition rules be set aside? 
This thesis is not concerned in reaching any conclusion or even discussion in detail of the 
nature of the principle of supremacy of EU law. However, before getting into the discussion 
on whether supremacy of EU competition rules requires uniform national competition laws,  
as background the following short reflection on the principle of supremacy of EU law might 
help to clarify the background to the debate.   
The overrated debate on the nature of the EU legal order when assessing the 
primacy of EU law 
Some authors argue that primacy is absolute.772 Others do not agree and some instigate 
Member States to refuse to comply with the CJEU rulings.773.  This dichotomy on the nature 
                                                             
768 Ibid.  
769 Freeman, 'The division of powers between the European Communities and the Member States', 
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770 Pescatore, 'Public and Private aspects of European Community Competition Law', 408. 
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773 Fritz Scharpf, 'The only solution is to refuse to comply with ECJ rulings' (Autumn 2008) Social Europe 
Journal  
 220 
of the primacy principle, rooted on the nature of the Union law, divides constitutionalist 
between “monists” and “pluralists”. It is argued however that, since the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
relevance of the debate on the nature of the EU law has become overrated for the purposes 
of addressing conflict-solving in the EU Monists stress the sovereignty in the last instance of 
the states as the “Master of the Treaties”, grounded on democratic considerations. On the 
contrary, pluralists stress the co-existence of the two systems, the national and 
supranational systems with overlapping and interlocking jurisdictions and the absence of any 
hierarchy between them. There is also a third way that tries to understand the interaction of 
both systems in the absence of a hierarchy. 
On the ground of Costa v ENEL jurisprudence,774 some authors found the supremacy of the 
EU Law on the claim of sovereignty in the legal sense of ultimate authority. Lindal argues that 
the reasoning of the Costa v Enel can be constructed as an assertion of sovereignty. He claims 
that, by recognizing that the Union’s order is a new and independent legal order, the CJEU 
has denied any external reference point in terms of law making of the new order. This 
corresponds to a constitutionalisation of the Treaties that assumes that the Union is a 
sovereign polity.775  Weatherill argues that supremacy is an absolute notion. It applies to the 
priority of any provision directly effective EU law, lower, minor and technical, over any 
provision of national law however weighty and fundamental.776 This idea of a sovereign polity 
and autonomy of the EU legal order is contested by many. Legal autonomy entails that it is 
the legal order which determines which activities are governed by it.777 Against this legal 
autonomy, Shilling argues that the only basis on which the Union’s law could claim a certain 
                                                             
774 Also on the Van Gend en Loos jurisprudence. See Gráinne de Búrca, 'Sovereignty and the Supremacy 
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autonomy from the legislative order of the Member States is international law. 778 This is 
because, if we consider that the EU is based on a transfer of sovereignty from the Member 
States to the Union, a national government cannot surrender more than what it has. He 
claims that the European Treaties cannot be considered a historically first constitution at the 
time of their conclusion, nor have they developed into such a constitution over time. A 
natural law of integration does not provide the theoretical basis for the claim of autonomy 
of the Union’s law. The only basis on which the Union could claim a certain autonomy from 
the legal orders of the Member States is international law. This autonomy is derivative and 
does not include complete interpretative autonomy. Grimm also argues that the basic legal 
order of the Union has neither originated in a decision made by its citizens nor is it attributed 
to them. It is a matter for the Member States to contractually agree upon a basic legal order 
which is then ratified by each Member States. Therefore, he claims that the Union law has 
no self-determination, but it is rather of external determination.779 It could be said, as 
Teubner did as regards private transnational regimes, that the EU system experiences the 
phenomenon described by Jacques Derrida as a “mystical recursivity” whereby a constituent 
power founds itself while it simultaneous presupposes its own existence. 780 The EU law gets 
its supremacy nature from the autonomy of a system that presupposes its own existence 
which justifies its autonomy. It is a circular reasoning. That explains why some authors, such 
Scharpf vociferously claimed that the only solution is to refuse to comply with the CJEU 
rulings.781   
                                                             
778 Theodor Schilling, 'The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible 
Foundations' (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal . 
779 Dieter Grimm, 'Integration by constitution' (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law , 
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Regarding the interaction of both systems in the absence of a hierarchy, MaCcormick argues 
that it is determined not by law but by strategy, according to binding mechanisms agreed by 
the parties.782  Maduro argues that that the relation between EU and national laws is 
determined by a “contrapunctual law” developed through an inter-court and other intra-
institutional the dialogue.783Kumm considers that the relation between the two different 
legal orders follow trans-systemic principles, such as legality, due process, subsidiarity and 
the respect for fundamental rights.784  
I argue however that, for the purposes of addressing conflicts in the EU legal order, the 
relevance of the discussion on the relationship between EU and national laws is overrated. 
Member States have solved the issue under the Treaty of Lisbon with a rather pragmatic 
approach.  
The controversy on primacy of EU law is fuelled by the different views on the nature of the 
EU law. From the point of view of the CJEU primacy is an absolute concept that stems from 
conceiving the EU as an “independent source of law [that] could not because of its special 
and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed without 
being deprived of its character of a community law and without the legal basis of the 
community itself being called into question.”785 The EU legal order in this approach is 
conceived as having the character of a legal system that encompasses the national legal 
systems and that has a higher hierarchy. This is because, as formulated by the CJEU in Costa 
v ENEL,  
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“By creating a community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the 
international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation 
of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the community, the 
member states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves. 
(…) The obligations undertaken under the treaty establishing the community would 
not be unconditional, but merely contingent, if they could be called in question by 
subsequent legislative acts of the signatories.”786 
Therefore, from the EU perspective the relation between EU law and national law is 
determined by the EU itself. When an EU act has direct effect it has primacy over national 
law.  
From the point of view of national legal orders, primacy however is not an absolute principle 
but a relative one.787 This is particularly true in relation to the Member States that have a 
dualist constitutional tradition. In dualist systems, international legal provisions do not form 
part of the domestic legal system unless and until they have been incorporated by the 
national law.788 This is opposite to monist constitutional systems that give international legal 
norms precedence over national laws.789   The practical relevance of this distinction is not so 
much whether the international law will become part of the national legal system or not. In 
the Member States with a dualist tradition, the international is incorporated in the national 
legal order by a national law. The practical relevance of this distinction is that the hierarchy 
between EU and national laws is determined by the national law. Therefore, supremacy of 
EU law is a matter for national law to decide. This does not mean that all national law will 
rank higher than EU law. For example, Italy, a country with a dualist tradition, established 
that EU competition law ranks higher than its national competition act.790 But this might 
mean that sometimes, national law may rank higher, particularly national fundamental 
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rights. The relative nature of the EU primacy for the Member States point of view is well 
illustrated by the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court that has imposed a 
fundamental rights limit to the primacy of EU. The primacy of EU law is not contested, so 
long as it guarantees similar fundamental rights to those recognised by the German 
constitution.791 The German Constitutional Court also formulated a competences limit to the 
supremacy of the EU, imposing an ultra vires control and limit to the scope of EU law. 
Contrarily the CJEU ruling in Foto Frost792 that stated that national courts cannot control the 
validity of the EU law and disapply it, the German Constitution Court considers that it has 
                                                             
791 This Court considers that ‘so long as the European legal order had not developed an adequate 
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competence to disapply European Law that it founds to be adopted ultravires.793 The relative 
view of primacy of the EU law by the Member States undermines the absolute view of the 
EU. That is why the Monists need to ground their views on primacy on sovereignty 
considerations, as the transfer of Member States’ sovereignty to the EU would be the basis 
for the power of the EU law to determine its relation with the national law and not the other 
way round.  
This question on the nature of supremacy of the EU law is a circular question. It can be said 
that the EU law has absolute primacy because the EU legal order is an autonomous system 
that stems its power from the transfer of sovereignty of the Member States to the Union. If 
this premise of an autonomous system fails, absolute primacy of the EU is not sustainable, 
and thus the legitimacy of the principle to serve as a conflict solving mechanism in case of 
conflict between national and EU laws can be questioned and alternatives can be proposed. 
I argue that the relevance of this debate seems to have been set aside up to a considerable 
extent by the solution found by the Member States in the Treaty of Lisbon.794  
The CJEU, monists and pluralists constitutionalists have something in common on their 
approach to EU and Member States law – their starting point. They start by asking an 
ontological question: “what is the nature of EU law?”, in order to answer a technical one: 
“how should the conflict between national and EU laws be solved?”795 The CJEU and monists 
constitutionalists differ from pluralists constitutionalists on the answer to the ontological 
question. Pluralists believe on the autonomy of the EU legal order, while monists believe that 
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the autonomy of EU legal order can only derivate from the Member States’ legal order. 
Therefore, they differ on the answer to the technical question. Pluralists believe that primacy 
of EU law is absolute, while monists believe that there is no such thing as absolute primacy 
of EU law over national laws.  
Member States took a different (and more pragmatic) approach to the interface of EU and 
national laws. In the Treaty of Lisbon they gave an answer to the interface of EU and national 
laws by separating the ontological question from the technical one.  
Declaration No 17 concerning primacy796 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon that reads as 
follows:  
“17. Declaration concerning primacy 
The Conference recalls that, in accordance with well settled case law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on 
the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States, under the 
conditions laid down by the said case law. 
The Conference has also decided to attach as an Annex to this Final Act the Opinion 
of the Council Legal Service on the primacy of EC law as set out in 11197/07 (JUR 
260): 
"Opinion of the Council Legal Service 
of 22 June 2007 
It results from the case-law of the Court of Justice that primacy of EC law is a 
cornerstone principle of Community law. According to the Court, this principle is 
inherent to the specific nature of the European Community. At the time of the first 
judgment of this established case law (Costa/ENEL, 15 July 1964, Case 6/641 [1]) 
there was no mention of primacy in the treaty. It is still the case today. The fact that 
the principle of primacy will not be included in the future treaty shall not in any way 
change the existence of the principle and the existing case-law of the Court of 
Justice.” 
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The Declaration on the Primacy of EU law confirms the Member States acceptance of 
primacy as a conflict solving mechanism, without them changing their national approach to 
the nature of the EU law. The ontological question of the nature of the EU legal order remains 
unanswered under the Treaties. However, an answer to the technical question was provided: 
“the Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy 
over the laws of Member States under the conditions laid down by the said case law.”797 This 
reduces the relevance of the discussion of the nature of the EU legal order for the purposes 
of conflict solving with the national laws. Primacy of EU law over national laws must be 
analysed on the grounds of the CJEU case law. This is discussed next.  
Diversity in not anathema to the primacy of EU (competition) law 
“A national rule, which is set aside for being inconsistent with Union law, is inoperative only 
to the extent of this inconsistency; the rule may continue to be applied to cases where it is 
not inconsistent, or to cases which are not covered by the EU norm, and it may fully apply 
again if and when the EU norm ceases to exist.”798  
The question then is when, and up to what extent, does a national law conflict with an EU 
law?  As asked by Schütze: “how supreme is European law?”799 How are conflicts framed? 
The answer to these questions has an impact on the possibility of Member States to enact 
diverse national competition laws, as under the primacy principle only national conflicting 
laws must be precluded. Primacy of EU law will restrain the Member States in the exercise 
of their regulatory power up to the extent that it conflicts with EU law. Constitutionalists 
describe this question as “the problem of pre-emption,” which “consists in determining 
whether there exists a conflict between a national measure and a rule of [EU] law.”800 There 
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are two types of pre-emption: express and implied. Express pre-emption is determined by 
the law itself, i.e. to what extent does Member States’ law will be pre-empted. 801 In the 
absence of an express pre-emption, it is for the EU judiciary that determines to what extent 
Member States is pre-empted by EU law.   
Express pre-emption 
An example of an expressly authorised derogation of EU competition law exists in the military 
sector.802 Article 346(1) TFEU authorizes a Member State to take unilateral measures where 
“the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade 
in arms, munitions and war material” are at stake or “in the serious of internal disturbance 
affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of war, serious international tension 
constitution a threat of war or in order to carry out obligations entered into by the Member 
State for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security which are connected 
with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material.” A list adopted by the 
Council by unanimous vote enumerates the products to which Article 346 TFEU applies.803 
This safeguard clause allows derogation of EU competition law regarding products intended 
for specifically military purposes. Compared to other safeguard clauses in the Treaties, such 
as the ones in Articles 114(6) TFEU, 143(3) TFEU and 348 first paragraph TFEU; Article 346 
TFEU gives a full margin of intervention to the Member States that can act unilaterally, not 
being dependent on an authorization of the Commission. Under Article 347 TFEU, if the 
Commission or another Member State, consider that a Member State made an improper use 
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of the safeguards of Articles 346 or 347 TFEU may bring the matter before the CJEU (Articles 
258 and 259 TFEU). 
Implied pre-emption 
As regards competition Treaty’s provisions in general, the Treaty assumes the co-existence 
of national laws under Article 103(2)(e) TFEU, therefore, there is no such thing as express 
pre-emption. 804 This also seems to be the understanding of the CJEU when in Walt Wilhelm 
it stated that: 
“(…) one and the same agreement may, in principle, be the object of two sets of 
parallel proceedings, one before the community authorities under article [101 
TFEU], the other before the national authorities under national law.”  
And that: 
“this interpretation is confirmed by the provision in article 87(2)(e), which 
authorizes the Council to determine the relationship between national laws and the 
community rules on competition; it follows that in principle the national cartel 
authorities may take proceedings also with regard to situations likely to be the 
subject of a decision by the Commission.” 
Therefore, the extent to which national laws will conflict with Treaty’s competition 
provisions will depend on the interpretation of the CJEU in order to understand whether 
there is an “implied pre-emption” on the national laws by Article 101 and 102 TFEU.   
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Building on the work of Cross,805 Goucha Soares,806 Waelbroeck,807 Weiler,808 and more 
recently Arena809 and Schütze,810 three types of EU implied pre-emption are generally 
identified: field pre-emption, obstacle pre-emption and rule pre-emption, on the grounds of 
the CJEU approach to conflicts between EU and national laws.811 They correspond to 
different “degrees of normative conflicts” which “reflect the various judicial reasons and 
arguments created to explaining why national law conflicts with European law.”812 This 
terminology was developed “in linguistic alliance with the US America constitutionalism”813 
where the doctrine of pre-emption was developed by the US Supreme Court.814 In the EU, 
the CJEU has not yet developed its terminology or theory(ies) of pre-emption.815 No decision 
of the CJEU mentions it. The theory is referred to in two opinions of Advocates Generals, first 
                                                             
805 Daniel Eugene Cross, 'Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community: A 
framework for analysis' (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review . 
806 António Goucha Soares, 'Pre-emption, conflicts of powers and subsidiarity' (1998) 23 European 
Law Review  
807 Waelbroeck, 'The emergent doctrine of Community pre-emption – Consent and delegation'. 
808 J.H.H. Weiler, 'Community system: The dual character of supreanationalism' (1981) 1 Yearbook of 
European Law . 
809 Amadeo Arena, 'The Doctrine of Union Preemption in the EU Single Market: Between Sein and 
Sollen' (2003) Working Paper 03/10 The Jean Monnet Center of International and Regional Economic 
Law & Justice, The NYU Institute on the Parks . 
810 Robert Schütze, 'Supremacy without pre-emption? The very slow emergent doctrine of Community 
pre-emption ' (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review . 
811 For an exhaustive view of the evolution of the EU doctrine of pre-emption see Arena, 'The Doctrine 
of Union Preemption in the EU Single Market: Between Sein and Sollen'. 
812 Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 364. 
813 Ibid, 365. 
814 The US Supreme Court described the three type of pre-emption theories in Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190(1983), at 203-4 
as follows: 
‘Congress intent to supersede state law altogether may be found from a scheme of the federal 
regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the interference that Congress left no room to 
supplement it, because the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so 
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same 
subject and the character obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose (…).Even where 
Congress has not entirely displaced state regulations in a specific area, each state is pre-empted to 
the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, (…) or where state law stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of the Congress. [Quotations 
and references omitted] 
815 Generally, it is necessary to use caution when comparing the EU to the US, as the nature of 
federation of the EU, contrarily to the US, hasn’t been established. However, independently of the 
debate on the nature of the EU, federalism, as a constitutional theory that allocates power between 
different levels of power, can provide students of the EU relevant insights.  
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in 2009, by AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer,816 and more recently, in 2017, by AG Szpunar.817 “Indeed 
the CJEU may not need to develop a general theory of pre-emption, preferring to examine, 
on a case by case basis, whether the very substance of a particular rule of EU law precludes 
national competence, as illustrated by the contrast between the Ratti and Gallagher cases 
discussed in the next section.818  
However, despite no “official” reference to pre-emption in any decision of the CJEU, 
supremacy and pre-emption are “two sides of the same coin,”819 or “two Siamese twins : 
different through inseparable. There is no supremacy without preemption”820  To place the 
debate in context, the main types of pre-emption are now briefly discussed.” 
Field pre-emption 
Field pre-emption refers to those situations where the Court excludes action from the 
Member States on the grounds that the EU legislator has exhaustively legislated the field. 
The CJEU does not investigate any material normative conflict, but rather excludes any 
legislative action of the Member States. The consequence of this is that Member States may 
not introduce legislation that is more restrictive or even more detailed or in any event 
different than the EU legislation.821 It has been said that the underlying idea of field pre-
emption is a “purely abstract conflict criterion: national legislation conflicts with the 
jurisdictional objective of the Union legislator to establish an absolutely uniform legal 
standard.”822 Thus, in such situations EU law represents an exhaustive set of rules, not 
                                                             
816 Judgment of 8 September 2009, Budĕjovický Budvar, C-478/07, EU:C:2009:52, paragraph 93.  
817Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar of 24 April 2017, Germany v Council, C-600/14, 
EU:C:2017:296, paragraph 71. 
818 In Ratti the EU law in question amounted to full (or complete or exhaustive) harmonisation whereas 
the EU law in Gallaher constituted minimum harmonisation. The degree of preemption of national 
law by the EU rules was  necessarily different in both cases.  
819 Krisov, Clause-Dieter Ehlermann and J.H.H. Weiler, 'Organs and the decision-making process in the 
United States and in the European Community' in Mauro Cappelletti, Monica Seccombe and Joseph 
Weiler (eds), Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience Vol 1: Methods, 
Tools and Institutions (1986), 90.  
820  Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 348. 
821Judgment of 5 April 1979, Ratti, Case 148/78, EU:C:1979:, paragraphs 26-27.  
822 Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 365. 
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leaving the space for national laws that are more detailed or restrictive than EU law. An 
example of a field pre-emption is given by AETR case concerning common transport policy. 
The CJEU considered that the EU exercise of powers in regard to that common policy: 
“excludes the possibility of concurrent powers on the part of the Member States, 
since any step taken outside the framework of the [Union] institutions would be 
incompatible with the Unity of the common market and the uniform application of 
[Union] law.”823 
Also, in Ratti, the CJEU considered an entire field pre-empted by EU law. The CJEU considered 
that under Directive 73/173 on the approximation of Member States’ laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous 
preparations (solvents),824 Member States were “not entitled to maintain, parallel with the 
rules laid down by the Directive for imports, different rules for the domestic market.”825 This 
was the result of the system established therein that “a Member State may not introduce 
into its national legislation conditions which are even more detailed or in any event 
different.”826 
Obstacle pre-emption 
Obstacle pre-emption, as stated by Arena,827 is found whenever the CJEU considers that a 
national measure “interferes with the proper functioning”828 of an EU legislation, or when it 
“endangers its objectives,”829 “even if the matter in question has not been exhaustively 
regulated by it.”830 The conflict does not result from a “normative friction”831 between a 
                                                             
823 Judgment of 31 March 1971, Commission v Council, Case 22/70, EU:C:1971:32 
824 OJ L 189, 11.7.1973, p. 7–29. 
825Judgment of 5 April 1979, Ratti, Case 148/78, EU:C:1979:110 , paragraph 26. 
826 Ibid, paragraph 25. 
827 Arena, 'The Doctrine of Union Preemption in the EU Single Market: Between Sein and Sollen', 31. 
828 Judgment of 27 November 1997, Danisco Sugar v Allmänna ombudet, C-27/96, EU:C:1997:563, 
paragraph 24. 
829 Judgment of 18 October 1979, Buys, Case 5/79, EU:C:1979:238, paragraph 4; Judgment of 12 
December 1973, Grosoli, Case 131/73, EU:C:1973:158, paragraph 13. 
830 Judgment of 25 March 2004, Industrias de Deshidratación Agrícola, C-118/02, EU:C:2004:182, 
paragraph 20; Judgment of 8 January 2002, Denkavit, C-507/99, EU:C:2002:4, paragraph 32. 
831Judgment of 30 November 1978, Francesco Bussone v Ministro dell'agricoltura e foreste, Case 
31/78, EU:C:1978:217. 
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national law and the EU law, or a “direct incompatibility between the content of one or 
another,”832 but from the fact that a national law interferes with the proper functioning of 
the EU law or impedes the objectives of the EU legislation.  A traditional example833 of 
obstacle pre-emption reasoning is the approach of the CJEU in Francesco Bussone v Ministro 
dell'agricoltura e foreste.834 The CJEU specifically mentioned that: 
“in the absence of express provisions on the compatibility with the organization of 
the market established by [the] Regulation (…) of national rules adopted for the 
implementation of those regulations, it is necessary to seek the solution to the 
question asked in the light of the aims and objectives of the regulations within the 
context of the principles laid down by the treaty itself.”835 
Rule pre-emption  
Finally, the most tangible type of conflict takes place where national legislation directly 
contradicts a specific EU rule. “Put negatively where the national law does not contradict a 
specific [EU] provision, it will be allowed.”836 The example that is traditionally given to 
illustrate this type of pre-emption is Gallaher.837 In this case the issue was the compatibility 
of the UK law transposing the Directive 89/622. While the directive required that the health 
warning on tobacco products should “cover at least 4% of the corresponding surface,” the 
British law required that type of warning to cover at least 6% of the label surface. The CJEU 
considered that “Member States are at liberty to decide that the indications and warning are 
to cover a greater surface area in view of the level of public awareness of the health risks 
associated with tobacco consumption.”838 A rule pre-emption allows a stricter national 
                                                             
832 Soares, 'Pre-emption, conflicts of powers and subsidiarity', 137.   
833 See Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 366.  
834 Judgment of 30 November 1978, Francesco Bussone v Ministro dell'agricoltura e foreste, Case 
31/78. 
835 Ibid.  
836 Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 367.  
837 Judgment of 22 June 1993, The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Gallaher and Others, 
C-11/92, EU:C:1993:262. 
838 Ibid, paragraph 20.  
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measure as it does not contradict the EU law standard. From the three types of pre-emption, 
this is the one that respects the most the sphere of the Member State.  
The impact of pre-emption on diversity in EU competition law 
The way CJEU frames the relation between EU and national laws will determine to what 
extent the latter conflicts with the former. Depending on the type of pre-emption doctrine 
used by the CJEU the vertical distribution of powers between the EU and Member States can 
result in a more or less scope of intervention by the national legislature, therefore, more or 
less diversity allowed. Where the doctrine of field pre-emption is used, this corresponds to 
a de facto removal of the field from the domain of shared competence and its inclusion in an 
exclusive competence of the EU. There is no more space for Member State action. In the 
words of Weatherill, “once the Community has acted, if it acts, it then assumes exclusive 
competence in the field which it has occupied, thereby transforming concurrent 
State/Community competence into exclusive Community competence”.839 This modality of 
pre-emption is thus the one “that causes the most damage to the sphere of national powers 
(…) [as it is] imbued with an exclusivist reasoning, because it tends to overcome the 
regulatory competitiveness in force.”840  
The doctrine of obstacle pre-emption, on the other hand, causes less disruption to the sphere 
of Member States regulatory power than field pre-emption. As stated by Goucha Soares, it 
“presupposes abandonment of the perspective of the vertical division of powers according 
to which adoption of rules by the [EU] in areas subject to power-sharing with the States, it 
fated to replace the latter’s regulatory prerogatives.”841 The vertical division of powers is not 
transformed into a de facto exclusive power of the EU in areas of shared competence. 
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However, as argued by Shutze, national laws are still pre-empted as “[a]ny obstacle that 
reduces the effectiveness of the Union system may be seen to be in conflict with European 
law.”842 
Finally, rule pre-emption is the one which has the least impact on the Member States’ sphere 
of competence.  As explained by Goucha Soares, this is because the “sole basis to prevent 
the Member States from legislating on a certain question regarding an area of power shared 
with the [Union] is by verification of a direct conflict between the regulatory provisions 
arising from both levels of regulation. In all other situations, [EU] law, as in particular the 
exercise of material power deriving from its area of action, is not held to threaten the 
regulatory authority of the States.”843 
Which theory(ies) of pre-emption is applicable in EU competition law? 
In Walt Wilhelm, the CJEU established a clear rule of primacy of the EU competition law over 
conflicting national laws. However, the CJEU did not automatically preclude national laws 
dealing with the same facts of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.844  As argued by Pescatore, the 
CJEU made it clear in Walt Wilhelm that there was room for simultaneous application of 
national and competition law to an agreement that had produced effects at national as well 
as at EU level.845   This seems to confirm that the CJEU rejected a field pre-emption approach, 
as it did not consider that the constituent legislator had regulated the entire field with 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. There was space for national competition laws. The CJEU 
however, subjected the application of national laws to an important qualification: 
“if the ultimate general aim of the treaty is to be respected, this parallel application 
of the national system can only be allowed in so far as it does not prejudice the 
uniform application throughout the common market of the community rules on 
                                                             
842 Schütze, European Constitutional Law, 366.  
843 Soares, 'Pre-emption, conflicts of powers and subsidiarity', 138.  
844 Kurt Markert, ' Co-existence of Community and National Competition Law' (1974) 11 Common 
Market Law Review , 93. 
845 Pescatore, 'Public and Private aspects of European Community Competition Law', 407.  
 236 
cartels and of the full effect of the measures adopted in implementation of those 
rules.”846 
Does this amount to field pre-emption? That would be the case if national laws that were in 
any event different to competition laws were considered in conflict with the Treaty’s 
competition provisions. I argue it does not. 
In the “perfume cases,” a referral by the Tribunal de Grand Instance, of Paris, related to 
selective distribution of luxury perfumes by several manufacturers – Guerlain, Rochas, Lanvin 
and Ricci,847 the CJEU was asked on the compatibility with the Treaty of stricter national 
competition laws. All of the referred perfume companies had notified their distribution 
agreements to the Commission under  Regulation 17/62, to obtain an exemption under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. After introducing some required changes to the agreements, they all 
received an almost identical letter from the Director General for Competition stating that 
there was no need to take any further action under Article 101(1) TFEU and that the file 
would be closed. In parallel, the representatives of those companies were ordered to appear 
before the Tribunal de Grand Instance de Paris, where plaintiffs claimed damages against the 
abovementioned perfume manufactures for refusing to fill orders for perfumery. In France, 
the law prohibited refusal to sell subject to certain exceptions including exclusive dealing 
agreements. Such an agreement could constitute an exception to the prohibition of a refusal 
to sell where it fulfils certain conditions, such as e.g. the interest of consumers, the absence 
of imposed prices, any idea of fraud on the right of third parties and of any intention 
voluntarily to restrict competition.848 The Tribunal de Grand Instance de Paris referred a 
question to the CJEU with the purpose to understand whether the letters from the 
                                                             
846 Judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 
EU:C:1969:4, paragraph 4. 
847 Judgment of 10 July 1980, Procureur de la République v Giry and Guerlain, Joined cases 253/78 and 
1 to 3/79, EU:C:1980:188. 
848 Ibid. 
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Commission prevented the application of the provisions of French legislation which 
prohibited a refusal to sell. During the proceedings before the CJEU, the defendants in the 
main proceedings claimed that the application of national competition law could not be 
permitted where it would result in an exemption granted by a decision or a block exemption 
being called into question. France, and the UK in its support, argued that there has not been 
any decision of the Commission exempting the agreement under Article 101(3) TFEU and 
that it remained competent to apply its national law. Also the Commission confirmed that 
there has been no decision to exempt the agreements in question under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
It added that it also considered that the Treaty’s provisions did not prohibit the national 
authorities from applying the French law to agreements not covered by prohibitions laid 
down in Articles 101(1) TFEU. According to the Commission, this was in line with the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU on the conditions for the applications of Article 101(1) and 102 
TFEU intended to determine the scope the Member States in the field of rules relating to 
agreements.849 
In its analysis the CJEU started by recalling Walt Wilhelm and the fact that “National 
authorities may also take action in regard to situations which are capable of forming the 
subject matter of a decision by the Commission.”850 It then mentioned that in “the above-
mentioned judgment the Court stressed that parallel application of national competition law 
can only be permitted in so far as it does not prejudice the uniform application, therefore 
the common market, of the Community rules on cartels or the full effects of the measures 
adopted in implementation of those rules.”851 The CJEU however, considered that the 
formalities for a negative clearance could not be applicable to the agreement, and thus it did 
not benefit from any decision in application of Article 101(3) TFEU. In the same sense, it was 
                                                             
849 Ibid. 
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not in dispute that those agreements did not come within the scope of any regulation 
granting block exemption.852 The CJEU then expressly stated that the fact that an agreement 
that can be subject to the Commission’s decision is deemed not to infringe Article 101(1) 
TFEU,  
“cannot by itself have the result of preventing the national authorities from 
applying to those agreements provisions of national competition law which may be 
more rigorous than Community law in that respect.”  
The CJEU then it also added that:  
“The fact that a practice has been held by the Commission not to fall within the 
ambit of application of the prohibition contained in Article [101](1) and (2), the 
scope of which is limited to agreements capable of affecting trade between 
Member States, in no way prevents that practice from being considered by the 
national authorities from the point of view of the restrictive effects which it may 
produce nationally.”853 
The CJEU was clear on the fact that a national competition law that is stricter than the 
Treaty’s competition provisions is not in conflict with the EU law.854 It is true that these cases 
concerned a comfort letter, which might be a ground of distinction, but it is submitted that 
the dictum of the CJEU remains powerful as it addresses directly the issue of the primacy of 
the EU competition law over a more strict national competition law. In the more recent case 
of Tele2Polska,855 discussed and criticised below, the CJEU held that the national authorities 
had no power under Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 to hold that there was no violation of 
                                                             
852 Ibid, paragraph 17.           
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854 The CJEU however left open the question on whether, under the parallel application of the EU and 
national competition law, an agreement exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU could be prohibited 
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855 Judgment of 3 May 2011, Tele2 Polska, C-375/09, EU:C:2011:270. 
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Articles 101 and 102. This case however seems to centre on the textual consideration of 
Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 and does not address the question of the applicability of 
stricter national laws.856 
An exemption granted by the Commission under Article 101 (3) TFEU was considered by 
some as within the “certain positive, though indirect action” mentioned by the CJEU, and 
therefore covered by the primacy principle.857 Today the question has a very reduced 
importance. Regulation 1/2003 replaced the centralised notification system under 
Regulation 17/62 by a directly applicable exception system. Only “[i]n exceptional cases 
where the public interest of the Community so requires, it may also be expedient for the 
Commission to adopt a decision of a declaratory nature finding that the prohibition in Article 
[101] or Article [102] of the Treaty does not apply, with a view to clarifying the law and 
ensuring its consistent application throughout the Community, in particular with regard to 
new types of agreements or practices that have not been settled in the existing case-law and 
administrative practice.”858 
As to Article 102 TFEU the CJEU the existence of stricter rules has been acknowledged as a 
common feature. See in this regard Advocate Jacob’s opinion in Oscar Bronner,859 where he 
made a stock-taking of the laws of Member States that have an approach to unilateral 
conduct that include a refusal to deal as an abuse of dominant position under certain 
                                                             
856 Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 concerns the powers of the competition authorities of the Member 
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859 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs of 28 May 1998, Bronner, C-7/97, EU:C:1998:264. 
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circumstances,860 and of those that had developed at the time the doctrine of essential 
facilities.861  
The way CJEU frames direct conflicts in EU competition laws, i.e. the pre-emption analysis, is 
coherent with the system of competences as established by the Treaty of Lisbon and should 
be retained. A direct conflict between national laws and EU laws with the same material 
scope is a hierarchical conflict. The primacy principle, as a rule that establishes a hierarchy 
when there is a vertical superposition between EU and national laws in favour of the EU law 
is thus an appropriate way to solve the conflict. However, primacy of EU law is also limited 
to the scope of the law and of the competences of the EU, i.e. conferral principle. The fact 
that there is a vertical superposition of competition laws cannot entail the CJEU to 
considered the field pre-empted. As previously seen, on the one hand, Member States did 
not transfer unlimited competence on competition matters to the EU. They retain full and 
exclusive competence over situations not affecting trade between Member States. EU law 
cannot be considered in conflict with national laws applicable to situations that have a 
national impact only and do not affect trade between Member States. This is an area of 
exclusive competence to the EU. On the other hand, Member States have shared legislative 
competence on substantive principles of EU competition law. Therefore, national 
competition laws can also be applicable to situations with EU relevance, i.e. that affect trade 
                                                             
860 This was the case in Spain, Finland, France, Greece and Portugal, Opinion of Advocate General 
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between Member States, as legislative competence on competition principles is shared 
under the Treaty of Lisbon. If both set of national and EU competition laws can coexist, 
national laws cannot be said as a priori conflicting with EU competition law. A further analysis 
than a simple filed pre-emption must be undertaken. The chances for a direct vertical conflict 
come when the national competition law is more lenient or more restrictive than EU 
competition law.  
Situations ought to be considered differently. More lenient competition laws conflict with 
EU competition law as they contradict it. Therefore, they should be set aside under the 
primacy principle.  Stricter national competition laws do not. Stricter national competition 
laws do not “interfere with the proper functioning” of the EU competition laws, obstacle pre-
emption does not occur. On the contrary. As stated by Monti: 
“It would be hard to deny the fact that the enforcement of national com- petition 
law helps the development of the internal market. Two concrete examples among 
many may be offered. German law penalizes bid rigging with criminal sanctions and 
the relevant provisions have been applied frequently: opening up the German 
procurement market must serve to enhance competition across the EU, as foreign 
participants are more likely to compete. Second, many of the market investigations 
carried out by the Competition Commission [now Competition and Markets 
Authority] in the UK are likely to have had pro-competitive effects across the EU.”862 
(References omitted)  
Stricter national competition laws cannot be considered as pre-empted by Articles 101 or 
102 TFEU as this would mean to unlawfully enlarge the scope of those provisions. Stricter 
national competition laws foster competition in the internal market. As such, they do not 
affect the functioning of EU competition provisions. Therefore, therefore there is also no 
“obstacle pre-emption” that could justify the incompatibility of stricter national rules. 
Stricter national laws shall thus remained allowed as they do not conflict with the EU 
competition law.   
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3. Fundamental Rights – Ne bis in idem 
“[T]he development of fundamental rights protection at European level — whether through 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights or accession to the ECHR [European Convention of Human 
Rights] — should not lead to any distortions in the finely calibrated system of competences 
on which the EU is founded and which characterises its relationship with the Member 
States.”863 Under Article 2 TEU the respect for human rights is one of the values on which the 
EU is founded. In the absence of an express reference to human rights in the Treaty of Rome, 
they have made their way into the EU legal order as “general principles of EU law.”864 Today, 
however, the “Treaties not only refer to fundamental rights as laid down in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [the 
“Convention”], and resulting from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, but also directly recognize the value as primary law of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union [the “Charter”] (Article 6(1) and (3) TEU).”865 Member States 
and the EU bodies must respect fundamental rights when they are implementing EU law.866  
One of the fundamental rights that finds formal formulation both in the Convention and in 
the Charter and that may have an impact in power distribution in the EU is the ne bis in idem 
principle.867   
Article 4(1) of Protocol (No 7) to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides: 
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“No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for 
which he has already been finally acquitted or convinced in accordance 
with the law and penal procedure of that State.” 
Under Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: 
“No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally 
acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance to the law.” 
This provision is said to “correspond to Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the [Convention], but its 
scope is extended to European Union level between the Courts of the Member States.”868 “In 
accordance with Article 50, the ‘non bis in idem’ principle applies not only within the 
jurisdiction of one State, but also between jurisdictions of several Member States.”869 The 
powers of the national competition authorities and the Commission to impose fines are 
criminal in nature for the purpose of the ne bis in idem principle.870 The main element for the 
application of the ne bis in idem is therefore the definition of what is considered to be the 
“same offence.”  
Some commentators read the principle of ne bis in idem as a limit to the parallel application 
of national and EU competition laws and for the same facts being investigated in parallel by 
several national competition authorities under national and EU competition laws.871 This is 
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because under Regulation 1/2003 it is possible that an infringement is prosecuted by a 
national competition authority or several National Authorities in parallel under national and 
EU competition laws or that the Commission starts an investigation after national 
investigations to the same facts under national laws.872 The CJEU has a different approach 
and considers that the parallel application of national and EU competition laws in not 
incompatible with the principle of ne bis in idem. In Walt Wilhelm one of the questions 
referred to the CJEU by the German court touched this precise point,  
 “whether the risk of its resulting on a double sanction imposed by the 
Commission and by the national authorities renders impossible the 
acceptance for one set of facts of facts being subject to parallel 
procedures, one at the Community level another one at the national 
level.”873 
In analysing this issue, the CJEU used a three-test step: the identity of fact, unity of offender 
and unity of the legal interest protected.874 The CJEU ruled out the applicability of the ne bis 
in idem principle in the case of parallel application of EU and national competition laws for 
lack of unity of the legal interests protected. The CJEU held that “community and national 
law on cartels consider cartels from different points of view”,875 and that “the acceptability 
of a dual procedure (…) follows in fact from the special system of the sharing of jurisdiction 
between the Community and the Member States.”876 The CJEU nevertheless added that if 
the two parallel procedures lead to consecutive sanctions “[a] general requirement of 
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872 Paragraph 5, Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities 
[2004] OJ C 101/43. 
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EU:C:1969:4, paragraph 10.  
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natural justice (…) demands that any previous punitive decision must be taken into account 
in determining any sanction which is to be imposed.”877 
Some authors consider that the CJEU’s approach to the principle of ne bis in idem in 
competition matters is incompatible with the approach of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) and that, as such it is difficult to avoid the application of Article 50 of the 
Charter.878 In Franz Fischer v Austria the European Court of Human Rights considered that 
the ne bis in idem principle is not only breached when a person is tried or punished twice for 
nominally the same offence but also when this person is prosecuted twice for two offences, 
the essential elements of which overlap.879 The judgement also confirms that a violation of 
the principle of ne bis in idem cannot be avoided by reducing the amount of the second 
punishment by the amount of the first punishment.880  
Devroe and Nazzini also argue the use of this three-fold test by the CJEU for assessing the 
existence of the same offense and the consequent application of thee ne bis in idem principle 
is specific to the field of competition and should be abandoned.881 They find support in the 
opinion of Advocate General Kokkot in Toshiba,882 a preliminary ruling where the CJEU was 
called to analyse a question corresponding in essence to “[h]ow many competition 
authorities in Europe may deal with one and the same cartel and impose penalties on the 
participating undertakings?”883 
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She pointed out that the CJEU does not apply the third criteria of the “unity of the legal 
interest protected” in other areas of law. For example, the CJEU has considered it irrelevant 
in the context of the rules governing the area of freedom security and justice,884  and the 
European arrest warrant.885 In such circumstances, AG Kokkot considered that the CJEU “has 
consistently held that the only relevant criterion is identity of the material acts, understood 
as the existence of a set of concrete circumstances which are inextricably linked together.”886  
AG Kokkot argues that “there is no objective reason why the conditions to which the principle 
of ne bis in idem in the EU legal order is subject in competition matters should be any 
different from those applicable to it elsewhere.”887  She argues that the different application 
of the ne bis in idem principle in the EU legal order depending on the area of law is 
“detrimental to the unity of the EU legal order”888 and, as it enjoys now the status of a 
fundamental right under Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, “the same criteria 
should apply in all areas of EU law.”889 Finally, she points out the impact of ne bis in idem on 
the uniformity of competition rules, by stating that in the same way that the principle ne bis 
in idem:  
“serves to guarantee the free movement of EU citizens in EU territory as 
a ‘single area of freedom, security and justice,’ in the field of competition 
law, it helps to improve and facilitate the business activities of 
undertakings in the internal market and, ultimately, to create uniform 
conditions of competition (a ‘level playing field’) throughout the EEA.”890 
On the same grounds, Nazzini argues that: 
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“the Court of Justice's approach in competition cases results in a market 
fragmentation which in other areas the Court itself always rejects as 
incompatible with the internal market.”891 
He observes that Article 4(1) of Protocol (No 7) to the Convention limits the ne bis in idem to 
the jurisdiction of a single State. Article 50 of the Charter extends its effects to the entire 
area of the EU. Ne bis in idem under Article 50 of the Charter has thus an extra-territorial 
effect. By requiring the “unity of the legal interest protected”, the CJEU is denying the 
viability of the ne bis in idem principle to be applicable in competition cases at the expense 
of the unity of the internal market.892  Prechal also argues that [t]he establishment and proper 
functioning of the internal market as one single market requires a system of common rules 
and principles which safeguards its unity. Any unilateral interference with these rules by the 
Member States or other actors has to be excluded.893 
However, the CJEU in Toshiba, a ruling by the Grand Chamber, contrary to the opinion of the 
AG Kokkot, reaffirmed the validity of the three-fold approach to assess the applicability of 
the ne bis in idem principle in the area of competition.894 The CJEU’s approach to ne bis in 
idem in the area of competition protects the application of national competition and 
regulatory laws. This is because “the legal interest protected changes when considered from 
the perspective of different sovereign States,”895 and therefore, ne bis in idem is ruled out. As 
such diversity is favoured. As observed by Nazzini,  
“[t]he requirement of the identity of the legal interest protected comes 
into play to rule out the application of the ne bis in idem principle to 
offences committed by the same person and arising out of the same facts 
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in different legal systems, as different legal systems are assumed to 
protect competition within their own national markets,896 or to offences 
committed in violation of rules aimed at achieving different regulatory or 
policy objectives, such as, for example, competition rules, on the one 
hand, and rules in the areas of tele-communications regulation897 or 
patent law,898 on the other.”899 (References from the original) 
I agree with the approach of the CJEU and argue that a change of the three-step test to a 
two-step test under which the “unity of the legal interest protected” is not possible under 
Article 6(1) TEU, as it changes the system of competences of the EU. 
In accordance with the second sentence of Article 6(1) TEU: 
“The provisions of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union] shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as 
defined in the Treaties.” 
Ultimately, the aim of prohibiting the extension of the competences of the EU is to safeguard 
the principle of conferral.900  
It has been previously submitted that the competence to legislate on substantive principles 
of EU competition law and the competence to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is shared. 
Furthermore, under Article 104 TFEU and Article 3(1) Regulation 1/2003, Member States 
must apply national competition laws in parallel with EU competition law. A change of the 
test of ne bis in idem regarding EU competition law will imply the exclusion of one sphere of 
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competence as only one set of competition laws could be applicable. As Member States 
cannot apply national competition laws to practices that are prohibited under Article 101 
and 102 TFEU without applying EU competition law,901 the sphere of competence excluded 
would be the national one. EU competition law would be the only one applicable in the 
internal market. This is an extension to the competences of the EU as defined in the Treaties 
and therefore prohibited under Article 6(1) TFEU. 
The impact of the principle of ne bis in idem that does not take into consideration the “unity 
of the legal interest protected”, in the competence of the EU in the area of competition policy 
as defined by the Treaties is confirmed by the Advocate General Kokkot in her view in the 
Opinion procedure 2/13 on the Accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.902 She 
considered however, that no changes would occur as “the draft agreement does not even 
cover Protocol No 7 to the [Convention]. Thus the EU will not, by virtue of its accession to 
the [Convention], assume any obligations under international law as regards ne bis in idem. 
It follows that there would be no need to take action in relation to ne bis in idem in the light 
of the accession to the [Convention] that is currently proposed even if — contrary to my view 
— the assumption was made that at present the conception of this legal principle in EU 
competition law does not (yet) fully correspond to that applied by the ECtHR in criminal 
cases.” 
The parallel application of national competition laws and the EU competition rules is not 
excluded by the ne bis in idem principle.  
                                                             
901 Article 3(1) Regulation 1/2003.  




Despite the constitutional arrangements in the competition field allowing action both by the 
Member States and by the Union as shown above, it could be argued that diversity in EU 
competition law would be excluded by  general principles of EU law of direct effect, primacy 
and Ne bis in idem. However, a close analysis of these principles under the case law of the 
CJEU undertaken in this chapter allows us to reach a different conclusion though.  
The direct effect of the Treaty’s competition provisions does not excludes discretion of the 
Member States to set priorities in the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Different 
approaches to EU competition law can take place depending on the priorities set to its 
enforcement. Moreover, diversity is not contrary to the justiciability of these provisions by 
the CJEU. Therefore, the balance between competition and other public interests may vary 
at the Member States’ level.  
Finally, when it comes to the primacy of EU competition law over national laws, the way the 
CJEU adjudicates conflicts, allows divergent national competition rules to exist. This 
conclusion is not jeopardised by the principle of ne bis in idem as protected under the 






Chapter 6 - Conclusions: Analysing reality 
without a magnifying glass - The case for 
diversity in EU competition law 
This thesis asks the question whether diversity in EU competition law is possible from a 
constitutional point of view?  
In 1962 the CJEU declared the direct effect of EU competition provisions, and in 1969 their 
supremacy, over national laws. The Treaty of Lisbon declared the competence to establish 
the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market as exclusive to the 
EU, from 1 December 2009. On this ground, the literature assumes that under the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the competence as regards EU competition law is exclusive to the Union, even if some 
authors have criticised this choice. Diversity in EU competition law would be excluded lex 
lata, as where a competence is exclusive to the EU, only the EU can legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts, Member States being able to do so themselves only if empowered by the Union 
or when implementing Union’s acts. Moreover, the majority of the literature also considers 
that any chance of diversity in EU competition law would in any case be excluded by the 
general principles of direct effect and primacy of EU competition law, as they require a 
uniform implementation of the EU law, or by the principle of ne bis in idem that prevents the 
simultaneous application of national and EU competition law.  
This thesis however, has reached a radically different conclusion. This thesis concludes that 
the competence to legislate on substantive principles of EU competition law is shared under 
the Treaties and so is the competence to enforce EU competition law. It also showed that 
diversity is not anathema to direct effect and the primacy of EU competition law, or in any 
way excluded by the principle of ne bis in idem. These conclusions are grounded in two major 
blocks: first a close analysis of the system of competences introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon 
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and second a close analysis of the relevant general principles of EU law in the light of the 
case law.  
Section 1 of this conclusions sums up the main findings of the thesis, the constitutional 
grounds and the practical implications. The following sections put forward four axes of action 
that can be taken to stimulate diversity in EU competition law without the need the change 
the Treaties.  
Section 2 explores unlawful bottlenecks to achieve diversity introduced by Regulation 
1/2203 and that should be removed. Such is the case of Article 3(1), which establishes a 
prohibition for stricter national competition rules on agreements, concerted practices and 
decision of association of undertakings. Such is also the case of Article 5 of that Regulation, 
which precludes national competition authorities from determining that there is no violation 
of Article 101 and 102 TFEU.  
Next, Section 3 identifies potential bottlenecks to achieve diversity that should be avoided 
and insists that future EU legislation on substantive principles of EU law be adopted on the 
correct legal basis: article 352 TFEU, and not article 114 TFEU as wrongly proposed by the 
Commission on its recent proposal for a Directive to empowered Member States to be more 
effective enforcers, also known as the ECN+ Directive. Article 352 TFEU requires unanimity 
whereas article 114 TFEU only requires a qualified majority. The former protects diversity 
more as it gives Member States a veto power. 
Section 4 presents a set of proposals to reform coordination among national competition 
authorities and the Commission to enforce EU competition rules, replacing the Commission’s 
vertical coordination in the European Competition Network by multilateral coordination at 
the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Abuse of Dominance Level.  
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Finally, Section 5  puts forward two radical measures that can always be taken to achieve 
diversity in EU Competition law: the use of Article 20 TEU to develop EU competition law and 
policy and the suspension or the abolition of Regulation 1/2003.  
1. The constitutional grounds for diversity in EU competition 
law 
EU law in general, and EU competition law in particular are riddle with conflictual dynamics. 
Townley identified the regulatory challenges that potentiate conflicts in EU competition law 
and policy. In brief, Member States have different views on harnessing or controlling the 
functioning of markets and market power and so does the EU. This may require different 
standards under competition law. Also, different Member States and the EU may value the 
public interest differently. This has an impact on how the balance between competition and 
other public policy considerations is made. Even if there is agreement on the value of a public 
interest, Member States and the EU may wish to address the issue in different ways. 
Furthermore, the way competence is allocated in the EU may require the intervention of a 
plurality of legal sources located at different levels, making contradictory demands. Finally, 
the fundamental transformation of business models – including the digital economy – 
requires an increasingly complex analysis that may give rise to conflicting solutions on the 
enforcement of EU competition law. In the eventuality of a conflict in EU competition law 
the constitutional issue is whether a uniform solution across the EU is required, or whether 
different solutions at national level are possible or, to a certain extent via different 
interpretations of EU law. This will depend on how the competence between the EU and the 
Member States in the field of competition is allocated (first building block) as well any limits 
the general principles of EU law may impose in the implementation of EU competition law 
(second building block).  
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First building block – The system of competences introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon 
The key question in the field of competition law is whether the competence in this sphere 
has in fact become exclusive to the Union under article 3(1)(b) TFEU. A close analysis to the 
system of competences introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon reveals that Article 3(1)(b) TFEU 
excludes more from the scope of the EU exclusive competence in EU competition law than 
it includes. This Article limits the conferral of competences to the Union in competition law 
to what is necessary for the functioning of the internal market. Member States remain solely 
competent to establish competition rules applicable to situations that affect the national 
territory only, as per article 4(1) TEU. Furthermore, Article 3(1)(b) TFEU concerns legislative 
competence only, as it refers to the competence to establish rules. The executive power to 
enforce those rules is shared under Article 105 TFEU as per Article 4(1) TFEU. Finally, Article 
2(1) TFEU requires that the scope and the arrangements for exercising a competence are 
determined by the legal bases established by the Treaties related to each area. In the case 
of EU competition law applicable to undertakings, the relevant legal bases are Articles 103, 
105(3) and 106(3) TFEU. None of them allows the EU to establish substantive principles of 
EU competition law. These articles concern the implementation of Articles 101, 102 and 106 
TFEU that are directly applicable. As such, implementing acts, even if of a legislative nature, 
cannot and do not determine the content of those provisions. The competence to establish 
substantive principles of EU competition law is conferred to the Union by Protocol (No. 27) 
on the internal market and competition law which in turn establishes Article 352 as the 
enabling legal basis for the Union to act. It is therefore a shared competence, exerciseable 
by the EU under an unanimity vote at the Council which protects the position of the Member 
States very much. This means that in case of conflict in EU competition law and policy, the 
answer depends on who is competent to act.  
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For example, the diversified approach to OTA parity clauses in the Booking.com cases 
explored above903, despite the criticism it raised in the literature due to the lack of 
harmonised enforcement of EU competition law at national level, is well founded on 
constitutional grounds. Such a diversified approach would also be possible regarding 
domestic MIFs of Visa and Mastercard discussed above, would national competition 
authorities have opted to do it considering the specificities of the national markets.  
Under the system of competences established by the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission has 
no special standing vis-à-vis the Member States when it comes to the implementation of EU 
competition rules. The executive competence to enforce EU competition law remains shared 
and so does the legislative competence to establish substantive principles of EU competition 
law. Therefore, national competition authorities enforce EU competition law in their own 
right and not mandated by the Commission. They interpreter EU competition rules according 
to the facts that they are called to analyse and within the limits set by the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU, that is the ultimate interpreter of EU law . In the same sense, going back to the 
MIFs case discussed above,904 a diversified enforcement of Article 101 TFEU regarding 
domestic MIFs deemed necessary to safeguard competition in different national realities, 
e.g. Portugal, was also possible. National competition authorities could have achieved a 
different conclusion regarding the compatibility of the level of domestic MIFs under Article 
101 TFEU, depending on the different national markets realities.  
Also, and for the same reasons, when it comes to the balance of competition against other 
public interest considerations, Member States may diverge on their approach. Wouters 
remains valid under the Treaty of Lisbon. We have seen that the EU Treaties are incomplete 
contracts in the sense that they do not provide a solution for the whole myriad of conflicts 
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that may take place in their implementation.905  Also, at national level, it can be necessary to 
balance national public interests with EU competition law. In Wouters the regulation 
adopted by the Netherland Bar Association prevented multidisciplinary partnership between 
lawyers and accountants. This was considered necessary to ensure the professional rules of 
the bar were respected and the lawyers remain independent and able to observe 
professional secrecy. The CJEU ruled that the regulation in question was a decision of 
undertakings for the purpose of applying Article 101 TFEU and restricted competition. 
However it considered that the restrictive effects of such regulation should be considered in 
the light of the objectives of the regulation in question (the integrity of the administration of 
justice) and “whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the 
pursuit of those objectives.”906   
Second building block: the limits to diversity imposed by the general principles 
of EU law of direct effect, primacy and ne bis in idem 
The second building block of the thesis examines three general principles of EU law - direct 
effect, primacy and ne bis in idem -  and concludes that a close reading of the CJEU case law 
shows that none of them excludes diversity in EU competition law.  
The CJEU confirmed the direct effect and primacy of EU competition law in early case law. 
Some authors consider that diversity would be excluded by the direct effect of the EU 
competition provisions as no discretion in the implementation of a self-executing norm is 
possible under the Van Gend en Loos test.907 Therefore, it is said that there is no margin for 
different interpretations of EU competition law or a different balance of competition against 
other public interest considerations. These authors however seem to ignore the fact that the 
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906 Judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 
EU:C:1969:4, paragraph 97.  
907 See the discussion in Section 1, Chapter 5, above.  
 257 
genesis of the direct effect of EU competition law is not the same as the one in Van Gend en 
Loos and does not relate to the content of the norms. When the CJEU recognised in Bosch 
the direct effect of EU competition law, it also recognised that the system of enforcement 
established under the Treaty was not of the nature to ensure a complete and consistent 
application of Article 101 TFEU. Nevertheless, that was not a reason not to recognise the 
direct effect of that norm. In any case, direct effect does not exclude the discretion to 
establish enforcement priorities. This allows diversity, as priorities can be related to the 
content of the norm directly. The divergence between the Bundeskartellamt and the 
Commission in the priorities for the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU are a good example. 
The prioritisation of the enforcement in relation to infringements that have an impact on 
consumer welfare, or the prioritisation of those cases that harm the competitive process 
instead, may lead to different approaches to Article 102 TFEU in cases such as predatory 
prices, for example. In any case, diversity is not against the justiciability of EU competition 
law, which is the ultimate test for direct effect. A different balance of public interest 
considerations by the Member States in EU competition law, such as within Article 101(3) 
TFEU is therefore possible, as recently confirmed by the CJEU in Ordem os Tecnicos Oficiais 
de Contas.908  
Turning now to the primacy of EU competition law, the relevant question is: when is a 
national law inconsistent with a EU norm?909 Constitutionalists refer to this question as “the 
problem of pre-emption.”910 When is national law pre-empted by the EU law? This depends 
on how conflicts between national and EU competition law are framed by the CJEU. This, in 
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turn, has an impact on the degree of diversity allowed in EU competition law, as under the 
primacy principles only national conflicting norms should be precluded by EU law. A close 
analysis of the case law allows us to conclude that the CJEU has correctly rejected a field pre-
emption theory in competition law, since Walt Wilhem911 confirms that there is room for 
simultaneous application of national and EU competition laws. Furthermore, when it comes 
to direct conflicts between EU and national laws the CJEU has correctly considered that 
stricter national competition laws are not in conflict with EU competition laws. Finally, where 
the Member States have not transferred competence to the Union in specific field, such as 
for example in the field of culture, to set aside national laws on the grounds of primacy of 
EU competition law could be contrary to the principle of conferral.912 
As regards the principle of ne bis in idem consecrated in Article 50 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, some authors read it as a limit to the parallel 
application of national and EU competition law, as it corresponds to double jeopardy. This 
thesis submits that this reading of the ne bis in idem principle is contrary to the principle of 
conferral and to article 6 (1) TEU since it would it would mean excluding national competence 
and the consequent extension of EU competence in competition matters. Parallel application 
of both sets of norms remains possible.  
 
2. Unlawful bottlenecks to achieving diversity 
There are several provisions in Regulation 1/2003 that are unlawful bottlenecks to achieving 
diversity and must be removed.  
                                                             
911 Judgment of 13 February 1969, Walt Wilhelm and Others v Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 
EU:C:1969:4. 
912 Monti, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy'; Schmid, 'Diagonal Competence Conflicts between European 
Competition Law and National Regulation – A Conflict of Laws Reconstruction of the Dispute on Book 
Price Fixing'. 
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Article 3(2) Regulation 1/2003  
Article 3 Regulation 1/2003 concerns “The relation between the EU and national laws” and 
paragraph 2, Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003 provides the following:  
“The application of national competition law may not lead to the 
prohibition of agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States but 
which do not restrict competition within the meaning of Article [101](1) 
of the Treaty, or which fulfil the conditions of Article [101](3) of the Treaty 
or which are covered by a Regulation for the application of Article [101](3) 
of the Treaty. Member States shall not under this Regulation be precluded 
from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national laws which 
prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings.” 
This paragraph has two contrasting rules regarding the interplay between national and EU 
competition law. It accepts stricter national rules on unilateral conducts while excluding the 
same possibility in respect of agreements, decisions of undertakings or concerted practices 
within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. 
Whereas 8 of the Regulation 1//2003 justify the need for contrasting rules as follows:  
“(…) In order to create a level playing field for agreements, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices within the internal 
market, it is also necessary to determine pursuant to Article [103](2)(e) of 
the Treaty the relationship between national laws and Community 
competition law. To that effect it is necessary to provide that the 
application of national competition laws to agreements, decisions or 
concerted practices within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty may 
not lead to the prohibition of such agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices if they are not also prohibited under Community competition 
law. The notions of agreements, decisions and concerted practices are 
autonomous concepts of Community competition law covering the 
coordination of behaviour of undertakings on the market as interpreted 
by the Community Courts. Member States should not under this 
Regulation be precluded from adopting and applying on their territory 
stricter national competition laws which prohibit or impose sanctions on 
unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings. These stricter national 
laws may include provisions which prohibit or impose sanctions on 
abusive behaviour toward economically dependent undertakings. (…).” 
 It has been established that, given the direct effect of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the Council 
has no power to determine the content of the competition principles established by Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU. It is bounded by the interpretation of the CJEU, that is the ultimate 
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interpreter of EU law. Further, the relation between those provisions and national 
competition law is determined by the primacy principle. It has been demonstrated in more 
detail that stricter national competition laws are not in conflict with EU competition laws. 
We have seen that when it comes to vertical conflicts, there is a conflict between a national 
law and the competition rules of the Treaty where the national law imposes a stricter 
standard than the one established by Article 101 TFEU.  As such, stricter competition rules 
on agreements, concerted practices and decision of association of undertakings are not 
excluded by the primacy of EU competition law. Article 3(2) Regulation 1/2003 however 
excludes the application of stricter competition rules to situations falling within Article 101 
TFEU. This amounts to an enlargement of the scope of Article 101 TFEU with the creation of 
a new competition law principle and harmonisation of national laws: all the agreements, 
concerted practices and decision of association of undertakings that are not prohibited 
under EU competition law are allowed in the internal market. By determining that stricter 
national competition rules, that are compatible with the EU law, cannot be applicable to 
agreements, decision of associations and concerted practices that affect trade between 
Member States but are not covered by the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU, the Council is 
enlarging the scope of this prohibition. This is a misuse of powers under Article 103 TFEU, as 
it corresponds, in substance to an amendment of the Treaty without following the 
procedures which it provides for that purpose.913  
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are EU primary law. As such, a change of their scope requires a 
Treaty’s amendment. Article 352 TFEU, that serves as the legal basis for the EU to enact 
substantive principles of EU competition law could also not be used.  
                                                             
913 Opinion of the Court of 28 March 1996, Adhésion de la Communauté à la CEDH, Opinion 2/94, 
EU:C:1996:140 
paragraph 30. See also Declaration (No 42) annexed to the Lisbon Treaty on Article 352 on the Treaty 
of the Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/351. 
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Moreover, under the subsidiarity principle, it is questionable that there is a need for 
harmonised competition rules on agreements, restrictive practices and decision of 
association of undertakings. Divergence as regards unilateral conduct is allowed, which 
means that business will keep facing non-harmonised competition rules in the internal 
market. Furthermore, stricter national competition rules on agreements, restrictive practices 
and decisions of undertakings do not endanger, on the contrary, they contribute, for 
“ensuring that competition is not distorted [in the single market].”914 
Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003should be annulled as it was adopted under the wrong legal 
basis – that of Article 103(1)(e), and no future harmonisation of national competition laws 
on agreements, restrictive practices and decision of undertakings seems justified.  
Article 5 Regulation 1/2003 and Article 3(1) TFEU  
Article 5 Regulation 1/2003 establishes the power of the competition authorities of the 
Member States as follows:  
“The competition authorities of the Member States shall have the power 
to apply Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty in individual cases. For this 
purpose, acting on their own initiative or on a complaint, they may take 
the following decisions: 
- requiring that an infringement be brought to an end, 
- ordering interim measures, 
- accepting commitments, 
- imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty provided 
for in their national law. 
Where on the basis of the information in their possession the conditions 
for prohibition are not met they may likewise decide that there are no 
grounds for action on their part.” 
Under this provision, national competition authorities are precluded from the power to 
determine that there is no violation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This is because “[a]ccording 
to the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Regulation, where on the basis of the information 
                                                             
914 Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition.  
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in their possession the conditions for prohibition are not met, the national competition 
authorities may decide that there are no grounds for action on their part.”915 This is 
“corroborated by the determination of the Commission’s decision-making power where 
there has been no breach of Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU. According to Article 10 of the 
Regulation, the Commission may by decision find that Articles [101 TFEU] and [102 TFEU] are 
not applicable.”916 
It has been established that competence to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is shared. It 
has also been established that there is a preference for action to be taken at the Member 
States’ level under the subsidiarity principle that remains applicable to EU executive acts. 
The limitation of the national competition authorities’ powers may have a significant impact 
on diversity in EU law and legal certainty of the parties. This is particularly true as regards 
the enforcement of Article 101(3) TFEU.  The argument that the limitation of national 
competition powers is necessary to guarantee a uniform application of EU competition law 
is not compelling. Different weights of public policy within Article 101 TFEU are accepted. 
Also, stricter national competition rules on cartels, restrictive practices and decision of 
undertakings are allowed by the EU legal order. Therefore, allowing national competition 
authorities to determine that there is no violation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU would not 
only respect the scheme of competences under the Treaties more as well as it would also be 
more in accordance with the principle that decisions shall be taken as closely as possible to 
the citizens in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. 
The impossibility to determine that there has been no violation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
also has another serious consequence on the powers of Member States with impact on the 
degree of diversity allowed in EU competition law. It precludes Member States from 
                                                             
915 Judgment of 3 May 2011, Tele2 Polska, C-375/09, EU:C:2011:270, paragraph 22. 
916 Ibid, paragraph 24.  
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enforcing stricter national competition laws on agreements, concerted practices and 
decision of undertakings. This is because, under Article 3(1) Regulation 1/2003: 
“[w]here the competition authorities of the Member States or national 
courts apply national competition law to agreements, decisions by 
associations of undertakings or concerted practices within the meaning 
of Article [101](1) of the Treaty which may affect trade between Member 
States within the meaning of that provision, they shall also apply Article 
[101] of the Treaty to such agreements, decisions or concerted practices.” 
Under Article 5 of the Regulation, national authorities are limited to “decide that there are 
no grounds for action on their part” if they consider that the conditions for prohibition under 
Article 101 TFEU are not met. They cannot take a decision under Article 101 TFEU. 
Consequently, they also cannot enforce national competition laws, even if, under national 
competition laws the agreement, restrictive practice or decision of association of 
undertakings would be considered unlawful. This is against the principle of conferral. We 
have seen that stricter national competition laws are not in conflict with EU competition law. 
The limitation of national competition authorities’ power under Article 5 Regulation 1/2003 
read in conjunction with Article 3(1) of that Regulation amounts to a de facto enlargement 
of the scope of Article 101 TFEU as it sets aside the possibility for the Member States to 
enforce stricter national laws. In the same terms, this is a violation of the principle of 
conferral. This does not apply in regard to abuse of dominance, as Article 3(1) Regulation 
1/2003 safeguards the power of the Member States to enforce stricter national rules on 
unilateral conduct: 
“(…) Member States shall not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting 
and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction 
unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings.” 
3. Potential bottlenecks to achieving diversity  
Future bottlenecks to achieving diversity can be avoided if legislative initiatives are grounded 
on the correct legal basis. The legal basis will determine the arrangements for the exercise 
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of EU competence. It has been submitted that, depending on the type of arrangements for 
the exercise of competence, the capacity of the Member States to influence a final result in 
a way that accommodates divergent views, varies. A legal basis that requires an act to be 
adopted by unanimity at the Council respects diversity more than a legal basis that requires 
a vote by qualified majority. Unanimity gives a veto power to every Member State, making 
an action at EU level less likely. It also gives the bargaining power to the Member States to 
introduce exceptions and safeguards to their divergent views.  
On 22 March 2017, the Commission presented a proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council917 intended to empower Member States' competition 
authorities to be more effective enforcers, also known as “ECN+”. The Commission proposed 
a double legal basis for the Directive: Articles 103 and 114 TFEU. To justify its choice, the 
Commission indicated that: 
“The current proposal is based on both Articles 103 and 114 TFEU because 
it pursues a number of goals which are inextricably linked, named to:  (1) 
give effect to the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by 
empowering NCAs to be more effective enforcers; (2) ensure that 
competition in the internal market is not distorted and consumers and 
undertakings are not put at a disadvantage by national laws and 
measures which prevent NCAs from being effective enforcers; (3) ensure 
that the same guarantees and instruments are in place for national 
competition law when it is applied in parallel to Articles 101 and 103 TFEU 
to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field; and (4) put in place 
effective rules on mutual assistance to safeguard the smooth functioning 
of the internal market and the system of close cooperation within the 
ECN”.918  
The Commission justifies the need to use Article 103 TFEU as  
“[e]nsuring that the NCAs have the means and instruments to be more 
effective enforcers of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU falls within the ambit of 
Article 103(1) TFEU as it is conducive to enduring the full effectiveness of 
the competition rules.”919   
                                                             
917 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament an of the Council to empower the competition 
authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning 
of the internal market, 22 March 2017, COM (2017) 142 final.  
918 Ibid, p. 5.  
919 Ibid.  
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However, according to the Commission 
“this legal basis does not itself suffice, because both the aim and the 
content of the proposed Directive transcend this legal basis. The proposed 
Directive has an independent objective of seeking to bolster the 
functioning of the internal market by (1) talking national rules which 
prevent NCAs from being effective enforcers thereby creating more equal 
protection of companies and consumers in Europe; (2) ensuring that the 
same guarantees and instruments are in place for national competition 
law when it is applies in parallel to Articles 101 and 103 TFEU to ensure 
legal certainty and level playing field; and (3) putting in place effective 
rules on mutual assistance to safeguard the smooth functioning of the 
internal market and the system of close cooperation within the ENC.”920 
According to the Commission the pursuit of the two-fold policy, one relating to the effective 
application of EU competition policy and the other to the proper function of the internal 
market (…) are inextricably linked [as] ensuring that NCAs are empowered to be effective 
enforcers necessarily means legislating to remove obstacles in national laws that result in 
uneven enforcement thereby distorting competition in the internal market.  
That is why the Commission considers that  
“These interdependent, though distinct aims, cannot be pursued 
separately through the adoption of two different instruments. For 
instance, it is not feasible to spilt the proposed Directive into a first 
instrument, based on Article 103 TFEU which provides NCAs with the 
means and instruments they need to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
and a second, based on Article 114 TFEU, that requires Member States to 
provide for the same rules for the application of national competition law 
when it is applied in parallel to the EU competition rules. For these 
reasons, the proposal is also based on Article 114 TFEU.”921 
The ECN+ Directive proposal contains proposals of procedural nature, such as rules on 
leniency, rights of defence of the parties to an investigation, rules on independence of 
national competition authorities regarding its resources and power to establish priorities as 
well as investigative powers. However, it also contains substantive concepts with a view to 
                                                             
920 Ibid.  
921 Ibid. p. 7. 
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harmonising national competition laws. That is the case of the concept of the notion of 
“undertaking” for the purpose of Article 101 and 102 TFEU: 
 “To ensure the effective and uniform application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, the notion of undertaking, as contained in Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, should be applied in accordance with the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union as designating an economic unit, even if it 
consists of several legal or natural persons. Accordingly, NCAs should be 
able to apply the notion of undertaking to find a parent company liable, 
and impose fines on it, for the conduct of one of its subsidiaries where 
such a parent company and its subsidiary form a single economic unit. To 
prevent undertakings escaping liability for fines for infringements of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU through legal or organisational changes, NCAs 
should be able to find legal or economic successors of the undertaking 
liable, and to impose fines on them, for an infringement of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union.”922 
The need for this provision came from the fact that in some jurisdiction, such as Germany, 
the addressee of a fine under the German law is a legal person.  Therefore, the action of a 
representative of another legal entity, even if it is a member of the same economic unit in 
EU terms, may not be attributed to another legal person, such as the parent of the company. 
The German national competition authority was nevertheless holding the parent company 
indirectly liable for an infringement committed by its subsidiarity under its supervisory duty 
of its subsidiaries’ activities.  This was because Article 130 of German Administrative Offenses 
Act establishes a duty on the representatives of a company to supervise its work force so 
that the company complies with its legal obligations. Though it can be argued that the fining 
of a parental company failing to fulfil supervisory obligations within a group of undertakings 
has a similar function to the European concept of parental liability, it is recognised that “the 
German law still falls short of the European enforcement system.”923 First, the parental 
liability is for the breach of a supervisory power, not for the breach of competition law. 
Second, it can be more difficult to establish a breach of the supervisory duty than to establish 
                                                             
922 Ibid, paragraph 31 p. 26.  
923 Konrad Ost, 'From Regulation 1 to Regulation 2: Enforcement of EU law by national sanctioning 
regimes an the need for further convergence ' (2016) European Competition Law Annual 2013 31, 35. 
 267 
the existence of an economic unit. Finally, the interpretation of the Bundeskartellamt 
regarding the supervisory duty of the parent company has repeatedly be challenged and 
therefore there is no certainty that it can stand in the future.924 This situation however seems 
to have been addressed in the recent reform of German Competition Act.925  
It could be argued that the Commission’s proposal relates to procedure, not substance. 
However it is submitted that a rule which enables substantial penalties and liabilities on 
entities that would not otherwise be liable has an effect on legal rights and obligations and 
thus is of substantive nature. 
As previously submitted, Article 114 TFEU cannot serve as legal basis to harmonising national 
competition laws. First and foremost, in Spain and Italy v Council926 the CJEU makes it clear 
that rules attached to the objectives set out in Article 26 TFEU, such those adopted under 
Article 114 TFEU are not competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
market. Second, the constitution limits affirmed by the CJEU to the powers under Article 114 
TFEU are relevant here. The first limit requires that the EU harmonise national laws, by 
replacing them and not creating parallel rights. Member States have exclusive competence 
to legislate on competition matters that are purely national, and that as such, are not 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market. Consequently, harmonisation measures 
must leave unchanged the national law applicable to the situations that are under the 
exclusive competence of the Member States. The notion of “undertakings” for the purpose 
of applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU coexists with the notion of “undertakings” for applying 
national competition law to situations that are national. The concept being the same is due 
to the choice of the national legislator, and is not indicative of EU law having the power to 
                                                             
924 Ibid, 36. 
925 9th amendment to the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, approved on the 31st of March 
2017, that introduced the EU notion of “undertaking’ for the purpose of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.  




harmonise the test. Otherwise there would be  a violation of the principle of conferral, as 
the exclusive competence of the Member States in respect of national matters would not be 
respected. 
Furthermore, the requirement that there must be an appreciable distortion of competition 
and that  EU legislation shall contribute to the elimination of obstacles to free movement or 
distortions of competition, is also not fulfilled. The ECN+ Directive does not eliminate 
possible distortions of competition between Member States, as it left unchanged the 
possibility for Member States to have more restrictive national competition laws. The use of 
Article 114 TFEU as legal basis for a legislative act in EU competition law in general and for 
the ECN+ Directive in particular is thus set aside.  
A legislative initiative that covers substantive principles of EU competition law must be taken 
in the use of EU residual competence under Article 352 TFEU. An act adopted under Article 
352 TFEU requires unanimity to be approved. Unanimity protects diversity more than the 
vote by qualified majority required under Article 114 TFEU.  
There is however a good argument against the use of a legislative act to harmonise the 
concept of “undertaking” for the purpose of applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU under 
national laws. The notion of “undertaking” for the purpose of applying Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU is an autonomous concept of EU law. As specifically mentioned in the ECN+ Directive: 
The concept of "undertaking" in EU competition law is established by the case law 
of the European Court of Justice. It means that different legal entities belonging to 
one "undertaking" can be held jointly and severally liable for any fines imposed on 
such "undertaking".927 
Where national administrations, such the national competition authorities, fail to apply EU 
law, this is a breach of the duty of loyal cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU. This is ground 
                                                             
927 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament an of the Council to empower the competition 
authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning 
of the internal market, p. 17. 
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for infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU. Therefore, the use of Article 352 TFEU 
is excluded in order to introduce a harmonised concept of “undertaking” for the purpose of 
applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The EU has the necessary powers under Article 258 TFEU 
to compel Member States to comply with their obligations under EU law.  Therefore, there 
is no space for a legislative act either under Article 114 TFEU or under Article 352 TFEU. The 
EU may take action under Article 114 TFEU only if a more specific legal basis for action is not 
available. Article 258 TFEU is a more specific legal basis than Article 114 TFEU, as it deals 
specifically with the situation of infringement by the Member States of their duty of loyal 
cooperation. Furthermore, the EU can use its residual competences under Article 352 TFEU 
to “attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties and the Treaties have not provided 
the necessary powers.” The EU has been granted enforcement powers under Article 258 
TFEU that allow it to address this situation. Therefore, the possibility for the EU to use its 
residual powers under Article 352 TFEU is also excluded.  
The risk of allowing ECN+ Directive to have Article 114 TFEU also as a legal basis is that it 
creates a precedent for other legislative initiatives regarding substantive principles in EU 
competition law to be taken under that provision. Article 114 TFEU would be transformed in 
to an “instrument of general governance.” This would represent a serious and systematic 
violation of the principle of conferral.  
4. Replacing vertical coordination by multilateral 
coordination  
The possibility for regulatory competition in EU competition law has been established, both 
at legislative and executive level. Power remains shared. Softer models of regulatory 
competition, such as “regulatory co-operation” and “co-ordinated diversity” have been 
presented as more beneficial particularly as regards EU competition law.  
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Both require a degree of cooperation and coordination among government levels. As stated 
by Townley, “[t]he aim is to encourage sufficiently commonality and expertise while 
simultaneously encouraging experimentation and accepting diversity in EU competition law 
and other areas too.”928 It has been shown in more detail that Regulation 1/2003 contains 
mechanisms of control and coordination regarding the enforcement of EU competition law 
by the Commission and by the Member States. However, depending at what level the 
enforcement takes place, these mechanisms vary considerably, in favour of a centralised 
vertical coordination by the Commission. When the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU takes place at national level, national competition authorities must notify the draft 
decision to the Commission, that can deliver an opinion.929 The opinion is not binding on the 
national competition authorities. However, under Article 11(6) Regulation 1/2203 the 
Commission can relieve national competition authorities from their competence to enforce 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by opening proceedings to investigate the same infringement. 
There is also the possibility for multilateral coordination. Article 14(7) of Regulation 1/2203 
establishes the possibility of an advisory committee to be called on a case being dealt with 
by a national competition authority, by the initiative of a national competition authority or 
the Commission. In such situation, the Advisory Committee does not issue opinions on cases 
dealt with by competition authorities of the Member States.  
When the enforcement takes place at EU level, there are some coordination mechanisms as 
well. Article 14(1) of Regulation 1/2003 establishes the obligation of the Commission to 
consult an Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions prior to the 
taking of decisions on individual cases under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Advisory 
Committee delivers a written opinion on the Commission’s preliminary draft decision that 
                                                             
928 Townley, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and for EU 
Law too)', 198.  
929 Article 11(4) Regulation 1/2003.  
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shall be taken under utmost account by the Commission. The Commission shall inform the 
Committee of the manner in which its opinion has been taken into account.930 The Advisory 
Committee may also recommend the publication of the written opinion, that shall be carried 
out by the Commission. An Advisory Committee can also be called at the request of a national 
competition authority of a Member State in respect of a case where the Commission intends 
to initiate proceedings with the effect of Article 11(6) Regulation 1/2003.931 The opinion of 
the Advisory Committee is not binding on the Commission that can take a decision under 
Article 11(6) Regulation 1/2003 disregarding it.  
Under the system of conferred powers as established by the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
Commission as no special standing when it comes to the enforcement and development of 
EU Competition policy. Executive competence is shared and so it is the legislative 
competence to establish substantive principles of EU competition law. Furthermore, a 
decision taken at national level corresponds better to the principle that action should be 
taken as closer as possible of the citizens, in accordance to the principle of subsidiarity. A 
multilevel mechanism of coordination corresponds better to this constitutional reality than 
a vertical system centralised in the Commission. The Advisory Committee is a multilateral 
mechanism of control and coordination. It allows all the parties with shared competence to 
have a close participation in the coordination of the enforcement and implementation of EU 
competition law. Diversity and experimentalism are more easily accepted when all parties 
have a chance to comment on the final outcome.  
The following changes to the current system under Regulation 1/2003 should be 
implemented.  
                                                             
930 Article 11(3) and (5) Regulation 1/2003. 
931 Article 14(7) Regulation 1/2003.  
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A decision of the Commission to initiate proceedings under Article 11(6) TFEU, when 
opposed by the national authorities concerned, should be always subject to an Advisory 
Committee whose opinion should be binding on the Commission. Furthermore, where the 
Commission deems necessary to enact an opinion on a draft decision of a national 
competition authority, that opinion should be given by the Advisory Committee and not the 
Commission. For the sake of efficiency, it is reasonable to have a centralised system of 
notification of draft national decisions enforcing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to the 
Commission. However, after the triage, when the Commission identifies a situation that 
would require the issue of an opinion, the Commission should call an Advisory Committee to 
deliver it. 
5. Radical measures to achieving diversity  
Two radical measures for achieving diversity can be envisaged by Member States. One is the 
use of enhanced cooperation pursuant to Article 20 TEU to develop EU competition law and 
policy. The competence to legislate on substantive principles of EU competition law is 
shared. Therefore, the possibility for an initiative of enhanced cooperation by Member 
States in the area of competition would not be set aside.932 For example, a group of Member 
States933 could establish enhanced cooperation for control of minority shareholding. The 
decision-making under close cooperation is restricted to the participating Member State that 
would be responsible for the development of the substantive content of EU competition 
policy in that area. The acts adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation only bind 
those Member States.934  
                                                             
932 Article 329(1) TFEU.  
933 Minimum 9 Member States, see Article 20(2) TEU.  
934 Article 20(4) TEU. 
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The second radical way to achieve diversity would be the suspension of Regulation 1/2003 
in general or regarding an economic sector in particular. As confirmed by the CJEU, in the 
absence of implementing measures under Article 103 TFEU, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are 
enforced according to the system envisaged by Articles 104 and 105 TFEU. This is because 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are directly applicable and the Treaty establishes the enforcement 
system directly. The enforcement of the EU competition principles under those articles is not 
dependent on an implementing measure. Under the enforcement system established by 
primary law, when the Commission finds an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can 
only “propose appropriate measures to bring it to an end.”935 The Commission cannot 
impose any pecuniary sanction. The enforcement of EU competition law would be mainly 
subject to the priorities of Member States. Moreover, under Article 104(1) TFEU, Member 
States “shall rule on the admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted practices and 
on abuse of a dominant position in the internal market in accordance with the law of their 
country and with the provisions of Article 101, in particular paragraph 3, and of Article 102.” 
There is no requirement under the Treaties for the national competition law to be 
harmonised with EU competition law. This means that, on the one hand, the enforcement 
would be subject to the priorities of the Member States. Different priorities of enforcement 
secure diversity. On the other hand, if under national law a certain type of behaviour falling 
within the prohibitions of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU is not prohibited, Member States will not 
enforce EU competition law. This is because under Article 104(1) TFEU they are required to 
apply EU competition law when they enforce national competition law. When there is no of 
national law, Member States do not need to open proceedings to enforce it. As such, the 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU will also be excluded. This would be the ultimate 
way of introducing diversity in EU competition law, quickly and in a manner fully compatible 
                                                             
935 Article 105(2) TFEU.  
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with the Treaties. This can be useful as, in solving conflicts in EU competition law, time is of 
the essence.  
6. Future research work 
Having set the case for diversity in EU competition law, there are several possible lines of 
future research work that deserve to be developed. Some topics of particular interest are:  
(i) the discussion on whether diversity in EU competition law is desirable;  
(ii) the debate on possible limits to the application of national competition laws 
steaming from the internal market freedoms;  
(iii) the discussion on the role national competition laws play in the fucntionaing of 
the internal market, and 
(iv) the development of new a new legal and institutional framework for 
cooperation between national competition authorities and the Commission 







Bhatia VK and others, Vagueness in Normative Texts (Peter Lang 2005) 
Bishop S and Walker M, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and 
Measurement (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 
Bouterse RB, Competition and integration: what goals count ? (Kluwer 1994) 
Cengiz F, Antitrust Federalism (Routledge 2013) 
Chalmers D, Davies G and Monti G, European Union Law - Text and Materials (3rd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2014) 
Cini M, The European Commission: leadership, organisation and culture in the EU 
administration (Manchester University Press 1996) 
Coase RH, The firm, the market, and the law (University of Chicago Press 1988) 
Cook JC and Kerse CS, EC Merger Control (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 
Craig P, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press 2011) 
Craig P, EU Administrative law (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Craig P and Búrca Gd, EU Law Text, Cases and Materials (Fourth Edition edn, Oxford 
University Press 2008) 
Cremona M, Market integration and public services in the European Union (Oxford University 
Press 2011) 
Dashwood A and others, Wyatt and Dashwood's European Union law (6th edn, Hart 2011) 
De Visser M, Network-Based Governance in EC Law (Hart 2009) 
Deringer A, The Competition Law of the European Economic Community (Commerce Clearing 
House, Inc 1968) 
Dixit AK, The making of economic policy : a transaction-cost politics perspective (MIT Press 
1999) 
Dworkin RM, Taking rights seriously (Harvard University Press 1986) 
Evans DS and Schmalensee R, Paying with Plastic:  the Digital Revolution in Buying and 
Borrowing (MIT Press 2005) 
Fon V and Parisi F, The Economics of Lawmaking (Oxford University Press 2009) 
Fritsch M and Hansen H, Rules of competition and East-West integration ( Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 1997) 
Galligan D, Discretionary Powers: a Legal Study of Official Discretion, (Clarendon Press 1990) 
Gerber DJ, Law and competition in twentieth century Europe protecting Prometheus (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 
Goyder J and Albors-Llorens A, Goyder’s EC competition law (Oxford University Press 2009) 
Hart HLA, The concept of law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 1994) 
Hayes-Renshaw F and Wallace HS, The Council of Ministers (Houndmills England/Palgrave 
Macmillan 2006) 
Hofman HCH, Rowe GC and Türk AH, Administrative Law and Policy of the European Union 
(Oxford University Press 2012) 
Jones A and Sufrin B, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases & Materials (6th edn, Oxford 
University Press) 
Kelsen H, General theory of law and state (Harvard University Press 1949) 
Kingsford RJL, The Publishers Association 1896-1946 (Cambridge University Press 1970) 
Lenaerts K, Le juge et la Constitution aux États-Unis d'Amérique et dans l'ordre juridique 
européen (Bruylant 1988) 
Lenaerts K and others, European Union Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 
Majone G, Europe as the Would-be World Power: The EU at Fifty (Cambridge University Press 
2010) 
Majone G, Rethinking the union of Europe post-crisis : has integration gone too far? 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 
 276 
Milgrom P and Roberts J, Economics, Organization and Management (Prentice-Hall 1992) 
Monti G, EU Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 
Motta M, Competition policy : Theory and practice (Cambridge University Press 2004) 
Ojala M, The competition law of Central and Eastern Europe (Sweet & Maxwell 1999) 
Pallieri GB, Il mercato economico commune e la legislazione italiana antimonopolistica, 
Diritto Intrenazionale (1959) 
Polanyi K, The Great Transformation: The political and Economics of Our Time (2nd edn, 
Beacon 2007) 
Rodger BJ and MacCulloch A, Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK (Canvendish 
Publishing 2001) 
Sauter W, Public Services in EU Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 
Schütze R, Sharpening the separation of powers through a hierarchy of norms? Reflections 
on the draft constitution Treaty’s regime for legislative and executive law-making (Working 
Paper 2005/W-01, EIPA 2005) 
Schütze R, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
Sierra JLB, Exclusive rights and state monopolies under EC law: Article 86 (formerly Article 90) 
of the EC Treaty (Oxford University Press 2000) 
Sweet AS, Governing with judges constitutional politics in Europe (Oxford University Press 
2000) 
Szyszczak EM, The regulation of the State in competitive markets in the EU (Hart 2007) 
Teubner G, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 
Townley C, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Bloomsbury Publishing 2009) 
Tridimas T, The General Principles of EU Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 
Tsebelis G, Veto players how political institutions work (Princeton University Press 2002) 
Waelbroeck M and Frignami A, Commentaide J. Megret, Concurrence vol 4 (PULB 1997) 
Weatherill S, Law and integration in the European Union (Clarendon Press / Oxford University 
Press 1995) 
Whish R and Bailey D, Competition Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 
Bellamy C, 'Mergers outside the scope of the new mergers regulation – implications of the 
Philip Morris judgement' in Hawk BE (ed), Fordham Corporate Law Institute (1989) 
Búrca Gd, 'Sovereignty and the Supremacy Doctrine of the European Court of Justice' in 
Walker N (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006) 
Dagtoglou PD, 'The Legal Nature of the European Community' in Communities CoE (ed), 
Thirty Years of Community Law (1981) 
Damien G and Hery D, 'Competition Law in the New Member States - Where Do We Come 
From? Where Do We Go?' in Geradin D (ed), Modernisation and enlargement: two major 
challenges for EC Competition Law (Intersentia 2005) 
de Búrca G, 'Proportionality and Subsidiarity in General Principles of Law' in Bernitz U and 
Nergelius J (eds), General Principles of EC Law (Kluwer Academic Publishing 2000) 
de Búrca G and Scott J, 'Introduction ' in de Búrca G and Scott J (eds), Constitutional Change 
in the EU from Uniformity to Flexibility? (Hart 2000) 
de Witte B, 'The cultural dimension of Community law', Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law (Kluwer Law International 1993) 
de Witte B, 'The Role of  Institutional Principles in the Judicial Development of the EU Legal 
Order' in Snyder F (ed), The Europeanisation of Law: The legal effects of European integratio 
(2000) 
de Witte B, 'Direct effect, supremacy and the nature of legal order' in Craig PdB, Gráinne 
(ed), The evolution of EU law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 
 277 
Esty DC and Geradin D, 'Regulatory Co-operation' in Esty DC and Geradin D (eds), Regulatory 
competition and economic integration: comparative perspectives (Oxford University Press 
2001) 
Forrester IS, 'A Bush in Need of Pruning: the Luxurian Growth of “Light Judicial Review” ' in 
Ehlermann C-DM, Mel (ed), European competition law annual 2009 : the evaluation of 
evidence and its judicial review in competition cases (Hart Publishing 2010) 
Fox E, 'Antitrust Law on a Global Scale: Races Up, Down, and Sideways' in Esty DC and Geradin 
D (eds), Regulatory competition and economic integration: comparative perspectives (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 
Hallstein W, 'Europäische Redes' in Oppermann T (ed), European Speeches of Walter 
Hallstein (Deutsche Verl.-Anst 1979) 
Hegemann, 'Voting, statements and coalition-building in the Council from 1999 to 2006' in 
Naurin D and Wallace HS (eds), Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games 
Government Play in Brussels (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 
Jans JH and Prinssen JM, 'Direct Effect: Convergence or Divergence?' in Prinssen JM and 
Schrauwen A (eds), Direct Effect: Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine (Europa Law 
Publishing 2004) 
Joerges C, 'The Law’s Problems with the Governance of the European Market' in Joerges C 
and Dehousse R (eds), Good governance in Europe's integrated market (Oxford University 
Press 2002) 
Joerges C and Falke J, 'The Social Embeddedness of Transnational Markets: Introducing and 
Structuring the Project' in Joerges C and Falke J (eds), Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the 
Potential of Law in Transnational Markets (Hart 2011) 
Krisov, Ehlermann C-D and Weiler JHH, 'Organs and the decision-making process in the 
United States and in the European Community' in Cappelletti M, Seccombe M and Weiler J 
(eds), Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience Vol 1: Methods, 
Tools and Institutions (1986) 
Kumm M, 'The Moral Point of Constitutional Pluralism' in Dickson J and Eleftheriadis P (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Lenaerts K and Verhoeven A, 'Institutional Balance as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU 
Governance' in Joerges C and Dehousse R (eds), Good governance in Europe's integrated 
market (Oxford University Press 2002) 
Lianos I, 'Competition law in the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon' in Ashiagbor D, 
Countouris N and Lianos I (eds), The European Union After the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 
Lindahl H, 'Sovereignty and Representation in the European Union' in Walker N (ed), 
Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006) 
Lindseth P, 'Delegation is Dead, Long Live Delegation: managing the democratic disconnect 
in the European market-polity' in Joerges C and Dehousse R (eds), Good Governance in 
Europe's Integrated Market (OUP 2002) 
Mattila M, 'Voting and Coalition in the Council after the enlargement' in Naurin D and 
Wallace HS (eds), Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games Government Play in 
Brussels (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 
Monti G, 'Legislative and Executive Competence in Competition Law' in Azoulai Lc (ed), The 
question of competence in the European Union (Oxford University Press 2014) 
Naurin D and Wallace HS, 'How should we best study the Council of Ministers' in Heisenberg 
D (ed), Unveiling the Council of the European Union: Games Government Play in Brussels 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 
Poiares Maduro M, 'Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action' in 
Walker N (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006) 
 278 
Prechal S, 'Direct Effect, Indirect Effect, Supremacy and the Evolving Constitution of the 
European Union' in Bernard C (ed), The fundamentals of EU law revisited: Assessing the 
Impact of the Constitutional Debate (Oxford University Press 2007) 
Serena Rossi L, 'Does the Lisbon Treaty Provide a Clearer Separation of Competences 
between EU and Member States?' in Biondi A, Eeckhout P and Ripley S (eds), EU Law After 
Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Sierra JLB, 'Article 106 - Exclusive or Special Rights and Other Anti-Competitive State 
Measures' in Faull J and Nikpay A (eds), Faull and Nikpay: The EU Law of Competition (3rd 
edn, Oxford University PRess 2014) 
Streit ME and Mussler W, 'European economic and social constitutionalism after the Treaty 
of Lisbon' in Snyder F (ed), Constitutional Dimensions of European Economic Integration 
(Kluwer Law International 1996) 
Townley C, 'Co-ordinated Diversity: Revolutionary Suggestions for EU Competition Law (and 
for EU Law too)' in Eeckhout P and Tridimas T (eds), Yearbook of European Law, vol 33 
(Oxford Universtiy Press 2014) 
Townley C, 'Constitutional limits to diversity (and Co-ordinated diversity) in EU competition 
law', Draft manuscript with the author (2017) 
Townley C, 'The EU Constitutional Order and Competition Law', Draft manuscript with the 
autho (2018) 
Türk AH, 'Lawmaking after Lisbon' in Biondi A, Eeckhout P and Ripley S (eds), EU Law after 
Lisbon (Oxford University Press 2012) 
Vesterdorf B, 'Certain reflections on recent judgments reviewing Commission merger control 
decisions' in Hoskins M, Robinson W and Edward DAO (eds), A true European - Essays for 
judge David Edward (Hart 2003) 
von Bogdandy A and Bast J, 'The Federal Order of Competences' in Publishing H (ed), 
Principles of European Constitutional Law (2011) 
Waelbroeck M, 'The emergent doctrine of Community pre-emption – Consent and 
delegation' in Sandalow T and Stein E (eds), Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives from the 
United States and Europe, vol II (Oxford University Press 1982) 
Walker N, 'Flexibility within a Metaconstitutional Frame: Reflections on the future of legal 
authority in Europe' in de Búrca G and Scott J (eds), Constitutional Change in the EU from 
Uniformity to Flexibility? (Hart 2000) 
Weatherill S, 'Beyond preemption? Shared competence and constitutional change in the 
European Community' in O'Keeffe D and Twomey PM (eds), Legal issues of the Maastricht 
Treaty (Wiley Chancery Law; United Kingdom Association for European Law; University 
Association for Contemporary European Studies 1994) 
Koremenos B, 'An Economic Analysis of International Rulemaking’' (American Society for 
International Law) 
Weiner SE and Wright J, 'Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and 
Determinants' (Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit Card Industries: What Role for Public 
Authorities?) 
Bank EC ECB Monthly Bulletin 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201209en.pdf> 
Bank EC, 'Technical features of Outright Monetary Transaction' ECB Press Release 
<eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html> accessed 6 September 
Bellamy C, 'ECHR and competition law post Menarini: An overview of EU and national case 
law' e-competition <http://awa2013.concurrences.com/business-Articles-
awards/Article/echr-and-competition-law-post#nh21> 
Council EP, 'Cross-border Interchange Fees: Why the General Court Got it Wrong in the 
MasterCard v. Commission Case' accessed 10 March 2018 
Montesquieu CdSBdLBed, The Spirit of Laws Book XI, Chapter 6 (1748) 
 279 
CMA, Online travel agents: monitoring of pricing practices results (2017) 
Union HoLSCotE, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market, Chapter 5: Competition and 
online platforms (2016) 
Arena A, 'The Doctrine of Union Preemption in the EU Single Market: Between Sein and 
Sollen' (2003) Working Paper 03/10 The Jean Monnet Center of International and Regional 
Economic Law & Justice, The NYU Institute on the Parks  
Aspinwall M, 'Government Preferences on European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five 
Theories' (2007) 37 British Journal of Political Science  
Beck G, 'The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice and the Euro Crisis – The Flexibility of 
the Court's Cumulative Approach and the Pringle Case' (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law  
Calabresi SG, 'A government of limited and enumerated powers": in defense of United States 
v. Lopez (Reflections on United States v. Lopez)' (1995) 94 Michigan Law Review  
Catalano N, 'Rapport entre les règles de concurrence établies par le Traité CEE et les 
législations des Etats Membres' (1963) Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé  
Chalmers D, 'Introduction: The Conflicts of EU Law and the Conflicts in EU Law' (2012) 18 
European Law Journal  
Craig P, 'Competence: clarity, conferral, containment and consideration' (2004) 29 European 
Law Review  
Craig P, 'Competence and Member State Autonomy: Casuality, Consequence and Legitimacy' 
(2009) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 57/2009  
Craig P, 'Pringle : Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology' (2013) 20 Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law, 2013  
Cross DE, 'Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community: A 
framework for analysis' (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review  
Cseres KJ, 'The impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the New Member States' (2010) 6 Competition 
Law Review  
Cseres KJ, 'Accession to the EU’s competition law regime: a law and governance approach' 
(2013) Working Paper Series 2013 – 07 Amsterdam Centre for European Law and 
Governance  
Dashwood A, 'States in the European Union' (1998) 23 European Law Review  
Dashwood A, 'The relationship between Member States and the European Union/European 
Community' (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review  
Devroe W, 'Limits of differentiation in European economic law: ne bis in idem and minimum 
versus maximum harmonisation' (2009) 16 Maastricht journal of European and comparative 
law  
Dougan M, 'The Convention's Draft Constitutional Treaty" a 'tidying-up exercise' that needs 
some tidying-up of its own' (2003) The Federal Trust for Education and Research Online 
Paper 27/03  
Easterbrook FH, 'Antitrust and the economics of federalism' (1983) 26 The Journal of Law 
and Economics  
Edward D and Hoskins M, 'Article 90: deregulation and EC law, reflections arising from the 
XVI FIDE Conference' (1995) 1 Common Market Law Review  
Ehlermann C-D, 'Quelques réflexions sur la communication de la Commission relative au 
principe de la subsidiarité' (1992) 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen  
Ehlermann C-D, 'Managing monopolies ; the role of the State in controlling market 
dominance in the European Community' (1993) 14 European Competition Law Review  
Ehrlich I and Posner RA, 'An economic analysis of legal rulemaking' (1974) 3 The Journal of 
Legal Studies  
Endo K, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors' (1994) 43 
Hokkaido Law Review  
 280 
Evans DS, 'The Economic and Regulation of What Merchants Pay for Carts ' (2011) 
Competition Policy International  
Everson M and Joerges C, 'Reconfiguring the Politics-Law Relationship in the Integration 
Project through Conflicts-law Constitutionalism' (2012) 18 European Law Journal  
Ezrachi A, 'Sponge' (2016) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement  
Fon V and Parisi F, 'On the optimal specificity of legal rules' (2007) 3 Journal of Institutional 
Economics  
Forrester IS, 'Due process in E.C. competition cases : a distinguished institution with flawed 
procedures' (2009) 34 European Law Review 817 
Freeman E, 'The division of powers between the European Communities and the Member 
States' (1977) 30 Current Legal Problems  
Gerber DJ, 'The Transformation of European Community Competition Law?' (1994) 35 
Harvard International Law Journal  
Gerven Wv, 'Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures' (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review  
Goebel RJ, 'The European Union grows: the constitutional impact of the accession of Austria, 
Finland and Sweden' (1995) 18 Fordham International Law Journal 1092 
Gori P, ' Applicazione paralela del diritto comunitário e del diritto nazionale in matéria di 
concorrenza' I Giurisprudenza Italiana  
Grimm D, 'Integration by constitution' (2005) 3 International Journal of Constitutional Law  
Hayes-Renshaw F, Aken WV and Wallace HS, 'When and why the EU Council of Ministers 
votes explicitly' (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies  
Hofman HCH, 'Legislation, delegation and implementation under the Treaty of Lisbon : 
typology meets reality' (2009) 15 European Law Journal  
Houin R, 'Consèquences civiles d’une infraction aux rèles de concurrence' (1963) Annales de 
la Faculté de Liège  
Jacobs DM, 'The Perfume Cases: concurrent Application of Community and National 
Competition Laws' (1980) Business Law Review  
Joerges C, 'The idea of a Three-dimensional Conflicts law as constitutional form' RECON 
Online Working Paper 2010/05  
Joerges C, 'Pereat Iustitia, Fiat Mundus: What is Left of the European Economic Constitution 
after the Litigation?' (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law  
Joerges C and Rödl F, 'Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European 
Integration: Reflections after the Judgement of the ECJ in Viking and Laval' (2009) 15 
European Law Journal  
Kovacic WE, 'Institutional foundations for economic legal reform in transition economies: the 
case of competition policy and antitrust enforcement' (2001) 77 Chicago-Kent Law Review  
Lasserre B, 'An interview with Bruno Lasserre' (2010) 13 Global Competition Review  
Lenaerts K, 'Some reflections on the separation of powers in the European Community' 
(1991) 28 Common Market Law Review  
Lenaerts K, 'Regulating the Regulatory Process: delegation of powers in the European 
Community' (1993) 18 European Law Review  
Lenaerts K and Van Ypersele P, 'Le principe de subsidiarité et son contexte : étude de l'article 
3 B du Traité CE' (1994) 1-2 Cahiers de droit européen  
Lenaerts K and Vanhamme J, 'Procedural Rights of private parties in the community 
administrative process ' (1997) 34 Common Market Law Review  
Linz JJ, 'Democracy’s Time Constraints' (1998) 19 International Political Science Review  
MacCormick N, 'The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now' (1995) 1 European Law Journal 259 
Majone G, 'Temporal Consistency and Policy Credibility: Why Democracies Need Non-
Majoritarian Institutions' (1996) European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No 96/57  
Markert K, ' Co-existence of Community and National Competition Law' (1974) 11 Common 
Market Law Review  
 281 
Mattila M, 'Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union Council 
of Ministers' (2004) 43 European Journal of Political Research  
Mayntz R, 'The architecture of Multi-level Governance of Economic Sectors ' (2007) 
Discussion Paper 07-13 Cologne: Max Planck-Institute für Gesellschaftsforschung  
Michaels R and Pauwelyn J, 'Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in 
the Fragmentation of Public International Law' (2012) 22 Duke Journal of Comparative & 
International Law  
Monti G, 'Article 81 EC and Public Policy' (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review  
Nazzini R, 'Fundamental rights beyond legal positivism: rethinking the ne bis in idem principle 
in EU competition law' (2014) 2 Journal of antitrust enforcement  
Odudu O, 'Article 81(3), discretion and direct effect' (2002) 23 European Competition Law 
Review  
Ost K, 'From Regulation 1 to Regulation 2: Enforcement of EU law by national sanctioning 
regimes an the need for further convergence ' (2016) European Competition Law Annual 
2013 31 
Pescatore P, 'International Law and Community Law - A Comparative Analysis ' (1970) 7 
Common Market Law Review  
Pescatore P, 'The doctrine of "direct effect": an infant disease of Community law' (1983) 8 
European Law Review 155 
Pescatore P, 'Public and Private aspects of European Community Competition Law' (1987) 10 
Fordham International Law Journal  
Ribstein LE and Kobayashi BH, 'An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Law' (1996) 25 The 
Journal of Legal Studies 131 
Scharpf F, 'The Joint-decision trap: lessons from German Federalism and European 
Integration' (1988) 66 Public Administration  
Scharpf F, 'The joint decision trap' (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies  
Scharpf F, 'The only solution is to refuse to comply with ECJ rulings' (Autumn 2008) Social 
Europe Journal  
Schiek D, 'The German Federal Constitutional Court’s Ruling on Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) – Another Step towards National Closure? ' (2014) 15 German Law 
Journal  
Schilling T, 'The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible 
Foundations' (1996) 37 Harvard International Law Journal  
Schimmelfennig F and Sedelmeier U, 'Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the 
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe' (2004) 11 Journal of European Public 
Policy  
Schmid CU, 'Diagonal Competence Conflicts between European Competition Law and 
National Regulation – A Conflict of Laws Reconstruction of the Dispute on Book Price Fixing' 
(2000) 1 European Review of Private Law  
Schütze R, 'Supremacy without pre-emption? The very slow emergent doctrine of 
Community pre-emption ' (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review  
Schütze R, 'Dual Federalism Constitutionalised: The emergence of Exclusive competence in 
the EC legal Order' (2007) 32 European Law Review 3 
Schütze R, 'From Rome to Lisbon: Executive federalism in the (new) European Union' (2010) 
47 Common Market Law Review  
Shaw J, 'European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic' (1996) 16 Oxford 
journal of legal studies  
Simms B, 'A new balance of power: is full political union of the eurozone the only way to stop 
the disintegration of Europe after Brexit?' (2016) 145 New Statesman  
Soares AG, 'Pre-emption, conflicts of powers and subsidiarity' (1998) 23 European Law 
Review  
 282 
Spaak F and Jaeger JN, 'The Rules of Competition Within the European Common Market' 
(1961) 3 Law and Contemporary Problems  
Tallberg J, 'Bargaining Power in the European Council' (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market 
Studies  
Teubner G, 'Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law' (1983) 17 Modern Law, Law 
Society Review  
Thatcher M, 'Varieties of Capitalism in an Internationalized World' (2004) 37 Comparative 
Political Studies  
Tiebout C, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures' (1956) 64 The Journal of Political Economy  
Toth AG, 'Is subsidiary justiciable?' (1994) 19 European Law Review  
Townley C, 'Inter-Generational Impacts in Competition Analysis: remembering those not yet 
born' (2011) 32 European Competition Law Review  
Tsebelis G, 'Bridging qualified majority and unanimity decisionmaking in the EU' (2013) 20 
Journal of European Public Policy  
Van Malleghem P-A, 'Pringle: A Paradigm Shift in the European Union's Monetary 
Constitution' (2013) 14 German Law Journal  
Verstrynge J-F, 'The relationship between National and Community Antitrust Law: an 
overview after the Perfume Cases' (1981) 3 Northwestern Journal of International Law & 
Business  
Waelbroeck M, 'L’application des règles de concurrence du Traité de Rome aux Pays-Bas' 
(1962) Revue du Marché commun 115 
Waelbroeck M, 'Le problème de la validité des ententes économiques dans le droit prive du 
marché commun ' (1962) Revue critique de droit international privé  
Weiler JHH, 'Community system: The dual character of supreanationalism' (1981) 1 Yearbook 
of European Law  
Weiler JHH, '60 Years since the First European Community—Reflections on Political 
Messianism' (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law  
Weiler JHH, 'The Political and Legal Culture of European Integration: An Exploratory Essay' 
(2011) 9 International Journal of Constitutional Law  
Weiler JHH, 'Van Gend en Loos: The individual as subject and object and the dilemma of 
European legitimacy' (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law  
Wils WPJ, 'The search for the rule in Article 30 EEC: much ado about nothing?' (1993) 18 
European Law Review  
Wils WPJ, 'The Principle of Ne Bis in Idem in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis' (2003) 26 World Competition  
Wils WPJ, 'The Compatibility with Fundamental Rights of the EU Antitrust Enforcement 
System in Which the European Commission Acts Both as Investigator and as First-Instance 
Decision Maker' (2014) 37 World Competition  
Wils WPJ, 'Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement, in Particular EU 
Antitrust Enforcement' ( 2011) 34 World Competition  
Woude MHvd, 'Article 90: "Competing for competence"' (1992) European Law Review ; 
Competition law checklist 1991  
Wyatt D, 'Community Competence to Regulate the Internal Market' (2007) Working Paper 
No 9/2007 University of Oxford Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series  
Kohl H, 'Helmut Kohl calls on EU leaders to take 'one step back' after Brexit vote' The 
Guardian (16 July) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/30/helmut-kohl-warns-
eu-leaders-one-step-back-after-brexit-vote > 
Newman M, 'Booking.com, Expedia and Others Escape Formal Probe in Poland' MLex (3 
November 2015) 
 283 
Petite M, 'EU commitment to competition policy is unchanged' Financial Times (27 June) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/72f53bd8-244a-11dc-8ee2-
000b5df10621.html?desktop=true&ft_site=falcon&siteedition=intl#axzz4sG5U4KX8> 
Chappatte P and Townley H, Online Hotel Bookings - A Joint European Approach or a Most 
Favoured Nation? (Briefing May 2015, 2015) 
International ES, 'France - Macron Law: A Focus on Online Hotel Reservation Platforms' 
(2015) <https://www.eversheds-
sutherland.com/global/en/what/articles/index.page?ArticleID=en/Competition_EU_and_R
egulatory/MACRON_LAW_FRANCE> accessed 31 May 2018 
Pringle T, 'Independent T.D. Donegal ' (2016) <http://www.thomaspringle.ie/deutsche-
welle-german-article-irish-mp-the-esm-is-destroying-the-eu/> accessed 20 July 2017 
 
